

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

FEBRUARY, 1932.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE.

IN the January number of this REVIEW, Sir Francis Young-husband summarised the results of last year's Round Table Conference. Since that article appeared the situation in India has developed so rapidly that there is need for carrying the story of events a little further and for attempting yet another analysis of the political crisis.

When Mr. Gandhi reached India he found the leaders of the Congress entirely unaffected by the atmosphere of mutual confidence that had prevailed in London; he found, on the contrary, that his followers were impatient to renew revolutionary activity and that they had already laid their plans for organising Civil Disobedience and a No-Rent Campaign. As a politician, Mr. Gandhi has always suffered from his inability to come to a decision, and on this occasion he attempted an impossible compromise between two opposite policies: he asked the Viceroy for an interview with a view to a peaceful accommodation, but, at the same time, threatened a renewal of Civil Disobedience, if his proposals were not accepted. The Government of India refused to obey Mr. Gandhi's dictation and acted with an energy to which they have long been strangers; they extended the repressive Ordinances, proclaimed the Working Committee of Congress an unlawful association, and placed its leaders, including Mr. Gandhi himself, under arrest. In addition, Lord Willingdon's Government issued a statement in which they put squarely before the Indian people the case against the Congress and then proceeded to show in temperate language that the maintenance of law and order was an indispensable condition of political progress. The arguments of the Government are unanswerable; disorder is not only a present calamity, but a threat to the very existence of the future constitution; it is, therefore, the duty of the present Government, as the official statement says, "to hand over to the new order a working administration and to resist with all their might forces which would create a state of anarchy and chaos."

It is well that these true words should have been spoken and vigorously enforced. Will they carry conviction to the great mass

of politically minded Indians and rally them to the support of lawfully constituted authority? That is the vital question of the moment. Indians who came into personal contact with British statesmen at the Round Table Conference probably agree with Mr. Sastri who said, in an eloquent appeal to Mr. Gandhi, "The British people often do wrong and take unwise courses. Nevertheless, in the long run, they return to the ways of reason and moderation. This is one of the occasions, it seems to me, that they are in a most winning and admirable mood. Take them now and victory is ours." But the great bulk of Indian politicians did not, of course, attend the Round Table Conference and their convictions have not been in the least modified. What we have to realise, unpalatable as it may be, is that the politicians of India are saturated with distrust of the sincerity of British policy. They do not believe that the British people really mean to entrust the government of India to Indians; they think that all the pother made in London over the difficulty of framing a federal constitution for India is only a pretext for not carrying out our promises. So reasonable a man as Sir Cowasji Jehangir thought it necessary to address a warning to Government about the dilatoriness of their procedure; in it he said: "Do not let the masses believe that non-co-operation is the only method of gaining liberty. Otherwise you will not have a friend left in India and you will wipe out those friends who throughout their life have stood by the British connection." A Madras newspaper, *Federated India*, declared that in so speaking Sir Cowasji represented "the view held by a large section of the public who abhor Civil Disobedience and, on the other hand, feel exasperated by the dilatory tactics of Government in unholy alliance with the Communalists."* The language used by the editor of *Federated India* can only fill Englishmen with bewildered astonishment; it includes such remarks as these: "Government's policy has been solely guided by a desire to stem the tide of nationalism." "The Government and the ruling race 'treated the arguments' of Indian Liberals as the effervescence of soda-water, a characteristic phrase of Lord Curzon's. The non-co-operation movement dissolved the Liberals; then the Government did not do anything to help the Liberals to fight lawlessness. Now the Government are hobnobbing and trafficking with Communalists." "It is a purblind Government that cannot see that their dilatoriness it is that lawlessness, in the garb of Civil Disobedience, thrives on." This, in my opinion, is an outrageously unfair description of England's policy in India. But there it is and we must look facts in the face. In a paper which has consistently opposed Civil Disobedience and has often criticised

* *Federated India*, December 2nd, 1931, Tondiarpet, Madras.

Mr. Gandhi with severity the Government of India is described as the ascendancy of a "ruling race" and it is alleged to be guided solely by a desire to stem the tide of Indian nationalism. How is this suspicious spirit to be exorcised? Resolute Government, necessary though I believe it to be, will not change this temper. We cannot expect active and helpful co-operation from "loyalty enforced by legislation and friendship by coercion," to borrow the words of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, a revolutionary whose vehemence cannot estrange from her the regard of one Englishman at least.

We must find a way out of this hopeless and intolerable position and such a way can, I think, be found. We have hitherto been attempting to do at one and the same time too very different things :

- (a) The transference of power from English to Indian hands.
- (b) The conversion of an autocracy into a popular government.

There is no reason whatever why these two momentous changes should be performed simultaneously; on the contrary, much may be gained by making them separately. Of the two the last is by far the most difficult and hazardous and I personally am not at all easy at the haste with which it is being rushed forward. But the first can be done almost at once; it requires no change in the legal constitution and nothing, so far as I can see, is to be gained by postponing it. The time is opportune for showing Indians that we are sincere in declaring that we do not desire to retain any vestige of racial domination in their country. To give practical proof of our sincerity I suggest that a large number of key positions in the Indian administration should be placed in Indian hands. My specific recommendation is that the Secretary of State for India should, as vacancies occur, submit to His Majesty the names of Indians and not of Englishmen to be Governors in a majority of the Provinces and to hold a majority of the portfolios in the Governor-General's Executive Council. If Indians were seen to hold the executive power in the Provinces and to frame the policy of the Central Government it would be difficult to maintain that India was being run by Englishmen in the interest of their own country. If this suspicion which is poisoning public life in India were once laid to rest it would then be possible to consider the framing of a constitution for India with the deliberation and freedom from passion which it assuredly requires.

Let us consider these two stages in India's advance towards responsible government more minutely. With regard to the transfer of power to Indians there are hardly any obstacles to a rapid advance. No racial discrimination is recognised in the Statutes affecting the government of India; there is therefore

nothing to prevent Indians from being appointed Governors of Provinces as soon as vacancies occur. As a matter of fact one Indian has already held such a post substantively and others have officiated for short periods. The situation as regards the Viceroy's Executive Council is equally unfettered by legislative restriction. The Council as at present constituted consists of seven members (including the Commander-in-Chief); if this number is retained I should like not less than four but preferably five to be Indians. The number of the Members of Council is not, however, limited by Statute and there would be considerable advantage in raising the number to nine of whom, in my view, six should be Indians. It is here worth while to consider what the Simon Report has to say about the Governor-General's Council. The Statutory Commissioners did not indeed recommend the extension of responsibility to the Central Government but they had a helpful habit of looking to the future and preparing the way for constitutional evolution. They saw that this Council would develop into the Cabinet of a Parliamentary Government and they dropped several hints and suggestions which might with advantage be developed now. Their first proposal is that the Governor-General should choose his own Council, which is common sense that must commend itself to every one. Their next suggestion is the creation of an additional member to hold the position of Leader of the Federal Assembly. This obviously gives an opportunity for appointing another Indian to the Council but it is recommended by the Commission on general grounds. The words of the Report are: "We think it very desirable that there should be included in the Governor-General's Council a Member not overburdened with departmental work whose primary function should be to 'lead the House.' . . . Nothing is more remarkable to an English Member of Parliament who has had the opportunity of watching the Legislative Assembly than the fact that a heavily burdened permanent official who is the head of the Home Department is also expected to discharge in the Legislature the duty of being the principal Government spokesman and of guiding the course of business so far as it falls to Government to do so. It is very much as though the permanent head of one of the principal departments in Whitehall should also undertake the Parliamentary functions of the First Lord of the Treasury."

Besides the Leader of the Federal Assembly there is obviously need for yet another member in the Viceroy's Council and that on grounds of administrative efficiency and not for the political purpose of finding places for Indians. The Statutory Commission's Report gives a short summary of the work the different members are now expected to get through; here is a list of the

responsibilities heaped upon one of them. "The Education, Health and Lands Department is also concerned with such subjects as local government, agriculture, forests, famine relief, etc., so far as these subjects touch central administration and responsibility, and in addition deals with questions concerning the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire." Seeing that the mastery of three such gigantic subjects as Education, Health and Lands would alone overtax the capacity of a super-man the enumeration of the Member's ancillary duties must be a piece of gentle irony. There is clearly work enough before the Governor-General's Council to keep another member actively employed. Another less important amendment may be mentioned here. The Viceroy's Council will shortly become the Cabinet of a Parliamentary Government; appointments to it will therefore be made for political reasons and not in accordance with the rules governing permanent Civil Servants. One such rule now prevalent is that an individual should not ordinarily hold the same appointment for more than one term, i.e. for five years. This of course is quite contrary to the practice of Democracy which employs its statesmen, like M. Briand, over and over again up to the last hour that health permits them to serve their country. The democratic practice should from now onwards be applied to Indian Members of Council; it would be a wise anticipation of the future needs of India to appoint such tried statesmen as Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to a second or third term of office in order to provide the future Parliament of India with a nucleus of men who had had a wide experience of the working of the administrative machine.

There is, as it seems to me, a great deal to be said in favour of the immediate appointment of Indians to the highest positions in the government of their own country; it is a policy to which we are already pledged and which must certainly be put into force with the coming of the new Government of India Act. Nothing is gained by delay. Those of my countrymen who dislike and distrust the whole policy to which we are pledged may exclaim that I am advocating surrender before we have come to the last ditch. That from their point of view is undoubtedly true, but I would urge that the collaboration of Indians with the old régime, even when it is expiring, is the best chance that now remains of handing on to the Ministers of the new constitution the methods and ideals which English officers have built into the framework of Indian administration. I admit without reservation that the impending changes are tantamount to a revolution; the vice of all revolutionary governments is their eagerness to make a clean break with the past, and it is this clean break which I am most anxious to avoid. The best chance of avoiding it that

I can see lies in the formation among Indians of a group of Elder Statesmen in whom the enthusiasm for change will be tempered by the experience of office.

I turn now to a consideration of the second item in our political programme, the transformation of an autocracy into a popular government. I have already indicated my alarm at the frantic haste with which it is proposed to bring about this momentous change. My hope is that if India's distrust of England's sincerity were appeased there would not then be the same desire as now exists to carry through this revolution at headlong speed. It is, I fear, no longer possible to avoid it. The politically minded in India certainly desire that the government should be "modernised." They protest even now, as Major Atlee said in the House of Commons, that they do not want to exchange a white oligarchy for a brown oligarchy; but there would not be the same passion for political change as there is behind the demand for national freedom; there would not, therefore, be the same impatience at the care and deliberation that ought certainly to be devoted to the framing of a federal constitution. It is mere petulance to deny that the great problems are still unsolved. The Round Table Conference has achieved much; both the Indian and British delegates displayed great qualities of statesmanship, but they failed to define the conditions under which the Princes will join the Federation and the manner in which the rights of minorities will be protected. It is mere verbiage to talk of safeguards unless we know what force there is to support these safeguards and in whose hands that force shall reside. I confess that I am quite at a loss to understand how the safeguards which Sir Samuel Hoare enumerated in the House of Commons are to be reconciled with the Central Government's responsibility to an elected chamber. I am not arguing that these problems are insoluble, but I do contend that much time and much patience will be needed for their solution. This is not only because these questions are intrinsically difficult but because they cannot be settled until some aspects of public opinion have been sensibly modified. Statesmanship has not only to find a right solution but to win over to that solution great blocks of humanity; that is a process which necessarily takes a great deal of time, but it is quite as important as the right solution. H.H. the Aga Khan and the other Moslem delegates to the Round Table Conference were quite right in refusing to agree to a compromise upon the Minorities question, because no compromise reached in London would have been honoured in India. A true leader is not one who strikes a bargain without consulting his followers but one who first satisfies himself that a certain course is wise and then

sets to work to convince his followers of its wisdom. When the rank and file Moslems and Hindus in India can be brought so near to a settlement as their representatives reached in London one of the obstacles to Indian autonomy will have been cleared away, but that result cannot be achieved in a hurry. Another question of great practical importance was almost untouched at the Round Table Conference. Provincial autonomy can hardly hope to succeed without a liberal readjustment of provincial frontiers, but the rearrangement of administrative areas demands patient examination on the ground and invariably takes a long time.

To sum up : I entirely sympathise with the demand of Indians to be masters in their own house and I wish to see them put into that position without delay under the terms of the existing constitution. On the other hand, the erection of a popular government upon a society which is neither national nor democratic, in the Western sense of those words, is a very hazardous and difficult task. Much hard thinking in the study and much propaganda among the people still remain to be done ; unless the foundations of the new constitution for India are well and truly laid the whole fabric will quickly collapse. To put contentious questions, unsolved or badly solved, into the body of the constitution is to foredoom India to disaster. The Fathers of the American constitution burked the question of slavery and it cost the lives of a million men in a later generation to make good their omission.

THEODORE MORISON.

THE WORLD CRISIS AND THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.

THE causes of the world crisis go back to the world war ; for the war has made the nations more fearful and suspicious of one another than ever before ; while war debts (including reparations) have intensified and aggravated the disunion of the world when its only hope of reviving prosperity lay in international co-operation. War debts (including reparations) are due in the main from Germany as the chief debtor, to the United States and France as the chief creditors. But for President Hoover's moratorium, most of the war debts and reparations payable in 1931-2 would have consisted of the sum of £83,000,000 (gold) flowing from Germany in the form of reparations, passing through France, Italy, Belgium and other countries which intercept £34,000,000, until at last £49,000,000 reaches the United States in the form of war debts. Part of this stream flows through Great Britain, but none of it stays there. But France retains £20,000,000, Italy £2,000,000, Belgium £3,500,000, and other countries £6,500,000. Such is the greater part of one year's instalment of a total debt exceeding in amount all the monetary gold of the world.

Because of international fear and suspicion, many countries have been trying since the war to become economically self-sufficient. They are anxious to depend as little as possible on other countries, in case another war might cut off indispensable supplies. Their policy of "economic nationalism" has led to high and variable tariffs—seven thousand more miles of tariff walls in Europe since the war. Behind these barriers new food stuffs have been grown and new industries developed without regard to the existence of sufficient supplies elsewhere. In this way the world's productive capacity has, for the moment, increased more rapidly than happens in normal times. There has followed an over-supply of certain commodities. When, for example, new regions of Europe are put under wheat, despite the fact that the normal expansion of the wheat-growing area of Canada would have sufficed to supply Europe's growing needs, a glut of wheat in North America is the inevitable consequence. Over-supply lowers prices and causes unemployment in the industries whose products can no longer be exported. This unemployment reduces consumption of other commodities, and so the unemployment spreads from one industry to another. The North American farmer who cannot sell his wheat, even at a very low price, cannot buy new tractors or continue to pay the instalments due on those he has already purchased. The manufacture of tractors, and of motor-cars, is

therefore curtailed; and the men who are thrown out of employment spend less money, so that the unemployment spreads to the textile and other industries. The value of industrial securities thus rapidly declines; and, in fact, the losses on the New York Stock Exchange during one month ending in the middle of November 1929 equalled the British National Debt—£7,000,000,000.

Faced by such colossal losses, and having regard to the political instability of Europe as shown by the unwillingness seriously to reduce expenditure upon armaments, it is no wonder that American investors ceased to send their money to Europe, and particularly to Germany. Since the collapse of the German currency in 1922, more than £800,000,000 (gold) had been invested in or lent to Germany, mainly by the United States and Great Britain. When the inflow of American money ceased, a large amount of German labour became unemployed, and this unemployment tended to spread to every country which had business relations with Germany. Moreover Germany, whose reparation payments had hitherto been made out of incoming investments and loans, had now to pay in goods or services or gold. Since tariffs put obstacles in the way of the free movement of goods, most of the payments had to be made in gold; and this led to the accumulation of gold in the United States and in France. By the summer of 1931 these two countries had acquired two-thirds of the world's monetary gold.

The consequent shortage of gold meant an increase in the value of gold in terms of other commodities, or a decrease in the value of these commodities in terms of gold. This world-wide fall in prices caused further unemployment, since no one wants to manufacture for profit goods which will cost more to produce than the price they will command when completed six months or more after the raw material has been bought and paid for. Thus unemployment increased until, in the spring of 1931, there were more than twenty million unemployed throughout the world. If the fall in prices and the consequent unemployment had, as is usual, brought down the average level of wages, the demand for currency would have become less and the amount of gold kept in the central banks might have been reduced. In fact, however, no such fall in wages took place. The demand for currency did not decrease, and as gold continued to flow to America and France, one country after another was forced off the gold standard. In so far as foreign creditors foresaw this result, their panic made it swift and sure. The assistance of the League of Nations must now be sought to solve the very difficult problem of stabilising world prices, perhaps by the adoption of a new monetary policy in place of the gold standard.

But, as we have seen, the present crisis is mainly due to international distrust on the one hand and to war debts (including reparations) on the other. There is no way out of our troubles unless these causes are removed. Nothing would do more to restore international confidence than the success of the first World Disarmament Conference when it meets this month. And the principal creditor country is not likely to agree to the cancellation of war debts until she realises that it would cost her less than she could gain from an all-round reduction in the scale of expenditure upon armaments. For both these reasons it is essential, if the financial and economic crisis is to be safely passed and is not to recur, that the Disarmament Conference should bring about a real reduction in the armies, navies and air forces of the world. By "Disarmament" I mean the reduction and limitation of national armaments by international agreement. I do not mean disarmament by example, or one-sided disarmament. Nor do I imply that a total disappearance of armaments is likely, or even desirable.

One other matter we must get clear at the outset: What are armaments for? Before 1914 the answer was easy. It is implicit in Canning's phrase—"Each one for himself, and God for us all"—which marked the return of Europe to "international anarchy" after Castlereagh's premature attempt at organising peace. Each State had then to provide for its own security by the greatest armaments it could afford. When, for example, Prussia proposed, in the middle of last century, to seize the Danish provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, the old King (afterwards Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse) observed that he had no right to make an unprovoked attack on Denmark. Bismarck's answer was "It has always been the tradition of the House of Hohenzollern to extend its territories." And the duchies became part of Prussia. For England the answer to the question: "What use are armaments?" was particularly easy. For more than one hundred years after Trafalgar, Britain enjoyed unchallenged naval supremacy, easily maintained because of her unrivalled position in finance and industry. Britannia ruled the waves, policed the seas, abolished the slave trade and put down piracy. Behind the sure shield of the Royal Navy, British merchantmen came and went in safety, while the future Dominions of the expanding and developing British Empire learned to live their own lives free and unafraid. But it is not every country that can be stronger than all the rest. The policy of Europe written in letters of gold on the Austro-Hungarian War Office in Vienna was "*Si vis pacem, para bellum.*" They prepared for war and in 1914 war came. The war set fifty-nine million men fighting. It also set many men

thinking for the first time about international problems. As they pondered over world affairs they realised that in the last hundred years civilised mankind had become a single society. On the economic plane the unity was an accomplished fact.

The World Society exists. We are members of it, whether we like it or not. Two-thirds of us in Great Britain are only able to maintain our present standard of life because of our fellow members of the world society overseas. If Great Britain were cut off from the rest of the world, two-thirds of the population of this island would have to disappear, or else our standard of life would have to be reduced to that of Indian coolies. We are Englishmen, citizens of the United Kingdom, citizens of the British Empire; but we are also members of a still larger society. And since there is a world society, there must be some kind of world government, to foster its interests and protect them when they come into conflict with private interests whether of individuals or of nations. Such thoughts as these were in men's minds when, at last, the war came to an end. Superbly phrased and stubbornly pressed by President Wilson, they formed the basis of the opening chapter of the treaties of peace. The Covenant of the League of Nations is the first World Constitution.

When I speak of a world government I do not of course imply the suppression of national or federal governments. The citizen of Northern Ireland has a government in Belfast which is supreme for certain purposes; he has another government at Westminster; and then there is the Imperial Conference, which has some resemblance to a government of the British Empire. The French-speaking citizen of Quebec has a government in Quebec with exclusive powers for that province; he has a national government in Ottawa; and again the Imperial Conference. Once more, the Dutch-speaking citizen of the Transvaal has, in addition to a Provincial Council with delegated powers in Pretoria, a national government in Cape Town; and again there is the Imperial Conference. For British citizens in different parts of the Empire already accustomed to two or three Governments, which do not get in one another's way but co-operate with and supplement one another, it is not difficult to understand the need for a third or fourth government which will strengthen and support all the rest and fill in the interstices between them, doing for the nations what they all want to do but cannot accomplish separately.

Sir Henry Maine said long ago that "The first business of a Government is to maintain order within the community which it pretends to govern." The first business of the League of Nations is to maintain order in the world. It could not hope to do that without the help, or at least the acquiescence, of the

United States. It is therefore well to remember the words spoken by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate soon after the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact: "It is inconceivable that America would stand idly by in the event of a gross breach of a multilateral treaty to which she is a party." The events of last autumn, when the United States were represented on the League's Council at Geneva for the purpose of preventing an outbreak of war in Manchuria,* show that Senator Borah was not speaking beyond the book. But how is the League to maintain world order? Article 11 of the Covenant provides that "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." How different might have been the fate of Denmark in 1864 if Prussia's threat of war had been treated as a matter of concern to all Europe!

The Covenant is reinforced by the Briand-Kellogg Pact which binds more than sixty States not to use war as an instrument of national policy and never to seek a settlement of their disputes except by pacific means. There are also the Locarno Treaties guaranteeing the western frontier of Germany, the Optional Clause binding most of the Great Powers to submit their legal disputes to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the General Act binding many nations, including our own, to submit political disputes also to arbitration. These and other instruments are the public law of the world, or of an important part of the world, to-day. Under this modern international law, the principal permissible uses of national armaments are

- (1) to maintain internal order and to police frontiers†; and
- (2) to co-operate in maintaining world order.‡

Everybody knows the difference between a police regulation which is unsupported by public opinion and a police regulation with public opinion behind it. The answer to the question: "How

* It is true that, in this instance, the League did not succeed in preventing Japan from having recourse to armed force, or from making successful use of it as an instrument of her national policy. But that success may be short-lived. The end is not yet; and when it comes Japan may regret that she used her sword to cut the Manchurian knot instead of asking the League to unravel it.

A further note on this subject is appended: see pp. 153-4.

† This is the only permitted use of the armies of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

‡ Including, of course, the preservation of territorial integrity and existing political independence against external aggression. The Lord Mayor of London, speaking in the Guildhall on March 24th, 1931, stated that the forces of the Crown now exist "for defence and for joint action with other League Members against any Power which has the criminal folly to break its Covenant and to start a war."

much armaments are needed to maintain world order? " depends upon how far public opinion supports the Covenant and the other treaties which bind the nations not to resort to war. In this matter, as in so much else, the nations of the British Commonwealth have shown the way to the States Members of the League of Nations. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales lately said of the nations of our Commonwealth :

They have solved the problem of Disarmament among themselves, for the question of making war against one another has been relegated to the scrap heap. Differences are settled not by resort to arms . . . but by friendly meetings and conversations round a table. . . .

Surely civilisation has by now reached a point at which we can believe that these facts have some meaning. If one-fourth of the human race can thus prove the practicability of a true League of united but independent nations, is it mere idealism to hope that the remaining three-fourths will be able to tread the same path?

It is important to realise the vital part played by public opinion in determining what armaments are necessary to maintain world order. So long as the nations accept the principle of " pooled security "—the defence of each by the strength of all—the position is one of stable equilibrium. Should any nation then build an unexpected cruiser, the other nations are grateful for this unforeseen contribution to world security, and regard it as a reason why each of them should build less. And the volume of armaments tends to go down. On the other hand, when nations are relying on their own armaments for their security the position is one of unstable equilibrium. Then the building of an unexpected cruiser by some one nation makes several others wonder whether it may not be aimed at them, and they all want to be on the safe side by building additional ships of their own. And the volume of armaments tends to go up. Indeed, if only one powerful nation prefers to rely for its security upon its own unaided armaments, while all the rest accept the principle of " pooled security," that one nation will tend to increase its armaments until the others, becoming suspicious, increase theirs also; and competition leads to war. The danger thus arising from excessive or unlimited armaments anywhere in the world is the reason for the first operative Article of the Covenant, which provides for the reduction and limitation of national armaments by international agreement. That Article has now been in force for nearly twelve years. Yet the reduction of armaments has not gone very far, if indeed there has been any reduction at all except in the case of the " vanquished " countries. Here are the official figures for all the Great Powers: they are taken from the *Economist* for July 18th, 1931, and they show the

expenditure on armaments (effective services only, without pensions) in millions of gold pounds, both before the war and in the year 1930.

				Percentage increase since 1909-13 Average per cent.	
			Average 1909-13	1930	
Great Britain	...	...	64	95.0	48
France	...	...	60	94.0	57
Germany	...	...	70	35.1	- 50 (decrease)
Italy	...	...	25	53.6	114
Russia*	...	...	76	118.9	56
United States of America	...	...	61.7	145.4	135
Japan†	...	...	19.7	48.0	143
Total, Great Powers			376.4	590.0	57

It will be seen that, apart from Germany, the actual expenditure by Great Britain has increased in a smaller proportion than that of any other Great Power. While it is quite true that a golden sovereign would buy far less in 1930 than during the five years before the war, these figures give very little support for the view that armaments—even British armaments—are materially less to-day than they were at a time of bitter competition when Europe was divided into hostile camps. In the case of Germany, the reduction of armaments is substantial. Her army, which was the greatest in the world, has been reduced to one hundred thousand men. Her navy is not permitted to include any ships of over ten thousand tons. She may not possess tanks or heavy artillery, and she is allowed no military aeroplanes whatever. But before Germany accepted the treaty which involved these restrictions, the German delegation made the following observations upon the military, naval and air clauses :

Germany is prepared to agree to the basic idea of the army, navy and air regulations . . . provided that this is a beginning of a general reduction of armaments.

It was to this observation that M. Clemenceau, in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, made the answer which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has said should be displayed on every hoarding in Britain in order to remind the British people of their pledge :

The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first step towards the reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.

* With pensions.

† Average 1910-14

Not much has yet been done to carry out this pledge. It is true that the Naval Conferences at Washington and London have limited the greatest navies in the world, and have thus prevented the cost of armaments from rising far above the present figures. But those figures are sufficiently alarming. The world is spending on armaments to-day no less than £2,000,000 a day, and this country's share is more than £200 a minute. Moreover, there is the danger of excessive and unlimited armaments.

It is in these circumstances, and after preparatory work by the League of Nations extending over many years, that the first World Disarmament Conference is going to meet on February 2nd, 1932. Not only the States Members of the League, but the United States of America, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and other non-Member States have helped to prepare for this Conference and intend to take part in it. Is it going to succeed?

The conditions of success are fast becoming clear. In the first place, France has stated, in a communication sent to the League in July 1931, that in order that the limitation of armaments may be carried into effect, "the principle of common action must supersede in the minds of the nations that of individual defence." There is here no necessary question of any new guarantee of security. But France has plainly told the other nations that, if she is further to reduce her own armaments, she must be able to rely upon them loyally and effectively to carry out all their pledges given in the Covenant.

Some years ago the British Government found it necessary to state that, owing to the risk of conflict with the United States, it was doubtful how far this country could fulfil some of its pledges under the Covenant. Since that time there have been great changes in the attitude of American public opinion and of the American administration towards the constructive organisation of peace and the prevention of war. There is now no longer any serious risk of America's armed assistance to a State which resorts to war in breach of its treaty obligations. The time has come for the British Government to make it unmistakably clear to foreign States that we accept the principle of common action and are prepared, in strict accordance with our pledges under the Covenant, to co-operate with the rest of the League in taking "any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." Let us not, however, imagine that France alone will benefit from "pooled security," or that Britain alone will pay into the pool what other nations will take out. We are often told that the British Navy does not now possess sufficient light cruisers and destroyers to protect our trade routes and to guarantee our essential food supplies and raw materials. But apply the principle

of "pooled security"—the defence of each by the strength of all—and freedom of navigation is at once assured. In this matter, as in so much else, world interests are British interests.

The success of the forthcoming Conference depends on Germany as much as on France. Although Germany has been a Member of the League of Nations since 1926, the German people have, as yet, very little use for the League. The League does not seem to them to deal justly. Unless this Conference brings about a real reduction in the armies, navies and air forces of the "victorious" Powers, and begins to effect equality between their armaments and those of Germany, there is a real danger that Germany may leave the League. Such an event would shake the League to its foundations, and imperil the future of our civilisation. But if the Conference can bring about an all-round reduction of armaments by 25 per cent., measured in money, within five years and if, as part of this reduction, it can remove some of the inequalities regarding particular weapons of warfare—ships of over ten thousand tons, heavy artillery, tanks, military aeroplanes—then there is reason to believe that Germany will be content to wait for another and still another conference, six and twelve years hence, to complete the reductions necessary to scale all armaments down to the German level.

It is possible, however, that the German delegation to the Disarmament Conference may be compelled, by the pressure of German public opinion, to raise the question of the revision of treaties. Now the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, the Locarno Treaties, the Optional Clause and the General Act all deal with the peaceful settlement of international disputes. But they do not provide—except in a very general way in Article 19 of the Covenant—for the particular case, the exceedingly important case, of disputes where the cause of conflict is the alleged injustice of existing legal rights. And yet it is plain that, as the years go by, a treaty, however just it may have been in its inception, must become, in parts, out of date, inapplicable and unjust. There must be effective machinery for dealing with this case; and it may be necessary for the British to say at the Disarmament Conference that we are prepared to advise the reconsideration of certain aspects of the Treaty of Versailles and other Treaties, with a view to the revision of parts which may have become out of date and unjust. Observe in this connection that "the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect of all treaty obligations" are binding upon all States Members of the League. This double duty requires that treaties, in so far as they have become inapplicable or seem to constitute obstacles to international goodwill, should be reconsidered and modified; and, in so far as other means to this end

are lacking, Article 19 of the Covenant should be made practically effective.

These, then, are the conditions for the success of the Conference. It must make a real reduction of armaments all round; it must begin to give equality to Germany; it must give security to France; and it may have to make it clear that we look to the League to provide justice as well as to stop war. But the British Government can only go so far as it believes the British people is prepared to go. The obvious moral for all who can influence our nation is to prepare public opinion to support the Government in any steps it may take, in co-operation with the other countries at the Conference, to bring about a reduction and limitation of the armies, navies and air forces of the world.

We have to change men's minds. A change of mind, a *μετάνοια*, is still the first step on the way to be saved. St. Paul and his friends were once accused of trying to turn the world upside down. We have to turn it the right way up. We want to remove those preconceptions—of ourselves as a chosen people, of people other than ourselves as “foreigners” and “lesser breeds without the law”—from which the most dangerous conclusions flow with a fatal ease. We have to make people realise that any attempt to make the United Kingdom or the British Empire live its own life and not bother about the foreigner simply means dismemberment of the world's body. It is as if the way out of our present troubles—financial, economic and political—were a great secret. Men see, but they do not perceive; they hear, but they do not understand. And yet the answer is simple enough. We members of the Great Society of civilised mankind must all pull together for our world instead of pulling in opposite directions for rival States and rival parties.

MAXWELL GARNETT.

APPENDIX

A NOTE ON THE FIGHTING IN MANCHURIA.

(1) The Council's immediate duty—to prevent further fighting; to secure the retirement of the Japanese troops within the railway zone; and to see that the ultimate settlement of the dispute is not dictated at the sword's point—must be kept separate and distinct from the problem of effecting later a just and peaceful settlement of all the issues in dispute between Japan and China.

(2) Had it not been for the League of Nations, the Far East would have suffered from “the limitless calamities of war”; Japan would be dictating the terms of peace to China, and would thereafter be in legal possession of Manchuria; China could only boycott Japanese

goods at the risk of further punishment from Japan; and the Great Powers of the West would, no doubt, as on similar occasions in the past, be quarrelling among themselves instead of acting together (however feebly) to maintain peace.

(3) On the other hand, the League's Council might have shown more firmness, strength and courage in maintaining the League's authority. No doubt scarcity of evidence of public support for the League had its effect upon the Council's proceedings, and an even greater effect upon the influence which the Council exercised upon Japan.

(4) Japan, according to the jurists, has managed to avoid breaking the law, except perhaps the second Article of the Pact of Paris. Japan's use of armed force did not constitute a "resort to war," and therefore the sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant were not automatically applicable. On the other hand, it was within the power of China at any moment to transform Japan's use of armed force into a "resort to war" within the meaning of Article 16 by withdrawing her Ambassador from Tokio and by declaring the existence of a state of war between China and Japan. Such a declaration would have a retro-active effect so that it would be Japan who had resorted to war in disregard of her Covenants under Article 12, 13 or 15. China has throughout been most anxious to avoid putting Japan in the position of having broken the Covenant by resorting to war.

(5) As the matter now stands, and owing to the existence of the League, Manchuria does not belong to Japan; China is free to continue her economic pressure upon Japan; and the presence of the League's Commission in Manchuria is bound to be awkward for Japan unless she brings her soldiers back to the railway zone within a reasonable period.

(6) These events in Manchuria and around the League's Council table have provided the League and its supporters with a sharp lesson: to break the Covenant in the spirit and yet to fulfil it in the letter must cease to be possible. What then must be done to make the spirit correspond with the letter of the Covenant? And, far more urgent and important, what must be done to create for the support of the Covenant, both in letter and spirit, a better educated and better organised public opinion?

THE DECLINE OF CAPITALISM IN GERMANY.

I

THE fact that the political and economic deadlock in Germany synchronises with a world-wide depression and that the two crises have many features in common will not blind the intelligent observer to the striking peculiarities of the German situation. The difference between the two crises may be approximately defined as follows: that, whereas in the rest of the world a return to normality will be found to be the solution, in Germany such a solution is utterly unthinkable. The German crisis indeed constitutes not the interruption, but the end of yesterday's normality; it is the conclusion of one epoch and the beginning of another. All Germany is, as it were, committed to, and in expectation of, a change; and many Germans believe that the change has actually taken place and that the only thing lacking is the consciousness of it.

The disruption of the bourgeois parties, the growth of Communism, the dramatic electoral triumphs of the National Socialists, the radicalisation of opinion on both Right and Left, are all outward signs of the revolt of the middle classes, and proclaim the emergence of a new spirit in Germany. But the change is deeper than these indications would suggest. The essential difference between the German and the world crisis is this, that whereas the latter, however severe, is a crisis which is not repugnant to capitalism, the former is one which seems to threaten its very existence. The outside world is more and more getting accustomed to the idea that the financial collapse of Germany is imminent and that the country is on the verge of bankruptcy. They fail to perceive that the collapse when it comes will be more catastrophic than this, involving the complete downfall of the capitalist system.

That the situation in Germany has entered on a revolutionary stage cannot escape the notice of anyone who studies the plain economic facts. The growth of unemployment, the decline of production, the increase of bankruptcy and insolvency and the closing down of big factories and works are all eloquent signs of the dissolution of the existing order. Moreover, the shock of this economic decline has been accentuated by the disclosure of a marked degeneration of commercial morality. Never in the history of capitalism have there been scandals so numerous, so blatant, so criminal, involving such colossal sums of money and implicating so many seemingly solid institutions and individuals, industrialists, bankers and politicians. So flagrant and widespread is the corruption

that German newspapers now devote a regular column to the chronicling of the country's financial scandals; while the business of the German courts is congested by the incessant trials of bank directors, business managers and speculators, who have come to grief through the wildest kind of speculation. The bank crisis of the summer of 1931 was largely due to the outcome of such speculation. In many cases bank managers were found to be using their short-term credits as well as their deposits for long-term investments and sheer speculation.

These sets of facts are enough to prove the crumbling character of German capitalism. But the desperate efforts which the ministers are making to shore up the structure are probably even more significant. The emergency legislation of the Reich and of the Prussian Government furnish in themselves the clearest indication of the profundity of the crisis. Many of the provisions of these decrees outline measures which, though tentative and mere expedients, are more sweeping and revolutionary in character than any socialist Government, outside Russia, has so far attempted to introduce. But in the latest of these decrees—"the Fourth Emergency Decree for the Safeguarding of National Economy and Finance and for the Protection of Internal Peace," issued on December 8th, Dr. Brüning has foresworn half measures and has boldly infringed some of the basic features of the capitalist system.

It must not be assumed, however, that in violating the sanctity of contracts and in decreeing the reduction of prices, Dr. Brüning and his advisers have conceived any deliberate intention of betraying the capitalist cause. On the contrary, it is well known that up to the last moment the Chancellor refused to entertain the idea of interfering with the rate of interest. The idea of a compulsory conversion of interest was first launched in November last at the meetings of the Advisory Economic Council. Rumours of the idea aroused such a storm of protest in the press that Dr. Brüning publicly denounced them (in a speech at Mainz on November 13th) as the products of sensationalism, and solemnly declared that the Government would not even consider "such dangerous and abominable measures." Yet, at the very time that he was thus reassuring public opinion, the Prussian Government proclaimed a moratorium for all debts incurred by the landlords and farmers of East Germany, a decree permeated by the very spirit which the Chancellor had denounced.

That these classes are in a desperate position as a result of the fall in agricultural prices and are heavily in debt is well known. The Prussian Government has for years been attempting to relieve their position, partly by subventions, that is at the direct expense of the taxpayer, partly at his indirect expense, that is by raising

the prices of agricultural produce and by imposing high protective tariffs. But the relief afforded by the moratorium is obviously of a very different character, given as it is entirely at the expense of the creditors. The "*Ost-hilfe*" constitutes nothing less than a kind of compulsory and State-protected bankruptcy of the land-owning classes. It violates both the principle and the practice of the capitalist system; and the only defence which the minister responsible for the working of the moratorium, Herr Schlange-Schoeningen, can make for it is a declaration of its inevitability. "The authors of the emergency decree," he remarks in one of his speeches, "have been accused of violating the principle of private property and of destroying the sense of right. This is not the time for concerning oneself with the finesse of juridical dogma. The nation's right to live forbids, to-day more than ever, the light-hearted play with the contents of the phrase '*fiat justitia, pereat mundus*.' Who has the right to-day to preach the absolute inviolability and sanctity of private property? . . . I can only recognise to-day one right and one duty, the salvation of the people. To ensure this many rights and many privileges too will have to be sacrificed."

In another speech, which was broadcast, Herr Schlange-Schoeningen waxes even more downright. "The emergency decree of November 17th, 1931," he declared, "has been described as an anti-capitalist and revolutionary measure. I ask: What does revolutionary mean to-day? Are we not living in the biggest chronic revolution of all time? . . . Besides it is necessary to answer the basic question: What is the country's primary interest, money as the medium of exchange, or production as the creator of value? Valuable as money and credit may be to the national economy, I for one unhesitatingly declare that I assign the first place to production. It is on production that the nation's foundations rest." This plea of necessity—the plea of the tyrant and of the revolutionary—must have had considerable weight with Dr. Brüning himself, who obviously was quite sincere in denouncing the report that the Government was contemplating a compulsory conversion of interest, and accepted the idea only because in the last resort he found it to be inevitable.

II

The object which the Chancellor indeed had in view in issuing this decree is best expressed in the popular German phrase "to make Germany a cheaper country"—that is to enable her to produce cheaper. This urge towards cheaper production and the development of the export trade has been

for years the dominating aim of Germany. The tremendous work of overhauling and rationalising German industries that was carried through so assiduously in the post-War period, and to pay for which thousands of millions of marks were rashly borrowed abroad, was largely dictated by the country's determination to increase her exports to the utmost possible extent. The fulfilment of the reparation clauses of the Versailles Treaty depended on this, and, although the burden involved in such fulfilment was palpably too onerous, it was borne with a certain resignation because it at once stimulated and justified the utmost efforts to increase and so to cheapen production. Now in retrospect it is fair to say that the Young Plan was accepted in Germany in something of an optimistic spirit. The working-off of the country's obligations was envisaged in the atmosphere of an ever-expanding volume of world trade, of which Germany would take her due share. This prospect proved a mirage. World trade, instead of expanding, contracted. In 1930 it was 18 per cent. lower than in 1929; while in 1931 it was 28 per cent. lower than in 1930. German trade, too, shared in this decline. Compared with other leading countries Germany perhaps did not do so badly. Considered indeed as a proportion of world trade, Germany's share became even slightly bigger. But her *volume* of trade declined over 30 per cent. In 1929 her imports per head of the population amounted to 17.5 Reich marks. In 1931 they fell to 7.4. In 1929 her exports per head of the population amounted to 17.6 Reich marks. In 1931 they fell to 11.6. These figures, registering as they did a striking decline, were at once recognised as danger signals. The whole conception of her ability to pay reparations was based on Germany's deep belief in the possibility of an assured and indeed unlimited expansion of the export trade. The realisation that this conception was ill-founded came as a great shock to the German people, who, however, were persuaded by their economists and business men that the decline was not organic and permanent, but susceptible of alleviation. Diagnosing that the cause was the increased competition of other industrial countries and their high protective tariffs, these advisers engaged in a furious propaganda in favour of a cutting-down of costs. This demand for a reduction in wages became especially insistent and almost hysterical when this country abandoned the Gold Standard and thereby obtained incidentally a premium on her exports.

Whether German industrialists really believed that cuts in wages would stimulate exports or whether they seized upon the international situation as a mere pretext for delivering a long-desired attack on the workers' standard of living is immaterial to the issue. It is sufficient to say that during October and November of last

year the propaganda for cutting wages became so clamant and irrepressible that the only question left to be settled was how to effect these cuts and how drastic to make them. Dr. Brüning was clearly in favour of some sort of reduction of wages; but like the statesman he is he made an attempt to secure this reduction by the consent of the workers. He firmly opposed the industrialists demand for the abrogation of trade union rights, especially those relating to collective bargaining ("tariffs"); but he was equally firm in declaring that the highest national interests required that wages should come down.

The point to realise is that Dr. Brüning's policy was not to cut wages in the confident expectation that the economic life of the nation would automatically adjust itself to this new standard, but to secure such an adjustment by an active intervention in economic conditions. As I have already declared he wanted not only a reduction in the cost of production, but in the cost of living. He wanted, in fact, to square the circle. He wanted an all-round "cheaper Germany." In his search for this queer sort of Utopia—the reduction of wages and salaries without a corresponding reduction of the purchasing power of the people, the Chancellor found himself caught in a chain of inexorable logic which compelled him in the end to violate some of the most fundamental principles of the existing economic order. To compensate the workers for the cuts in their wages, prices had to be forced down. Goods, rents, railway fares, tramway fares, all had to come down. It was comparatively easy to make a cut in transport prices; but the reduction of rents created a very difficult and delicate problem. German houseowners were notoriously in no position to sustain this loss; while the Government, which only two months before had been compelled to reduce the property tax 50 per cent., had no means by which it could alleviate the houseowners' plight. A deadlock arose. To make houseowners shoulder the loss they would incur by a 10 per cent. reduction of rent was out of the question; and yet without such a reduction the whole scheme of a "painless" cut in wages broke down. Some way of compensating houseowners had to be discovered. Some victim had to be found. And a victim was found in the mortgage-holder, who was summarily deprived of half his gains. Such a reduction of interest (from 12 to 6 per cent.) was obviously a most flagrant attack on the foundations of capitalism; and it may be presumed, especially in view of his previous protestations, that Dr. Brüning sanctioned it not without a good deal of heart-burning. But necessity knows no law; and since the German Chancellor's sole hope of saving his country depended on his ability to equip her for the production of the biggest possible exportable surplus, he could recognise no other

guiding principle than the necessity of lowering costs. Dr. Brüning's decree of December 8th, 1931, will be eventually recognised as one of the landmarks in German history. It established in the most dramatic fashion the principle of State interference with economic relations.

III

The main purpose of the famous decree, the strengthening of Germany's position in the world market, was defeated even before it was promulgated. The fresh decline in the volume of exports which began in November obviously could not be arrested by the decree. But the figures for December reveal a still further decline, and the prospects for 1932 are, so the experts say, definitely discouraging. It has dawned at last on German consciousness that the sanguine hopes of a fabulously extensive export trade are unattainable and that this is so not because Germany is a dear country—this, of course, is a pure fallacy—but because the whole conception of production solely for export and for the working off of a whole generation's obligations is radically Utopian and false. The myth of a renaissance of Germany through unlimited exports has now been finally exploded.

When the Germans protest to-day that they cannot pay reparations they thereby confess that the whole of their post-War activities has been misdirected. They are bound to admit this; for ever since the signing of the Versailles Treaty these activities have been based on the grotesque idea that the country could attain prosperity by working like coolies ("*Sich-emporarbeiten*") in order to swamp the world markets. It is quite obvious that public opinion outside Germany is not yet fully prepared to envisage the reparations problem in its proper light. Consequently the German default is not likely to be judged dispassionately. Germany will be regarded as the villain of the piece, whereas she is herself as much the victim as the villain. The economic consequence of reparations was to make Germany the workshop and the storehouse of the world. Germany entered a vigorous protest against being placed in this situation "of economic servitude." But she eventually resigned herself to it and took full advantage of it, with the result that she now owes Europe and America nearly 30,000 million marks, the greater part of which has been spent in reconditioning her industry for the accomplishment of an absolutely Sisyphean task. Now that the task has had to be finally abandoned she is confronted once more with the invidious necessity of overhauling her economic life from top to bottom, no longer with the intention of swamping the world markets with her

goods but with a view to raising the standard of living of her own people.

As a sheer piece of statecraft, Dr. Brüning's decree of December 8th was a stroke of genius. It took the wind out of the sails of the extreme parties by borrowing items from their respective programmes. The Social Democrats, the bourgeois parties, the National Socialists all damned it for some of its provisions, but applauded it for others. The one provision that came in for most attack and for most praise was the reduction of the rate of interest. The gravamen of bourgeois criticism of this provision was that it struck a fatal blow at the foundations of capitalism. "The capitalist economic order," declared Dr. Gustav Stolper, the editor of *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, "is based on the free operation of *price* and of *interest*. When these two categories have fallen into the direct dictation of the State, German capitalism has ceased to exist."

The fact that this infringement is merely provisional and is described as emergency legislation does little to diminish its intrinsic importance. Long after the decree of December 8 has been forgotten its effects will be felt in Germany. With the issue of this decree the principle of State interference with economic relations has been asserted and established with the utmost emphasis and has been accepted as a welcome relief by millions of destitute Germans. There can be no doubt that the German middle classes are enthusiastic in their approval of this new economic dictatorship and that its promulgation has immensely strengthened Dr. Brüning's political position in the country. It is plain, however, that the Chancellor cannot afford to rest on his laurels. The famous decree is only the first step towards some kind of State Capitalism, the vogue for which promises to be increasingly popular in Germany. The electoral successes of the National Socialists are due largely to their opposition to Liberal theories of *laissez-faire* and to their readiness to support a bold programme of State Capitalism. Dr. Brüning cannot afford to exclude them from his reckoning.

Political thought in Germany, however, is still amorphous and has yet to crystallise itself. The frontiers separating parties are vague and unmapped; and it is extremely difficult to define not only the difference between parties, but the principles on which one or another is united. Learned economists declare indeed that German capitalism is but a pseudo-capitalism. Certainly to an English or a French observer many of the political phenomena of Germany must seem strangely unreal. German Communism is probably only a pseudo-Communism; just as the Socialism of the National Socialists is an obvious fiction. The Nazis have got all the appa-

tus of a political party ; but a political party they most decidedly are not. They represent not even a movement ; what they stand for is a certain mood. Their strength is derived from their ability to reflect and to express the despair aroused by the crumbling of the existing economic order. They represent the aspirations towards State assistance of a middle class which is being pressed down to the economic level of the proletariat, but still clings desperately to its old social and cultural standards. This class feels that its only chance of survival is to secure the protection of the State, and that is why ideas of State Capitalism are so popular in Germany to-day, and why there is such an impatient and such a revolutionary tension in the country. The middle classes must either sink to the level of the masses or help that party to power which promises them salvation.

MICHAEL FARBMAN.

January 14th, 1932.

THE DEADLOCK IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

ADVERSITY has a certain educative effect, and it is at last becoming almost a commonplace to assert that the best hope of a *détente* in the European situation lies in direct agreement between Paris and Berlin, even though the active co-operation of London and other capitals is also obviously essential. But what is true of the major problems of European policy, is no less true of central and south-eastern Europe. The deadlock between Paris and Berlin has its parallel in the Danubian countries, where the last thirteen years have been marked by real economic anarchy. Much admirable constructive work has been done inside the framework of the individual states: specially notable has been the progress of Czechoslovakia under the enlightened and uninterrupted guidance of MM. Masaryk and Beneš. But the solitary example of inter-state co-operation, the Little Entente, though it has performed a most valuable and necessary task, has followed negative rather than positive lines. Its mere existence has averted dangerous upheavals and assured the *status quo*: and its two primary aims—to prevent the restoration of the effete Habsburg dynasty and to resist any movement for frontier revision—have lost none of their cogency to-day. But it has none the less failed in two directions, for it has neither solved the vexed question of minorities nor that of economic barriers.

In 1918 the nations of the old Habsburg Monarchy, perhaps inevitably in such circumstances, placed independence and self-government higher than economic interests: but in so doing they set at defiance certain common interests in the economic and social sphere which acute political differences had temporarily obscured. The great problem which has faced them for these thirteen years has been to devise some means of restoring severed economic ties without thereby sacrificing the essence of independence. But instead of this they have piled the Ossa of tariffs and prohibitions upon the Pelion of frontier restrictions and the mutual confiscation of books and periodicals; with the result that each nation tends to live in a watertight compartment of its own, unduly self-centred and ignorant of neighbouring cultures. Rival political propagandas, sometimes, alas, encouraged by ill-considered campaigns from the outside, accentuate these tendencies still further, and the vicious circle continues, in which economic agreements are thwarted by political resentments, and political agreements by economic disputes. It has required an economic world crisis of unequalled severity to bring home, at least to the more thoughtful sections of public opinion in these countries, the vital

need for economic co-operation if complete disaster is to be averted.

The idea of some kind of regrouping on economic lines, between all or some of the states of the defunct Dual Monarchy, has been constantly put forward since the war and has taken many forms. It has generally aroused acute alarm on one side or the other, owing to the incautious use of such words as "federation" or "confederation": even "league" or "union" is too precise and too ambitious, and indeed a new word is needed to express the minimum, not the maximum, of what is practicable—some rather vague word such as "groupement," which might gradually acquire a significance of its own. Obviously none of the new states, neither victors nor vanquished, desires a reconstitution of the old Habsburg Monarchy, and some are prone to suspect legitimist or reactionary intrigue in the background—not without reason in view of certain quite recent happenings. Moreover it is always easier to break down than to build up again, and it is not quite clear where co-operation should begin. Obviously negotiations between all the five principal states would be apt to end in chaos, and yet for two to act alone might arouse suspicion on the part of the others. Which, then, of the various possible combinations should be attempted first? An economic union between the three states of the Little Entente would at once acquire a sharp point against Hungary and Austria and increase political friction; a similar union between Austria and Hungary would for obvious geographical reasons be regarded as a wedge directed toward splitting up the Little Entente; while either project would perpetuate the grouping between enemy and vanquished states, and the suggestion for union between all three would simply alarm public opinion in Czechoslovakia and be regarded as an attempt to separate her from her allies. Again, an agreement between Hungary and Roumania alone, or between Roumania and Jugoslavia alone, would present less obvious advantages, since in each case it would be between two states which are predominantly agrarian and therefore do not stand in such need of each other's products.

From all this the conclusion follows that the most promising line of approach is between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and that the moment is ripe for an understanding between the two countries. At first sight this may seem paradoxical and even absurd: for it is notorious that there has been repeated friction between them, that Magyar resentment against Trianon has concentrated itself above all upon the Czechs, and that there has been a specially marked contrast between the oligarchic Hungarian régime and the democratic tendencies of Masaryk, Beneš and their entire nation. It is, however, also true that the lot of the

Magyar minority in Slovakia, though not yet all that it should be, is distinctly more favourable than that of the Magyars in Transylvania, and infinitely more so than that of the Magyar or other minorities in Jugoslavia. In one respect this very fact contributed to the friction, since informed opinion at Budapest was inclined to assume that the failure of Roumania and Jugoslavia to solve the question of minorities would in the end react in favour of Hungary, whereas it was fully aware of the remarkable work of transformation and emancipation which was rapidly freeing Slovakia from all possibility of a relapse to Magyar rule. Moreover Czechoslovakia by her relatively successful solution of the land question was not merely undermining the power of the Magyar aristocracy in Slovakia, but creating a precedent for land reform in unreformed Hungary and making any return to pre-war conditions impossible. She was at one and the same time the chief obstacle to Habsburg restoration and to territorial revision.

All these factors have, however, been driven into the background by the acute dangers of the economic situation. Despite alarmist rumours in the Left Press of Paris, Habsburg restoration is not an immediate issue, not merely because the funds of the legitimists are drying up, but because those on whom Hungary depends for financial assistance make the abandonment of such adventures a condition *sine qua non*, and above all because the peasant masses want bread and work, not a coronation and a luxurious court. Certain revisionist "die-hards" may continue to clamour for territorial changes, but the plain man knows that such clamour only increases the paralysis of trade and agriculture from which the peoples on both sides of these frontiers are suffering, and that the real need is not to change the existing frontiers once more and so produce fresh friction and uncertainty, but to deprive those frontiers, to the utmost limit possible, of their present character as economic and cultural barriers.

In the last two months it has been openly declared by the Hungarian Premier, Count Károlyi, and such economic experts as Mr. Teleszky, that Hungary, unless she can increase her exports to neighbouring states, will be forced to reduce the area under cultivation and to industrialise herself. Czechoslovakia, on her side, as a strongly industrial state, has a vital interest in increasing her exports and would be committing an act of folly in leaving a near neighbour to plunge into an industrial career, when she herself can supply so many of that neighbour's requirements. The crowning folly of this year of crisis in central Europe has been the rupture of commercial relations between Budapest and Prague—a rupture for which both sides must bear the blame. It is only natural that all the influence of economic experts at

Geneva and Basel should have been brought to bear to end this scandal: but it is no longer possible to revert to mere normal intercourse, and emergency measures for economic co-operation are now urgently needed. Count Bethlen declared last May Hungary's readiness to enter into closer economic relations with any neighbour who would not try to exploit them for national ends: and M. Beneš has quite recently held out a hand to Hungary. Here is a unique opportunity for statesmanship, and the time at our disposal is all too short.

Meanwhile it is clear that to insist upon either the formal renunciation of revisionist aims by Hungary or upon the acceptance of the revisionist principle by the Succession States as a preliminary basis of discussion, is simply another way of declining all discussion. What is necessary in the first instance is to leave these thorny questions resolutely on one side and to concentrate upon the problem: how best to co-operate for the restoration of economic prosperity in the whole Danubian area. Even a limited economic agreement would have an astonishing effect upon the whole political atmosphere, and would be the first step towards a wider movement between Prague and Vienna, between Vienna and Belgrade, between Bucarest and Budapest.

Sheer necessity is bringing these considerations home even to the most conservatively minded statesmen of the Danubian area. While on the one hand the obstructive tactics of certain sections of the Czech Agrarian party are viewed with growing disquiet by public opinion in Prague, men like Dr. Gratz and Baron Szterényi, the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, have openly declared themselves in favour of a Hungaro-Czechoslovak understanding, while of course making clear that they have not abandoned their old political aspirations—for indeed such a declaration would mean instant political suicide. The veteran Count Apponyi also admits the imperative logic of events, and a former Secretary of State, Professor Hantos, while equally avoiding pronouncements in the delicate field of politics, is organising a campaign in favour of a Danubian economic union, definitely planned on such lines as shall not be inimical to the legitimate interests of Germany. In a word, it is more and more recognised that, for obvious geographical reasons, the relations of Prague and Budapest are the keystone of the arch, just as much as the relations of Paris and Berlin in the major problem of European co-operation. Though there are very wide differences of opinion as to the best remedies for the present precarious state of Europe, it is generally agreed that some steps must be taken to reduce economic barriers and trade restrictions and to promote international co-operation on rational lines. An exclusive nationalism

has penetrated into economics and laid its numbing hand upon commerce and finance, until in some parts of Europe it is no exaggeration to say that there is a return to methods of primitive barter between the nations.

There is, however, another direction in which exaggerated nationalism is an obstacle to normal development in Europe, and even to the vital issue of disarmament—namely, what was called before the war “the question of nationalities” and is now called “the question of minorities.” During the Great War many of us argued that satisfied nationalism was the only sound basis upon which an international settlement could rest, and when the peace treaties revealed the fact that exact ethnographic frontiers were unattainable, it was hoped that by special treaties and guarantees signed by the individual States most concerned, the full rights of these minorities could be secured, and that the spectacle of a ruling race devoting all its resources and ingenuity to the assimilation of weaker subject races would become very largely a thing of the past.

Unhappily this has not been the case. From first to last many of the minority treaties have remained a dead letter or have been violated in many important directions, while certain Powers which are not bound internationally, but which began by freely promising full rights to their own minorities, have subsequently repudiated their pledges and now withhold the very elements of liberty. The “under-dogs” of yesterday have in some cases become the “upper-dogs” of to-day, while in other cases a nation in its blind fanaticism applies to one of its neighbours those very methods of repression to which some of its own compatriots are being subjected by another neighbour. In Europe to-day (exclusive of Soviet Russia, where the problem follows different lines) there are in round figures and according to official statistics (which certainly often err by understatement) at least 30,000,000 people, in fifteen different states, in the position of minorities.* Not all, but very many of these minorities are in considerable, sometimes in grave national danger, and look across the frontier (sometimes a frontier recently formed against their will) to kinsmen of their own blood, and dream of revision. Some of the victors in the late war are afraid to disarm owing to the alleged desire of their neighbours to recover lost territory. (Last November Mr. Marinkovitch, the Foreign Minister of Jugoslavia, a well-known figure in Geneva, publicly expressed his conviction that unless his country remained strongly armed her neighbours would fall

* Many students of the question would estimate the figure at 40,000,000 as a minimum: I content myself with a figure which no one can challenge: it is quite bad enough. See table on following page.

A ROUGH TABLE OF THE MAIN EUROPEAN MINORITIES
(Exclusive of Russia, Finland, Greece, Turkey, and Albania)

State and Date of Census	Total Population of Country	NATIONALITY OF MINORITIES								Total Minority Population
		German	Russian	Jewish	White Rus.	Polish	Lithuanian	Estonian	Ukrainian	
I. NORTHERN GROUP										
Estonia (1922)	1,107,059	18,319	91,109	4,566	—	59,374	25,885	7,708	—	136,352
Latvia (1930)	1,900,045	69,855	201,778	94,388	36,029	—	—	Left	—	503,583
Lithuania (1923)	2,028,971	29,231	50,460	153,743	4,421	65,599	—	14,883	—	319,929
Poland (1921)	27,176,717	1,059,194	56,239	2,110,448	1,060,237	—	68,667	Czech	3,898,431	8,362,478
Denmark	3,267,831	40,000 ²	Roumanian	Jewish	Magyar	Polish	Mixed	Cz.-Slovak	Ukrainian	Others
Germany (1925)	62,410,619	—	—	— ³	—	356,314	649,308 ^{5a}	30,382 ⁶	—	40,000
Czechoslovakia (1921)	13,374,364	3,123,568	13,974	180,855	745,431	75,853	Jugoslav	—	461,849	1,163,169
Austria (1923)	6,534,481	—	—	—	25,071	—	88,154	98,703 ¹¹	—	4,613,427
Hungary (1920)	7,980,143	551,211	23,760	—	—	—	83,093 ¹⁰	141,882 ⁷	—	259,871
III. S.E. GROUP										
Jugoslavia (1921) ⁴	11,894,911	505,790	—	—	Magyar	Roumanian	Albanian	Czechoslovak	Other Slavs	833,090
Roumania ⁵	18,024,269	713,564	174,293	778,094	467,658	231,068	439,657	—	176,479 ⁹	2,040,852
Bulgaria (1926)	5,478,741	—	19,590	41,563	1,463,373	351,328	Jugoslav	31,884 ¹²	Ukrainian	4,469,694
IV. SOUTHERN GROUP										
Italy (1921)	—	—	German	—	—	—	52,570	Basque	Catalan	—
Spain (1920)	21,959,086	—	400,195 ¹³	—	—	80,282	Jugoslav	1,000,000	4,169,004	980,068
							389,219 ¹⁴	—	—	5,169,004
							—	—	—	28,994,088

¹Includes 7,850 Swedes. ²Approximate. ³No separate Jewish nationality in Census rubrics. ⁴Macedonian Slavs (not less than 700,000) are reckoned as Jugoslavs and not entered separately. ⁵Racial statistics of Winkler, the official figures of Census of 1930 not yet available. ^{6a}Returned as bilingual (i.e. German and one of the following: Polish, Mazurian, Wendish, Lithuanian, Danish. ⁷Czech. ⁸Slovak. ⁹Includes 7,494 Danes. ¹⁰Entered separately as Slovenes, Croats, Bunjevci, Sokci, Serbs. ¹¹193,533 Czech, 5,170 Slovak. ¹²Of these only 5,000 Czechs. ¹³Of these, 8,335 in pre-war Italy. ¹⁴Of these, 258,944 Slovenes and 92,800 Croats in Venezia Giulia and 37,475 Slovenes in pre-war Italy. ¹⁵Speaking French and Greek.

upon her and wrest territory from her, in other words, he admitted that Jugoslavia had failed to solve her question of minorities.) The vanquished on their side demand territorial revision, to repair the alleged injustices of the peace treaties, and a seeming deadlock has been reached. Sentimental opinion in the west or in America, realising that the position of these minorities is often lamentable, has sometimes jumped to the rash conclusion that the true solution for Europe's woes lies in a revision of frontiers. Senator Borah is an admirable example of this essentially honest, well-intentioned, but none the less superficial and misleading opinion.

Such critics cannot be too often reminded of two fundamental factors in the situation :

(1) That in many of the most hotly contested districts of Europe—on the Polish-German and Russo-Polish frontiers, in Hungary and in Macedonia—no human ingenuity can ever hope to draw purely ethnographical frontiers, and that therefore, even if the frontiers could again be changed, either by agreement, or as is more probable by universal war, important racial minorities would still remain on the wrong side of all these frontiers ;

and (2) that the treaties of 1918-20, despite many blemishes, have definitely improved the status of most of the nationalities of Europe ; that nine races formerly entirely under foreign rule (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Letts, Lithuanians, Ests and Finns) now have national States of their own, and that no nationality, with the single unhappy and very important exception of the Ukrainians, is to-day entirely under foreign rule : in a word, that except on the Polish-Russian frontier Europe is to-day faced no longer by major issues in this question of nationalities, involving the life and death of whole races, but rather with a problem of gathering up ragged edges and completing a task already more than half finished. Solve the problem of equal rights for all nationalities, and you have achieved peace between Slav and Teuton on the Elbe and the Vistula, between Slav and Latin on the Adriatic, between Slav and Magyar in the great Danubian plain, between Slav and Slav in Macedonia. But ignore this problem or evade it, and you will suddenly find it emerging in a crude form during the discussion of disarmament between the nations. If on the one side there are Powers which are not ready to disarm without first obtaining the necessary "sanctions," on the other side there are Powers which are not ready to renounce their hope of overthrowing or at least modifying the *status quo*, until they have "real guarantees" (this was the abstract phrase which made a concrete agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1913 and 1914 impossible) that their kinsmen beyond the frontiers will not be denationalised.

Is there then no alternative to revision? and must the deadlock continue? Most emphatically not. If we can diagnose the malady, it should be possible to find a remedy. The fact is that on the one hand many of the minority treaties have not been made effective, the machinery for their control at Geneva has proved inadequate, and till recently healthy publicity has been evaded. On the other hand, certain minorities have pursued very foolish tactics, advancing impossible claims and accusations whose falsity could often be demonstrated, and even when they kept their irredentist leanings within the strict limits of the law, they were all too negative in their attitude towards the States of which they were citizens. The book recently published by the Congress of Nationalities, under the careful editorship of Dr. Ammende (*Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas*) is a first sign that moderation, accuracy and realism are winning the day and that claims will remain within the bounds of the possible.

Such agitations for revision as that inaugurated some years ago by Lord Rothermere can only do infinite harm: and in actual fact the only result has been to strengthen the illusions on the one side and to make the other side less conciliatory both towards its neighbours and towards its own minorities. It would be easy to prove by detailed statistics that in each of the cases to which revisionist agitation is directed the only serious alternatives are mere rectification of frontiers (which would affect perhaps one-quarter or one-fifth of the populations concerned and would therefore produce great confusion and unsettlement, but no definitive solution) or a reversion to the pre-war frontiers (which would of course be resisted to the death and could only be achieved through a general war). Moreover the problem has in these thirteen years been complicated by growing differences in land tenure and social legislation: indeed there are cases where national feeling and social or economic interests point in opposite directions.

The revisionist agitation has two main underlying motives. With those of the older generation who have learnt nothing, that motive is "revanche": these are the irreconcilables. But with the great majority of men there is the genuine fear for the fate of their co-nationals on the wrong side of a frontier—a fear only too often based on the knowledge that here and there the underdogs of yesterday are applying to their former masters the methods from which they themselves formerly suffered. The only way to take the sting out of revisionist agitation is to prove that fear to be groundless, by putting an end to "assimilationist" policy, and by not merely enforcing the existing minority treaties, but by extending them to the maximum compatible with the safety and smooth administration of the state. It is essential that the

public law of Europe should recognise a clear distinction between the very different conceptions of "nationality" and "citizenship" and ensure that a man's nationality and language shall be as sacred and inviolable as his religion has already become in every European state save Russia. In the sixteenth century the principle of "*cuius regio eius religio*" drenched Europe in blood. In the twentieth century the same principle, under a thin camouflage, has been applied by more than one state to its national minorities, and until this is stopped, unrest will continue. Means must be found to save the individual citizen from the necessity of choosing between his allegiance to the state and his allegiance to his own nationality: the two must be allowed to subsist side by side, and on equal terms. The true solution lies in the direction of such Charters of cultural autonomy as have been granted to the minorities of Estonia, and again of such gestures as the recent foundation of a Magyar Academy in Slovakia. If once this principle could be made universal, frontiers would speedily lose a great deal of their importance, and the way would be opened for fuller cultural intercourse, for those economic agreements which are determined (to a far greater extent than the economists care to admit) by *political* likes and dislikes, and for that drastic reduction of armaments which is so necessary a preliminary to the restoration of Europe's shaken financial and moral credit.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BELGIAN CULTURE.*

TWENTY years ago the title of this lecture would have caused some astonishment among a London audience. Educated people knew that Belgium existed as a national entity, created in 1830 by a council of the Great Powers sitting in London; but few realised that this apparently new country was really of old origin and possessed distinct political, economic, artistic and intellectual traditions—in short, what we may call in the broadest sense of the term a national culture.

The attitude of the Belgians during the War and the energy displayed by them during the period of reconstruction have done a great deal to remove such misconceptions. It is generally agreed to-day that a people which possesses sufficient strength to pass through such an ordeal, without losing any of its vital qualities, must be linked together by a bond of union which no artificial political structure of recent origin can possibly achieve. Nevertheless, a few thoughtful critics are still puzzled by the paradoxical aspect of the Belgian problem. The concept of nationality is closely connected in our minds with that of language unity, and Belgium is divided between two peoples talking and writing two different languages. It is also associated with the existence of geographical frontiers and, apart from the coast-line in the north-west, the country possesses scarcely any natural boundaries. Further, the origins of Belgian nationality are blurred by the fact that for three centuries the Belgian provinces were administered by foreign princes and were considered first as Spanish and later as Austrian and French possessions. To make confusion worse confounded, the very word “Belgique” is of modern origin, and is mainly used in the eighteenth century as an adjective—*les provinces belgiques*—while the designation “Bourgogne,” prevalent in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and emphasising the connection with France, is completely misleading. Judged by ordinary superficial standards, a country so clearly divided should never have existed; it would receive short shrift at the hands of some theoreticians who wish to reconstruct the world on more sensible lines. But the fact that Belgian culture seems to challenge certain linguistic, geographical or historical conceptions does not justify us in ignoring its various manifestations, and it is to a few of these manifestations that I should like to draw your attention to-day.

Foreign observers generally agree that one of the most charac-

* Inaugural Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics on October 29th, 1931 (Chair of Belgian Studies).

teristic features of the modern Belgian Constitution is the power conferred on the local authorities, and more particularly on the burgomaster and on his council. The first magistrate of a Belgian city remains to-day the supreme chief of the police force and enjoys more power and prestige than his colleagues in more centralised countries. Such prerogatives were not conferred on him by a caprice of the National Congress which drafted the Constitution in 1830. Its members were no doubt anxious to extend to Belgium all the progressive institutions established by the English, French and American democracies, but they were at the same time careful not to wound local feelings based on long-standing traditions. The origin of these feelings, which have been described as the "love of the clock-tower," can be traced as far back as the Middle Ages, when the country was divided into a number of principalities, only loosely connected on the one side with the Kingdom of France, and on the other with the German Empire. These principalities were gradually drawn together until the Dukes of Burgundy succeeded in bringing under their rule, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, all the territories extending from the Zuider Zee to the Somme, and later known as the Netherlands. This work of unification was completed by Philip the Good, who fully deserved the title of "Founder of Belgium," *Conditor Belgii*, given to him by the humanist Justus Lipsius two centuries later.

Though nominally a vassal of the French king for the Dukedom of Burgundy, Philip the Good was really an independent sovereign who might, according to his own words, "have been king had he willed it," that is to say, had he consented to pay homage to the Emperor. In all internal and external affairs, and more particularly with regard to his alliance with England during the Hundred Years War, he pursued the interests not of France but of the Netherlands, which were by far the wealthiest part of his possessions. The "Great Duke of the West," as he was called, played in the Netherlands in the fifteenth century a part similar to that which Louis XI played in France and Henry VII in England during the same period. He succeeded in consolidating a centralised state as the legists of the Renaissance conceived it, a state possessing a distinct life apart from the people and above them; and established a few central institutions, such as the States-General, on which the delegates represented the various principalities. The Dukes of Burgundy were nevertheless obliged to take into account the resistance, not so much of the feudal lords, as of the powerful communes, such as Ghent, Bruges and Liège, which had grown stronger in the Netherlands than in any other part of Western Europe. The

result was not complete unity as in France and England, but a kind of compromise: that is to say, the superimposition of central institutions on local institutions. As Dukes of Burgundy, the sovereigns of the Netherlands controlled foreign affairs, foreign trade and, to a certain extent, the States-General; but as Counts of Flanders, Dukes of Brabant, Counts of Hainault, etc., they bound themselves to respect the liberties and privileges of each town and principality belonging to the Burgundian confederation. These privileges were confirmed and strengthened in the *Grand Privilège* granted by Mary of Burgundy after the death of Charles the Bold, which for three centuries was considered as the sacred charter of Belgian liberties.

There is no feature of Belgian culture which is more characteristic than the jealous preservation, throughout modern history, of this spirit of local independence. It asserted itself again and again after the Netherlands had fallen into the power of the Hapsburg dynasty, under Maximilian, Philip the Handsome and Charles V. It was one of the main causes of the revolution against Spain, which brought about the separation between the Northern and the Southern Netherlands at the end of the sixteenth century. It remained rampant throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and provoked a series of riots against the Spanish and Austrian administrations, notably in Brussels, Antwerp and Louvain. It looks as if national life, when no longer able to assert itself in affairs of State, had recoiled upon itself and sought refuge behind the walls of every city, and as if the people, too weak to resist foreign interference in national questions, clung tenaciously to the most trifling local liberties granted to them centuries before by their national princes.

The case of the Brussels riots of 1699 is particularly typical. At the close of the War of the League of Augsburg, Maréchal de Villeroi subjected Brussels to a bombardment which lasted two days and two nights and destroyed nearly 4,000 buildings. Among the wreckage was found an old document belonging to the archives of one of the corporations which mentioned certain privileges granted many years before to the Brussels guilds. These privileges were not important and their non-observance could not seriously affect the workers' interests. Nevertheless, the precious document was reprinted in pamphlet form and the people urged the Elector Maximilian, who acted as Governor for the King of Spain, to grant them what they considered their indisputable ancestral rights. Maximilian who had never heard of these rights before, was reluctant to comply, and riots followed which were of course repressed. The governor must have wondered how a people which could stand patiently

the privations and sufferings entailed by fifty years of devastating wars, could be so deeply stirred by the chance discovery of an obsolete document.

This was not the only occasion when the attitude of the Belgians puzzled their sovereigns and governors. The so-called *brabançonne* revolution of 1789 was no doubt determined by the news of the taking of the Bastille, but its causes and character were very different from those of the French Revolution. Broadly speaking, the movement was a violent reaction against certain administrative measures taken by Joseph II, which might have been beneficial to the country, but which ruthlessly suppressed long-cherished local liberties. While the French revolutionaries looked towards the future, the Belgian revolutionaries looked towards the past, and the amazed emperor, who had lost their loyalty, was to a certain extent justified when he wrote to his French friend Comte de Ségur: "A general madness seems to seize all peoples; those of Brabant, for instance, have revolted because I wanted to give them what your own nation clamours for."

There are no more misleading expressions than those of "Spanish Netherlands" or "Austrian Netherlands," which are frequently applied to the Belgian provinces during the latter part of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth century. The country was never conquered and annexed by Spain or Austria as it was by France from 1792 to 1815; it was never a Spanish or Austrian province, but was merely attached to Spain and to Austria by dynastic ties similar to those connecting England and Scotland. We are thus led to consider another characteristic aspect of Belgian modern institutions and the part played by the sovereign in the nation's political life. Throughout the sixteenth century and the first part of the seventeenth, the people clung to the Burgundian tradition and showed themselves ready to adopt the rule of their national princes, as long as this rule did not ignore the essential interests of the country. This explains the popularity of Mary of Burgundy, of Philip the Handsome, before he became King of Spain, and of Charles of Luxemburg, before he became Emperor of Germany. It is only when Maximilian, Charles V, and more particularly Philip II, ignored Belgian interests and subordinated their policy in the Netherlands to their Spanish or Imperial interests, that discontent broke out. In 1579 the provinces which had combined to form the Confederation of Arras demanded that the administration of the Netherlands should no longer be entrusted to Governors appointed by the Kings of Spain, but to a prince of royal and legitimate blood; and when at last this demand was granted, and Archduchess Isabella shared

with Archduke Albert the sovereignty of the country, the enthusiasm of the people knew no bounds. In spite of the fact that the new régime was incapable of fulfilling all expectations, it was nevertheless associated with a remarkable economic and artistic revival.

It is true that, after the death of Isabella, Belgium became once more a mere dependency, first of the Spanish branch, later of the Austrian branch, of the Hapsburg dynasty, but the monarchical feeling remained so deeply rooted that when, in 1830, the National Congress had to come to a decision with regard to the future form of government, constitutional monarchy won the day by 140 votes to 13. This majority is the more remarkable that some prominent leaders of the revolution were convinced republicans. The Congress's decision was no doubt influenced by the conditions prevailing at the time in Europe, but it was also determined by a desire to maintain a long-standing and respected tradition. The members of the Congress felt that the republican form of government was foreign to the country's spirit. They attributed most of the evils which had befallen Belgium under the Spanish and Austrian administration, not so much to the faults of the "Old Régime," as to the fact that the sovereigns, instead of residing in the country and living in close touch with their Belgian subjects, had delegated their power to others. These feelings are eloquently expressed in an address delivered to King Leopold I, on New Year's Day, 1839 :

"Belgium has always suffered from want of national unity and of a native monarchy," declared Baron de Gerlache. "The country had no Belgian king when, by the Treaty of Westphalia, the Scheldt was closed and her trade ruined. She had no Belgian king when, in the course of the seventeenth century, five or six treaties were concluded with Holland and France, which were bought each time by some strips of territory torn from her land. The country had no Belgian king," he concluded, "when she was turned successively into a Spanish, an Austrian, a French and a Dutch province; when, in short, her princes or her masters bartered her for their own selfish interests."

These views, couched in the romantic style of the period, are not perhaps in strict accordance with historical facts, but they reflect nevertheless a popular belief which reveals itself again and again in the chequered course of Belgium's destiny and which is at the root of the loyalty of the Belgian people for their princes. The power of the executive in Belgium to-day is no longer what it was in the Netherlands in the fifteenth century, but the sovereign is still considered as the defender of the country's independence and the surest protector of her constitution. I need not add that

these expectations have been more than fulfilled by the present dynasty.

If we turn our attention from political institutions to economics, we are faced with fresh evidence of the power of tradition and of the influence exerted by the past on contemporary life. Belgium must necessarily strike a superficial observer as an eminently modern country. She is highly industrialised and, like Great Britain, depends largely on her export trade. She possesses the densest railway system in Europe, one of the busiest ports on the Continent and a vast colony, the natural wealth of which has only begun to be appreciated. But this modern activity is merely the development, under new conditions, of an agelong activity displayed in this small corner of Europe by the Flemish and Walloon population. It is interesting to notice for instance that in this same fifteenth century, during which the Dukes of Burgundy laid the solid foundations of Belgian nationality, almost all the modern features of Belgian economy are already apparent. It is the time when Antwerp inherited the prosperity of Bruges as the banking centre and the great port of transit of Northern Europe, when the linen industry succeeded in Flanders to the cloth industry ruined by English competition, when the first coal-pits were sunk in the region of Liège and when coal, for the first time, was exported abroad.

The proportions are completely altered to-day, and it would be foolish to compare the old industrial equipment with the new, but we nevertheless find in the ancient Flemish and Brabançon handlooms the origin of the mills in Ghent; in the ancient Meuse smithies, that of the iron and steel industries of Charleroi and Liège; and above all, in the ancient port of Antwerp, that of the great metropolis of to-day. As an economic unity the country was already constituted five centuries ago, and the natural waterways which did so much to link Walloon industry to Flemish trade and to weld the various provinces into one nation were already utilised. This fact is made still more evident if we allow agriculture its due share of attention. In his most valuable book on modern Belgium: *Land and Labour, Lessons from Belgium*, Mr. Seeböhm Rowntree deals mainly with the agricultural problem, and what he said in 1911 remains substantially true to-day. He insists on the high rate of production of Belgian farms—the highest in Europe—and attributes it to the system of land tenure, so different from that prevailing in England. He further points out that the division of the land and the large number of small holdings was not due in Belgium, as in other countries, to the sale of confiscated lands following the French Revolution, but to circumstances dating from a much earlier period. M. Pirenne,

in his monumental *Histoire de Belgique* confirms these conclusions and draws attention to the fact that as early as the thirteenth century, feudal lords and monasteries enlisted the services of a large number of serfs to reclaim the marshes and the moors which covered their estates, and rewarded their labour with the grant of small farms.

If we remember that agricultural production remained throughout modern history, and in spite of the successive wars which ravaged the "battlefield of Europe," the mainstay of Belgian economic life, we shall have no difficulty in understanding why the Belgian peasant possesses such remarkable recuperative powers. Periods of reconstruction succeeded periods of devastation in every century. What was done in West Flanders ten years ago had been done five times before. While political events paralysed industry and ruined trade for two centuries, they were never able to interfere for long with the labour of the Flemish and Walloon farmers. The rich and powerful peasant co-operative societies of to-day, such as the *Boerenbond*, are carrying on traditions which were already solidly established before the name of Belgium had even been heard.

The same continuity cannot be traced in architecture, art and literature. This sensitive aspect of social activity was even more deeply influenced than trade by the fluctuations of the country's fortunes. It reacted surprisingly well under the influence of native princes or whenever the independent life of the nation asserted itself; but it fell into rapid decadence when this life became paralysed by adverse political circumstances. I will illustrate this point with a few examples taken from the civic architecture of Brussels. You remember no doubt the fifteenth-century town-hall which expresses so well the luxury prevailing at the court of the Dukes of Burgundy and the local pride which the Belgian cities succeeded in preserving under their rule. This great building is surrounded on the Grand'Place by a group of seventeenth-century houses with gilt façades in the picturesque late Renaissance style known as Baroque. Compare with this historic market-place the correct and uninspired square of houses surrounding the Place Royale and the Parc in the upper part of the town, erected in the eighteenth century according to the plans of the French architect Guimard and the Viennese architect Zimmer, and you will be able to appreciate how much Belgium suffered intellectually and artistically from the eclipse of her national personality during this period. Though she produced masterpieces of exceptional value during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and some remarkable work during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Belgium does not possess what might be called

a genuine classical style of architecture, corresponding to the Louis XV and Louis XVI styles in France, or to the Queen Anne and Georgian styles in England. Anxious as one may be to avoid hasty generalisations, it is impossible not to be struck by the fact that artistic efflorescence coincides with national independence, and sterility or scant production with political effacement. It is equally significant that out of the seven hundred-odd pictures shown at the Exhibition of Flemish and Belgian Art which was held at Burlington House in 1927, ranging from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the end of the nineteenth, there were only about half-a-dozen works belonging to the eighteenth century.

If we wished to characterise this school of painting, comparing it with other European schools and more particularly with the Italian, we should be inclined to emphasise at the same time its mystical and realistic qualities. While the fifteenth-century Madonnas and Saints appear to us like heavenly visions far removed from this world, the Donors kneeling at their feet, or the lords and ladies appearing in neighbouring portraits are described with merciless realism and the most scrupulous accuracy. The process of idealisation which allows Botticelli and other fifteenth-century Italian painters to give their Christian and pagan characters such graceful features, is practically absent in the Netherlands.

After the partial eclipse lasting from the end of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth, we witness a remarkable artistic and literary revival, coinciding with the national emancipation of 1830. Henri Leys, Henri de Braekeleer and Hippolyte Boulenger began to paint towards 1840; the Flemish novels of Henri Conscience were written at that time, whilst the first great master of Belgian literature of French expression, De Coster, the author of *Ulenspiegel*, began to write about ten years later. The literary movement distinguishes itself from similar movements in other European countries by precisely the same association of realism and mysticism, so apparent in the Flemish paintings of the early and later Renaissance; we are struck by the same richness of colouring, the same contrast between a deep religious aspiration on the one hand, and a healthy sensuousness and a somewhat crude description of nature and man on the other. It might indeed be contended that most of the Belgian literature of the nineteenth century is founded on mediæval and renaissance tradition. It is particularly strong on the side of poetry and legendary drama, while its weakness lies in psychological novels and comedies. It is, in many instances, powerful and sincere but it is also rugged and crude. It flies from one extreme of human nature to the other and lacks that dainty sense of propor-

tion and intellectual balance which many English and French writers, even among the Romanticists, inherited from the Classicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

I have only been able to outline a few features of Belgian culture. The survey is far from complete; I have not even alluded to the development of religious life, which did so much to weld into one nation the two peoples settled on Belgian soil. But I hope that I have said enough to show that these various political, economic, artistic and literary aspects of social activity belong to the same nation, and that the whole picture "hangs together." There seems at first sight no relationship between the exceptional powers conferred on a Belgian burgomaster and the delight taken by Belgian story-tellers in the description of pageants and kermesses—or between the intensive methods of production adopted by Belgian farmers and the lack of great classical architecture in Belgian towns. These various aspects of social life are nevertheless closely linked together, for the first two are associated with the mediæval love of the "clock tower" and the power of local tradition, and the two others with the political decadence of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which provoked an artistic and commercial decline and compelled the people to concentrate their activity on the land. Such reflections will help us to realise that the character of this strange Belgian people, divided and united, democratic and monarchic, conservative and progressive, realistic and religious, possesses certain qualities which deserve the interest and sympathy of the student.

EMILE CAMMAERTS.

THE UNITED STATES LEADS THE WORLD.

IN one field the predominance of the United States remains unchallenged. John Haynes Holmes, the great New York preacher, recently said, "America is the most lawless country on the face of the globe." Statistics, indeed, prove that in the simple matter of murder she leads the world, and has done so for two decades. Never, perhaps, in all the annals of mankind has there been so callow a disregard for human life as exists to-day in many large American cities. The reader thinks of Chicago, but its criminal record is far from the worst, although it is pre-eminently successful in getting the most publicity. Recent crime statistics indicate that Chicago is slowly improving, whereas New York, Detroit and Memphis are growing worse. Memphis still retains her proud place as the most murderous spot on earth. In 1929 she had 668 murders per million, an increase of 10 per cent. over the previous year. Verily the casualties of peace are heavier here than those of war. Chicago's rate was only 127, a fall of 30 per cent., while New York showed a rate of 71, an increase of 25 per cent. The homicide rate in the United States for 1929 was 105, which was twenty-one times that of Great Britain, nine times that of Canada, five times that of Austria and nearly three times that of Italy. It has increased, moreover, 350 per cent. in ten years. The record in criminal law administration appears even worse. In the past five years, three hundred and fifty persons in Chicago were taken "for a ride." For these crimes a half-dozen were tried, and not one was sentenced to death. Murder would seem to be one of the safe occupations in Chicago. There are said to be 10,000 criminals at large in Chicago, and 30,000 in New York, where 25,000 "speakeasies" exist contrary to law. The Wickersham report on prohibition and crimes mentioned one notorious New York resort by name. The next day the police closed it!

A few years ago a group of Chicago "racketeers" exterminated at one fell swoop seven members of a rival gang with machine guns. Months later, a reporter (whose relations with the underworld have since made his name notorious) was murdered. On the heels of this, a Detroit radio announcer (later discovered to be a "racketeer") was "put on the spot" for broadcasting information about its criminals. The murder of Arnold Rothstein in New York was never solved, because the police feared the consequent revelations. Despite their great circumspection, however, the public learned sufficient to link this man with the dregs of the underworld and the police. A Chicago gangster kept an account

book which fell into the hands of the police when he was done to death. This book showed disbursements to the local police and £10,000 to the campaign fund of Mayor Thompson in 1927.

Under such conditions it is not to be marvelled at that such sinister figures as Al Capone and Jack Diamond make their appearance. The former's career serves to prove that truth is stranger than fiction. He is, indeed, almost a portent. Long known as a "public enemy," he has pursued his career of crime for five years with perfect impunity. His traffic in liquor, drugs, gambling and brothels is supposed to have brought him £14,000,000, of which he paid £6,000,000 for protection. He is the acknowledged chief of the "racketeers" employing seven hundred gangsters, of whom 20 per cent. are aliens and 30 per cent. paroled convicts. He is said to have cost Chicago nearly £30,000,000 a year. Nevertheless, neither the city police nor the state authorities found any cause to move against these enterprising persons. It was left for the Federal Government to proceed against them for their failure to pay taxes on income earned in a business clearly illegal and criminal. Capone pleaded guilty and the court gave him a month to settle up his business affairs. At the end of that time the judge allowed him to change his plea to "not guilty" and he went to trial in the usual way. Rare consideration indeed for a man reputed to be responsible for the deaths of fifty people. Experts calculate that the crime wave is costing Americans each year two to three billion pounds, which goes into the pockets of the worst criminal element the world has ever seen, an element, indeed, that kills innocent citizens with less compunction than the average person shoots a mad dog.

To account for the prevalence of violent crimes in America is far from easy. Due in part to the influence of the frontier where human life has been held cheap, murder has always been common. The country has been settled by the aggressive and discontented. In the earliest days the colonists advanced their frontiers only through killing aborigines. The United States was scarcely free from England until Shay's Rebellion and the Whisky Insurrection occurred. Two thousand murders characterised the period of the Gold Rush in California, five hundred in one year, with not more than five legal executions. While the Civil War was in progress, Quantrell and his band playfully shot down one hundred and forty people in the streets of Lawrence, Kansas. In the Southland they have for two-thirds of a century systematically violated the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution, and "Lynch Law" still raises its ugly head, naked and unashamed.

The *mores* of the frontier have been carried over into the twentieth century. Except for a few of the older cities, the United

States is still socially in a transition stage: she has ceased to belong to the frontier without becoming urban-minded. The bulk of the people in the towns take little interest in Government except on election day. The small-town newspaper, presumably the guardian of the public interest, is far more concerned with business, social life and sport, than with politics, unless, perchance, it is in league with the town's political boss. Crusading editors of the type of Horace Greeley no longer abound, and the passing of the *New York World* marks, perhaps, the end of that great phase of American journalism. Instead of attempting to develop an intelligent public opinion, the press entertains its readers by exploiting the sensational. A great lecture may receive a paragraph, while a man who sits eighty-seven hours on the top of a pole gets a column, and a brutal murderer half a page, sometimes accompanied by pictures of the beast. The responsibility of the fourth estate for the prevalence of crime is great, particularly for juvenile delinquency. To the immature or weak-minded the yellow journals and the cinema even succeed in making vice and crime attractive. Yet some agencies for the prevention of crime urge "more and better crime news." What they may mean by "better" is problematical, but many newspapers could not devote "more" space to crime, except at the expense of advertisements.

Our great industrial system, by diverting the attention of able, fearless men from government to business, is in part responsible for the growth of crime. America's unprecedented prosperity blinded its better citizens to the enormous cost and appalling inefficiency of local government, especially in the larger cities, where the carnival of crime reigns supreme. The influence of the World War in increasing crime in America has been much exaggerated, for the opposite result is apparent in Britain, France or Germany, whose people certainly suffered far more from it. The war, however, did speed up the production of lethal weapons and teach two million youth how to use them efficiently in a land where one buys machine guns almost as readily as postage stamps. These weapons, together with bombs and smoke screens, have all been skilfully utilised by high-powered criminals. The speedy automobile, in particular, has proved a great boon to them. And what of the future with the airplane?

Prohibition is frequently mentioned as a major cause for America's predominance in crime. Yet she has had local option for two-thirds of a century in certain areas, with but few violent crimes. Even the half-hearted attempt to enforce prohibition has brought about a collapse of local government. Local administration has always been inefficient in the United States, and frequently corrupt. Bentham's demand for trained experts in government has

never been accepted and scarcely heard of in the rural communities of the South and West, where the expert is suspect. Professor Laski justly complains because the American college graduate ignores politics as a career. Without political influence he would be foolish to consider it, as professional politicians loathe educated men with liberal ideas. Prohibition has only served to display the inadequacy of the local government to meet the exigencies of an industrial, twentieth-century civilisation.

The murder rate is highest in Southern cities, where the majority of the population is coloured. The policy of unrestricted immigration is another factor that has contributed heavily to the orgy of crime, for the "racketeers" are mainly Italians and Poles, frequently defended by cunning lawyers of foreign persuasion. The process of assimilation has been little helped by the public schools in the slums, where the teaching of practical citizenship begins and ends with saluting the flag. In the crowded cities old world parents have lost control over their progeny, particularly the boys, who are taught in school the creed of personal self-expression, which carries by implication the idea that no one should be required to do anything distasteful. In attempting to make education painless in the United States, educational administrators have almost succeeded in making it useless, at least for character training. Even the universities are accused of being a compromise between a country club and an athletic carnival. The religion of the children of immigrants also tends to disappear, with the result that when parents, schools and churches provide no restraining influence, the youth follows the line of least resistance. In him has been inculcated the fundamental doctrine of his gang that the only crime consists in getting caught.

Nothing startles the Englishman more than the lawlessness of American youth. This indictment applies not only to the children of wealthy families (for it has always applied to them), but to the lower and middle classes as well. While moral standards are being questioned as never before, the home, the school and the church are losing their grip on boys and girls during their most impressionable years. Nannery belonged to a youthful gang of seven. Two of these killed each other, one committed suicide in prison, another was killed attempting to escape; a fifth is still at Sing Sing, and a sixth enlisted in the Foreign Legion. Nannery himself was recently captured. His car contained a sawed-off shotgun, an automatic pistol and two revolvers. Nannery himself carried two revolvers and a tear-gas pistol. This walking arsenal is almost typical of the lawless youth, who are filling American prisons, or would fill them if the police did their duty. The Illinois Crime Survey showed that 64 per cent. of the boys and

57 per cent. of the girls brought before the juvenile courts of Chicago had foreign-born fathers.

Without a doubt, however, the greatest cause for the crime wave in America is the appalling breakdown of criminal justice. The inefficiency of the police, especially in the rural areas, surpasses belief. All too frequently they are corrupt, but usually they are simply incapable. Chosen through personal and political favouritism, they have, in the smaller cities, little or no training for their task, and their mental equipment is shockingly low. They are, even if honest, no match for the shrewd criminals with whom they must match their wits. A city of half a million recently introduced a civil service examination for policemen. These tests were made as elementary as possible. Yet only 10 per cent. of the candidates passed, even with the most liberal marking! Sheriffs and other executive officers in local areas have approximately the same training and intellectual outlook. Two such officers started for jail with two dangerous criminals. All four disappeared. Weeks later, the bodies of the sheriffs were found in a brush heap. Despite their handcuffs, the prisoners overpowered the officers, killed them and escaped.

Once apprehended, a dangerous criminal immediately calls in his lawyer. The legal profession in the United States is on a very low plane. There is no such distinction between solicitor and barrister as in England; the ordinary lawyer is both, and frequently in small towns a real estate agent besides. No criminal can be so notorious that he cannot find some able lawyer anxious to defend him. Clarence Darrow recently became the counsel of one of the most sinister figures in all American history, a man who was for a brief time the unscrupulous political boss of a considerable area in the middle and south west, and is now serving a life sentence for murder. Shrewd lawyers not only secure the release of their clients on bail, but by making use of various legal technicalities gain delay after delay, until the public has lost all interest in the case or the more important witnesses have disappeared. The prosecutor, often young and untrained, uses this office as a stepping-stone in law or politics. However efficient he may be, he is not likely to exert himself unduly against the defence lawyer, who is usually a prominent member of the bar and may be of great help to him in his professional advancement. Usually, however, the prosecutor is no match for the lawyer for the defence, who profits greatly by the prosecutor's ignorance or inefficiency. Frequently he secures the dismissal of the case against his client on the slightest technicality. A nefarious Chicago gangster was brought before the court twenty-eight times in ten years, and each time was let off without trial. Regardless of the seriousness of the crime or the bad character of

the defendant, bonding companies stand ready to furnish enormous bail, although at a price that staggers belief. Bankers also place their services at the disposal of notorious gangsters without asking embarrassing questions. Ralph Capone boasted that he had accounts in his bank under five different names. Neither he nor his brother could carry on their nefarious activities six months without banking facilities.

After numerous and long delays, incomprehensible to the layman, the accused comes to trial. A jury must first be secured, which frequently takes days, occasionally weeks. Disregarding entirely the oath which must be taken by the jurymen, both the defence and the prosecutor insist upon securing a jury ignorant of all the facts in the case, a custom which some English writers aptly refer to as "knocking the brains out of the jury." Challenges may be used for the most frivolous pretexts, and in serious crimes without any pretext whatever. If a case is really important, it is very difficult to secure twelve persons who have neither heard of the case nor made up their minds about it. Intelligent folk, moreover, shun jury duty as they do the plague, for their treatment during the trial is often so outrageous that a man from Mars might well wonder whether the defendant or the jury was on trial. The jury is often a splendid illustration of arrested mental development. Recently a most disgusting murder case ended in a verdict of manslaughter, carrying with it imprisonment from one to ten years. Ten of the twelve jurymen immediately announced that they had voted for manslaughter under the impression that it carried the death penalty. What hope is there for justice, when it is in the hands of a jury of morons?

Judges in the United States, both Federal and State, from the highest to the lowest are selected for political reasons. The President appoints Federal judges, but the nominations rest with the Senators in the districts concerned. Even in filling vacancies on the Supreme Bench, the President must study the candidate's political affiliations and the geographical area from which he should be drawn. In most states judges are elected, and for relatively short terms. Their pay, moreover, is so small that most men seeking such positions look upon them only as stepping-stones in the legal profession. One and all, they are inclined to be highly responsive to public criticism, ever fearful of damaging their political futures. Even in the states where the judges are appointed, conditions are frequently no better. The corruption among the New York City judges has of late become notorious. Appointed by Tammany Hall, they are little better than political henchmen. Yet Supreme Court judges there are paid £5,000 a year for a period of fourteen years. Tammany cynically boasts that she has the best judges money

can buy. The recent, unsavoury history of Crater, Silberman, and Norris indicates that judges there are even worse than in the days of Tweed. The recent dismissal of several Tammany judges for malfeasance in office indicates that conditions are much worse than in the days of Boss Tweed. And the Seaberry investigations now under way suggest that there is much worse to come.

The judge has no such authority in carrying on a trial as in England. In state and local courts he is inclined to fear the skilful defence lawyer who utilises every legal trick to prolong the trial and lessen the punishment. Even after the conviction, he may secure a stay of sentence or appeal the case on the slightest technicality. Mr. Albert Fall, Senator, and later a member of the Harding Cabinet, was finally convicted two years ago for a crime committed seven years earlier, and sentenced to imprisonment. Only recently has he entered the prison of his choice, after exhausting every legal means to obtain a respite or a pardon on the plea of ill-health. The trial of Harry Daugherty, his colleague, was another solemn, judicial farce, that may readily occur to mind. On the other hand, Saccho and Vanzetti have been executed, and Mooney and Billings are still serving time for crimes which many legal experts are convinced they never committed.

The worst feature in criminal law, however, is unquestionably the unscrupulousness of criminal lawyers. Admission to the bar is comparatively easy in all American states. With the proper coaching a man with only scant legal knowledge (and little else) can pass the necessary examinations. In far too many cases even the successful candidates are practically illiterate. One state constitution expressly forbids any qualifications for admission to the bar. A man once admitted to practice is unlikely to suffer disbarment. Although the number of tricky lawyers is legion, few are ever brought to task. Ambulance chasers and "fee-splitters" flourish as the green bay tree. The defence lawyer is often as bad as the criminal he defends. Occasionally at least he is an accomplice both before and after the fact in securing witnesses who will swear to anything he desires, as punishment for perjury is very rare indeed, though the crime itself is rampant. In such circumstances alibis are readily provided for those who need them. The counsel always knows, moreover, that if he steps beyond the pale, another of his own type will defend him.

With police, prosecutors, juries, judges, and lawyers such as they are, it is little short of a miracle that the ends of justice are served so frequently as they are, for these men are aided and abetted in their work by a sickly, mawkish sentimentality on the part of the public. A county treasurer stole £20,000 from the funds entrusted to him. His friends and neighbours defended

him by saying that he was a fine, public-spirited citizen who was always good to his family. It is superfluous to suggest that almost anyone could be good to his family with other people's money. Even should the convicted person be sent to prison, friends with political influence secure a parole or even a pardon before he has scarcely begun to serve his sentence. It is notorious that well-known criminals of the most dangerous sort are released, and the public is none the wiser until they are caught red-handed once more.

Is there no relief in sight? Not until the American people are willing to divorce the administration of justice from politics. As long as the police, the prosecutors and the judges are a part of the spoils system, just so long will such a state of things continue. Until some steps are taken to destroy the influence of the political boss in selecting officers of the law, all other suggestions at reform will prove futile. Once this principle is accepted, however, the United States may hope for efficient police, who will not only apprehend criminals, but prevent crime. Prosecutors may then be selected for merit, and adequately rewarded by a liberal salary so that they may look upon such positions as in themselves worthy, rather than as a stepping-stone to something better. Then, too, will come judges of high character who will put unscrupulous lawyers in their place. All this can come, however, only with the thorough awakening of public conscience. That is going to be difficult, for Americans have been quiescent so long in their period of great prosperity, waiting for the legal profession (which dominates legislatures as nowhere else in the world)* to reform criminal law. Some of the finest legal minds to-day are anxious for revolutionary changes in procedure, but they are as voices crying in the wilderness compared to the great unleavened mass of lawyers who are abundantly satisfied with things as they are. With even a slight simplification of the procedure in civil and criminal cases the United States could dispense with half her lawyers. The average citizen, therefore, need not expect the legal profession to commit *hara-kiri*. Neither should he anticipate at first too much from a population whose economic smugness has been satisfied with such men as Walker and Thompson for mayors of large cities.

Since the days of Edmund Burke, lawyers have been a power in America. They are to-day so entrenched in business and as the protectors of Big Business that it will require a popular revolution to cause them to consider seriously reforms that are

* Less than 15 per cent. of the House of Commons are members of the legal profession, while more than 60 per cent. of the American House of Representatives are lawyers.

absolutely indispensable. This move must, therefore, come from the people themselves, certainly not from the lawyers, who are inherently conservative. They bitterly opposed the reform of criminal law in England a century ago and they oppose to-day any considerable change in America. Educating public sentiment into a respect for law must begin in the home. Parents must not only preach it, but practise it as well, for there are intimations that in some instances youths will become wild imitating their parents. The schools, with parental backing, could do much that they have hitherto failed to do, especially when they have been drawn off from their legitimate task of training youth into an exploitation of the theories of behaviourism and Freudianism. The Church also could do far more in solving this problem of problems than it has hitherto done. Its time would be far better employed thus than in quarrelling over minute questions of doctrine, or in questioning the bearing of Darwinism upon the description of creation as set forth in the book of Genesis hundreds of years ago. Perhaps the serious economic depression may give American citizens sufficient leisure for a thorough heart-searching, and lead them to a deeper sense of civic responsibility. Once thoroughly aroused the public conscience may, in the name of social justice, force a complete overhauling of criminal procedure.

In so brief a summary, the shortcomings of American criminal procedure have necessarily been over-emphasised. After all, miscarriages of justice affect directly a comparatively small part of the people. Except in the largest cities the number of criminals is never large, and the proportion of citizens paying tribute to "racketeers" negligible. Even in Memphis or Chicago the average person goes peacefully on his way, undisturbed by gang warfare. Despite the spoils system, there are large numbers of able, unselfish lawyers, judges and prosecutors, who are working manfully to safeguard the ends of justice; despite legal technicalities and subnormal juries, substantial justice is rendered in a large percentage of trials.

WILLIAM THOMAS MORGAN.

Indiana University.

THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN JAPAN.

COMMUNISM in China is an Eastern thing with a Western name—a mixture of peasants' war and the brigandage engendered by mass poverty and government impotence. In Japan it is a genuine modern growth, born of industrialism, nurtured on Marxian economics, avowing loyalty to the Third International and preaching a dictatorship of the proletariat. Mr. T. Nosaka, a Japanese Communist, dates the beginning of Communism in Japan from the Russian revolution which "awakened the masses from their long sleep." The date need not be disputed though Communism in Japan, as in Europe, had a pre-natal history. What the Russian revolution did was to separate the left wing from an old amorphous movement which had been slowly growing since the first Socialist Society was founded (soon to die) in 1882, and give it a name and a policy. After 1922 Syndicalism and Anarchism disappeared, *spurlos versenkt*, and the Socialist movement divided into two camps, Parliamentary Labourism and Communism.

Seeds from Russia's red harvest could not have failed to blow over Japan's garden wall; but the Third International, then busy extending the Communist movement to the Far East, did not trust to the wind of the spirit alone. In 1921 the Baku Congress of Nations of the Orient, presided over by Zinoviev, organised the Communist movement in Asia. Japan was not represented. In 1921 a Chinese emissary of Comintern, equipped with funds, visited Japan and invited a number of left wing Socialists to attend the next conference of the Third International in Moscow. They went; they saw; they were converted. In 1923 the Japanese Communist Party ("J.K.P.") was founded, but the arrest of the leaders in May of the same year halted its activities before they had well begun. Three months later the movement disappeared in the ashes of the great earthquake and was not heard of again until 1925, when it was revived at the instigation of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Third International, then ruling the roost at Shanghai. Japan had just enfranchised ten million propertyless voters, and Comintern saw opportunities in the coming election in which the "toiling masses" would for the first time take part. In 1926 "J.K.P." was reinforced by Japanese students from the Lenin University at Moscow and its organisation was overhauled. A political programme with local colour was prepared, a central executive committee appointed and regional committees were set up. "Cells" were planted in factories, in trade unions and in the new Labour groups which were coming together for the election. A Communist sheet *Akahata* (The Red Flag) was mimeographed

and secretly circulated among the reliable who, if its circulation is a guide, did not exceed four hundred. The Communist Party, an illegal organisation, could not appear in the open, so its agents permeated the unions and the leftward Labour groups. The results were encouraging. While the number of convinced Marxians cannot have been great, hundreds of hot-headed young Labour politicians were influenced. The Labour-Farmer Party on the extreme left came under Communist control, according to the police. It nominated eleven candidates, found their deposits of £100 each and paid their expenses—a suspicious feat, as it seemed to the watchful Home Office, for a small party of penniless men. From all parts of the country “red” activity was reported. Under cover of a snowstorm of election literature thousands of Communist tracts were distributed. The nature of their propaganda varied from mild radicalism to full-blooded revolution. Beginners were wooed with innocuous handbills on “The Right to Strike,” “An Eight-hour Day for All,” “State Relief for the Unemployed.” For those who wanted stronger meat there were “Parliament without an Emperor,” “Confiscate the Property of Emperor and Capitalists,” and “Dictatorship of Workers and Farmers.”

A Seiyukai Cabinet of conservative-nationalist complexion was in power presided over by General Takaka. Ministers were startled by the extent of Communist propaganda, surprised and shocked by the vulgarity of certain references to the Imperial family. Counter-measures were elaborated. On the night of March 15th, 1928, the police of 34 prefectures raided the homes of hundreds of people suspected of Communist sympathies and detained for examination in the police stations more than a thousand persons. The Government dissolved the Farmer-Labour Party but permitted it to reorganise later. Two of its members who had been elected to Parliament were allowed to retain their seats. The legal weapon against revolutionary agitation, the Peace Preservation Act of 1925, was amended to provide that members of any organisation aiming at the “alteration of the foundation of the State as laid down in the constitution, might be punished with death, or with life imprisonment or with imprisonment for not less than five years.” Of the thousand or more persons detained, 484 were prosecuted; 280 of these are now serving sentences and 166 still await their trial; 18 were acquitted; 20 dismissed.

The movement had suffered a resounding blow, but it rallied. More Japanese graduates were sent from Moscow to replace the lost leaders and some of those at home who had slipped through the police net showed no lack of determination. In the winter of 1928-29 “J.K.P.” was resuscitated and the propaganda begun anew. But the authorities had not been asleep. After the alarming

discoveries of the election the special branch of the police which deals with subversive movements was reorganised and strengthened, and subsequent events proved that it possessed a remarkable inner knowledge of Communist activities. As the result of fresh raids in 1929 and 1930, 895 more persons were sent for trial out of a much larger number examined. During a considerable part of this period "J.K.P." leaders had been "on the run" and the party was not functioning. Now virtually all of the known leaders are under arrest and the trials, including those of some moving spirits who have been in prison since the first raid, have begun. Communism has once more been suppressed and the police are confident that any recrudescence will be promptly detected.

The party organisation being thus broken up, the authorities are concerning themselves with methods of checking an alarming growth of Communism among students. Of the 1,422 persons arrested, 463 were graduates or students of higher schools, colleges and universities. Of 173 persons sent for trial after the 1930 Tokyo raids, 93 had received university education. Tokyo Imperial University headed the list with 31 of its members indicted; and almost every seat of higher learning in the capital contributed its quota. Some of the younger professors have been arrested and others forced to resign. One arrested student is the heir of a viscount, one the son of a general, two are sons of a university president. Many were released without prosecution, but leniency did not prevent fresh ebullitions. On May Day this year 35 Tokyo students were locked up for participating in the minor disorders proper to the occasion. The provincial universities are as deeply infected as those of the capital. Kyoto, that ancient and beautiful city, is a hotbed of student Communism. In the round-up of 1928 some 32 student Socialist societies were ordered to dissolve.

This aspect of "dangerous thoughts" gives the authorities greater concern than any other. The Minister of Justice has declared that the possibility of students one day taking the lead in Communist activity is a source of danger to the State. A vision of the universities furnishing leaders to the proletariat has appeared to some of the students. "'Forward among the masses' was our motto," writes one of them, "as it had been that of the young Russian intellectuals in the nineteenth century." It is an outmoded motto in modern Communist doctrine, and the rules of "J.K.P." now provide that only "workers" may be admitted to membership. So, at least, a Communist student informs me, but a visit to the Tokyo court where the Communist trials are now proceeding would show that the rule has been applied with some

flexibility. Communism in Japan is not rich enough to reject recruits from any source. The movement has drawn its best leaders from the intelligentsia. And while students may be ineligible for membership of "J.K.P." they have given it much needed help. The Tokyo *Nichi Nichi* reports that after the police had broken up the Communist organisation the collection of funds became very difficult and the leaders were reduced to the direst poverty. A young Communist hit on the idea of making collections in the universities, with the result that a monthly income of about £200 was obtained. The sum may be exaggerated but the leaders who were last arrested were not in want of money.

This picture of the universities honeycombed with Communism is at first sight very disquieting. But student Communism, as the authorities begin to realise, is not the true Communism of Comintern but a sympathetic growth which has been stimulated by unwise methods of repression. Marxist doctrines have been enveloped in prohibitions. Professors of economics suspected of sympathy with them have been compelled to resign. Students have been given the idea that Communist economics are a social high explosive and it is not surprising that eager spirits have formed circles for their study. As the prohibition of alcohol has made drinking fashionable in some American universities, the frowns of the authorities have made Marx fashionable in Japan, and the term "Marx-boy" has come into vogue to describe not so much the serious young Socialist as his imitators who would be in the mode. The methods of the police in dealing with student Communists have been the opposite of those which would be thought effective in England. Sakae Osugi's* description of himself as a "prison-made man" can be applied to most of the students who have graduated from intellectual curiosity about Marxism to the active propagation of Communism. A little knowledge of police methods shows how the hardening process which makes amateurs into revolutionaries is done. Anyone suspected of Communist sympathies may be taken to the police station for examination, and detained, regardless of the spirit of the law, till the police are satisfied that he has nothing more to reveal. The "third degree" is employed, subject to the single restriction that physical marks which might be shown to a judge are avoided. The word torture is not too strong for some of the methods said to be employed with recalcitrant prisoners while they are in the hands of police officers of low rank. Stories of the brutal treatment of students in police stations circulate through every high school and university in the country. Young men whose interest in Marxism would be quickly

* Osugi was a well-known anarchist who was strangled by an officer in the disturbances which followed the earthquake and fire of 1923.

appeared hear those stories and are drawn by indignation and sympathy into the often puerile "red" societies which the police so vigilantly hunt down.

Severity having failed, other methods are now being tried. Conferences of the faculties with legal and administrative officials are continually discussing means of directing students' thoughts into safer channels. The difficulty of obtaining employment after graduation is believed to be a cause of discontent, so employment agencies are being established at the universities. The study of Marxism is not prohibited, but students are to be guided by their professors instead of forming debating clubs of their own. When students engage in suspicious activities they are to be cautioned instead of taken to the police station for the "third degree." On the day that this is written the vernacular press announces that 24 students of the Law College of Tokyo Imperial University have been suspended for a year and one has been expelled in consequence of the actions of a club to which they belonged. The students protest that they only tried to get an obnoxious restaurant removed from the University precincts, but the professors who investigated the case would hardly have imposed a public penalty for so small a cause. At all events, the matter was handled by the University and not by the police, and that indicates a sensible change. It may be more successful than the other and can hardly be less. The judicial authorities for two years past have been urging the necessity of distinguishing between student Communism and the Communist Party, and in 1930 and 1931, 367 arrested students were dismissed by the judges without trial.

Despite the unquestionable vitality of student Communism, it can hardly be called an organic part of the Communist movement, and wiser handling by the authorities should lead to its natural decline. Student life in Japan is free from the heady movements which afflict the universities of Egypt, India and China. The Japanese student is generally a practical person who seeks in education the means of a successful career. Next to his studies his chief interest is sport. "Dictatorship of the proletariat" is not the social ideal of a man who expects his degree to open the way to a distinguished or at least a comfortable career. It is true that the authorities are in a dilemma; they cannot easily administer a policy which professes to grant intellectual freedom for the study of Marx's ideas and at the same time prohibits all efforts at putting those ideas in practice. Yet a change of method, even if the golden mean between liberty and repression is hard to find, will make revolt less alluring to young minds. As the Japanese are efficient administrators, it is reasonable to expect that the errors of the past few years will be rectified, and when that is done student

Communism will shrink to dimensions as unalarming as those of the general Communist movement.

The reader has now a picture of the Communist movement in Japan before him. The statistical test—1,422 prosecutions in four years—suggests as a first impression that it cannot, with any pretence to sober description, be called “a vast revolutionary conspiracy.” And while, in a question like this, one is conscious that the *imponderabilia* may be more important than the statistics, scrutiny of the facts behind the figures confirms that first impression. The arrests were not a single haul of persons simultaneously engaged in a seditious enterprise, but the successive reappings of four harvests of Communist propaganda. The offence for which those hundreds of persons have been tried is the propagation of Communism. Plots against persons or against property have not been discovered. The words of the statute are very broad. It is a crime to belong to a society which seeks to subvert the fundamental principles of the constitution or repudiates the system of private property. A judgment of the Appeal Court has just affirmed that anyone who knowingly assists the members of such an organisation is equally guilty with them. The police in their reports of later raids have announced the arrest of a number of “sympathisers,” sympathy having in some cases taken the form of contributions to the funds. The wide definition enables the police to subject to rigorous and prolonged examination virtually any person whom they suspect. The provision of the law which forbids the detention beyond a limited period of persons not charged with a definite offence is defeated by moving the prisoners from one police station to another or by liberating and rearresting them. The meshes of the police net are close. It is extremely difficult to obtain sight of Communist leaflets, simply because people are afraid to have them in their possession. On occasions such as May Day the police have no scruples about stopping likely looking persons in the street and searching them.

One naturally asks why there should be so much cry about so little wool. The answer is that the offence is new and therefore alarming, and it is peculiarly hateful to the authorities and to the conservative instincts of the race. The Japanese are the least Oriental, in mentality, of the Asian peoples, but they reverence discipline and are accustomed to be ruled. The police are the instruments of an authority which pervades every department of life; they attend all political meetings, and do not hesitate to stop any speaker whose sentiments seem to go beyond their narrow bounds of political propriety. If some Japanese visitors to England admire the freedom of speech of Hyde Park, there are more who deplore the laxity which tolerates it, and few who would

be content to see similar freedoms introduced to Japan. They are probably right, for the Japanese people are impressionable, and their religious life shows that charlatans easily obtain a following. Public life is plagued with societies of super-patriots ready for every kind of reactionary activity from breaking strikes to planting bombs in Ministers' doorways. They are a survival of old Japan, too deeply ramified to be easily extirpated, and in any case it is more convenient to authority to turn a blind eye on the ultra-loyal than on the disloyal. But the risk that freedom of agitation might call up opposing hosts of Communists is one from which Governments shrink. It is natural therefore that the police should exercise minute supervision over politically suspicious speech or action, and not surprising that a movement which proclaims its faith in the Russian revolution should be relentlessly hunted down. The indifference which a British Government could display is no criterion in Japan.

The efficiency of police repression brings its own penalties. Unquestionably some of the Communist leaders now on trial have been hardened by police severities. Severity suggests fear and creates the impression that Communism is truly dangerous and thus attracts those who are dissatisfied and desire change. But all such considerations only throw into stronger relief the failure of Communism to make progress since its introduction to Japan ten years ago. Making full allowance for the fervour of the Communists and the persistency with which they stick to their cause, they are too few and their influence is too limited to make them a danger to the State. The circumstances which gave them their opportunity in Russia are absent from Japan. The government is strong and efficient, and though it is less completely under the influence of public opinion than that of England, quadrennial parliaments and manhood suffrage ensure that unpopular Ministries can be dismissed and that policy does in the main command the support of the people. Before the enactment of manhood suffrage in 1925 Japanese labour saw little hope of achieving its ends by constitutional means and might have been accessible to Communist propaganda. The grant of a vote to every labourer and the spectacle of Labour forming a Government in conservative and monarchical England brought the trade unions into the parliamentary school. A constitutional Labour party is developing in Japan on British lines, and this party, though still immature and schism-ridden, seems likely to draw to it both the growing trade unions and the intellectual "liberals" of the cities and universities. Parliamentary Labour is a barrier which Communism can hardly hope to scale in a country like Japan where education is universal, order enforced and respected, and the masses, poor, no

doubt, but strongly self-respecting, are quite capable of self-help both by strikes and by the vote. It would be foolish to pretend that the new factory proletariat which modern industry has created is not discontented, but its members are enrolling in trade unions and not in the Communist party.

In the long run the character of a people determines which way it will turn when it finds itself at the cross-roads. The Japanese national character is the product of the family system, and is saturated with ideas of loyalty, discipline and responsibility. The man in the street is consequently impelled to the right rather than the left, and the Fascist idea, embodied in the Young Men's Associations with their two and a half million active members, is incomparably more congenial to the Japanese mind than the idea of revolt and subversion preached by the Communists.

A Judge of the Supreme Court who has tried many Communists thus sums up his views :

Though Communism has for the time being been suppressed we cannot overlook the fact that there is a strong tendency in that direction on the part of some people. . . . They are tired of the hard lot of the workers, oppressed by the greed of those who profit at their expense, and disquieted by disclosures of corruption among officials whose unscrupulous dealings with wealth have fostered an unprecedented feeling of distrust of the upper classes. The increasing number of university graduates who are unable to find employment aggravates the situation. Those unemployed intellectuals find the road to radicalism very inviting and, pushed by despair and shattered ideals, they travel swiftly towards Communism and anarchism. As might be expected, the literature of the time reflects those tendencies and tends to feed the desire of young idealists to learn about the condition of the proletariat and to do something to improve their miserable lot. We cannot pick up a current magazine without finding it filled with works of this kind. There is no doubt that the public in general has no sympathy with extreme ideas which aim to establish a proletarian dictatorship. Most people know that change can only come gradually if it is to be lasting, but everyone knows that changes must come, and reactionaries who try to retard progress and hamper freedom may lead this growing nation into paths which are more dangerous than their own shortsighted vision can perceive. What the result of this struggle between the longing for freedom and justice and the desire to preserve the old order will be only the future can tell."

The writer may be permitted to add his own belief, supported by such acts as the grant of manhood suffrage and the recent Government bill giving legal status to trade unions, that the Japanese authorities are not unaware of the value of timely concession nor blind to the need of reforms.

HUGH BYAS.

TEACHING THE BLIND TO MODEL.

THIS globe is a very tiny place. When a daring soul in Paris—or was it New York? I really do not know the origin of the revolutionary innovation—let us say New York then—first used mother-of-pearl enamel on her finger-nails, all self-respecting women in the centres of the civilised world were made aware of the fact inside a very few days, and could act accordingly. When Suzanne Lenglen turned milliner a breathless universe knew it the selfsame day. When Jack Diamond was shot, cables and wireless kept five continents posted as to the exact stages of his sufferings, and new clues to the assassins. This globe is a huge place. Many shiploads of grain were being burned in the Argentine and the Middle West, at the same time that thousands were dying of starvation in China. Fine and stirring books that might give joy to millions remain unknown except to a circle of a few hundred. Deeds of courage, of sacrifice, of loving-kindness and public-spirit are done every day, deeds worthy to be bruited abroad; but none hear of them. Are these the tritest of commonplaces? They are. But one should sometimes have the courage to pronounce them.

Little post-war Austria, with its harrowing need and agonising distress, and its great surplus of creative intelligentsia—half of its denizens live in the cities—seems to be teeming with new ideas and experiments and full-fledged reforms in the provinces of education, arts and crafts, medicine, housing, civil engineering. Some of the achievements in the sphere of the activity, school, housing and architecture generally, and surgery, have become pretty well known lately, at least in the circles interested. Others have remained absolutely obscure, perhaps because the persons responsible have neither push nor personal ambition, resting content in quietly pursuing the work for its own sake. The following is an attempt to represent such an experiment: teaching the blind to model in the true sense of the word. In the writer's judgment it is a momentous one, though naturally limited to a small circle. Yet surely every effort to enrich the lives of the blind, who have been almost entirely cut off from the enjoyment of the fine arts, deserves the profound interest of both the general public and the experts. Readers familiar with institutes for the blind will tell me that modelling has long been a feature in these schools. That is so, but with a vast difference.

When Haüy, the immemorial founder of the first institute for the blind, inspired by Diderot's treatise on the subject, began to train and educate blind children, he made the mistake of laying the chief stress on oral teaching; and his successors, above all

the remarkable educator of the blind in Vienna, Klein, continued in this path. The hand, the only substitute the blind have for the eye, was woefully neglected. That was more than a hundred years ago, however, and the bad effects of this lop-sided training, on the one hand an acquisition of empty, merely verbal knowledge, a ready juggling with words without real live conceptions behind them, and on the other a dangerous development of fancy at the cost of common sense, were found out comparatively soon. Then came the great development of modern psychology which investigated all the possibilities of the sense of touch, and showed that perceptions coming from several different channels, such as the senses of smell, taste, hearing, and touch, could merge into a so-called "complication," that is a uniform conception built up by simultaneous associations, and far more valuable than a simple perception, not only because of its strength, but also because it can be recalled by any one of the components apart from the rest. Thus when a blind child comes to know a walnut, say, by hearing it clatter to the floor, then picks it up, feels the shell, breaks it, smells and finally eats the kernel, he will from now on know a nut by any of its characteristics, of smell, of taste, of form (in its various essentials) and of sound, even when only one of them is brought to his knowledge.

When all this was recognised, the educators of the blind began to concentrate their energies on developing and training the sense of touch, especially the hand, and this part of the training is actually tending to claim a certain supremacy. Modelling in wax and clay was soon introduced as an aid, but the lessons in this subject had one aim only: the training of the sense of touch, so that it should perceive delicate differences in temperature, in texture, in form and dimension. The pupils were given large relief models in plaster and other materials of subjects known to them in nature, such as flowers, leaves, fruit, and they were made to copy them as exactly as possible. The teaching was generally limited to the two highest forms, that is to boys and girls from sixteen and upwards.

What Professor Loewenfeld, a young Vienna painter and teacher at the Vienna Institute for the Jewish Blind, has been doing for six years, is a very different matter. For the little children he has found a means of indulging their restless urge for activity, so far denied an appropriate outlet. For while normal children will draw, paint, paste, and work in sand and clay, without any instruction or even impulse from without, the blind child has only blocks and suchlike, more or less fixed and unmouldable elements of his play, that do not even remotely reach the possibilities offered by a scrap of paper and a pencil to the imagination

of the seeing child. And when we hear that nine-tenths of his impressions come to man through the eye, one-tenth only through the medium of the other four senses together, we can faintly imagine how thwarted and incomplete the life of the blind must necessarily be. We are apt to forget this, because the blind, *when we see them*, are so cheerful and content. They are happiest in company, but wretched enough, with dark squalls of passion passing over them, when alone. This in direct contrast to the deaf, who feel their disability most in company, and can be quite happy alone with a book, or with nature. These comments, of course, apply chiefly to those who have been born blind, or, what comes to the same thing, have lost their sight at an early age. They form over one-third of the blind in Europe, in the Orient still more. People who have lost their sight late in life, such as, for instance, the victims of war, are in a different class. Not only have they had the advantage of normal training of their faculties, but they have at their disposal an inexhaustible fund of memories, sometimes as good as reality, or better.

For adolescents Loewenfeld's teaching means much more than an outlet for creative impulses; it has enabled them for the first time to indulge in self-expression other than written or oral outpourings of the soul. It is true that for the average normals there are no more than the same opportunities as, theoretically, exist for the blind. But we must remember that in fact these opportunities are far more limited, because the blind cannot form friendships and other unions with the ease of people moving freely in normal human companionship, and because to write what they can read again is a most complicated—and costly—affair. Furthermore, the blind are so hampered, so completely thrown on their inner resources, that their life of emotion and dream is far stronger and stormier than that of the normal, and involves a far greater need of an outlet. In practice, the teaching seems simple enough, though even the layman can see that it needs an understanding soul, and sound training not only in the actual subject, but also in psychology, as well as a good all-round cultural equipment.

The lowest class consists of children from seven to ten years of age. The first difficulty to be overcome is that of the material. While normals love nothing so much as dabbling in mud and the like, the blind abhor the feel of the slippery, cold clay, and prefer wax, a material not so well suited to the purpose. Once this dislike is overcome, however, the interest and eagerness of the children is intense. They work in couples, the chief advantage being that each is obliged to feel what the other is doing, not merely to attend to his own work. The subjects are taken from

life mostly, great care being observed to avoid such as are not accurately known to the children. But the lessons are also meant to illustrate and strengthen the conceptions gained in the course of the regular curriculum, especially as an aid to geography, natural history, and so on. Thus the children form little landscapes known to them, a public park with a Beethoven memorial in it where they sometimes take their walks, for instance; they make carts and horses, dogs and cats; a boy from the country models a cow with a sucking calf; and the day I watched them a great and exciting experiment was being made: a steamboat was the subject, though only four of the dozen children had actually been on a real steamboat. The risk attending such imperfectly realised subjects is obvious from what I said above: the blind are ready to juggle with superficial conceptions, as they do with empty words; they tend, naturally, either to overrate or to minimise their powers, and such tasks as involve the use of much imagination may bring deep disappointment. However, on this occasion the experiment was made, because the children who had had the glorious experience of a sail on the Danube had so graphically described it to the others. They had also constructed a boat in the garden with the aid of an overturned table, some boards and sticks and ropes, and had played at boat for days. Consequently one might suppose the children knew enough about the subject to risk the experiment, especially as they had also handled small models. It proved a great success. I do not think that normal children could on the average produce anything like what those blind children did, unaided except by occasional explanations and directions. One ship was only just recognisable as such; it was made by the smallest boy and the clumsiest girl of the class. All the others were marvellous, one so delicately finished that at first sight it might have been taken for a wooden model; another had artistic value, being "seen" as a whole and modelled accordingly.

The teacher gave actual help only twice—it was not demanded oftener—but had to explain divers points of a technical nature, and to restrain the eagerness for unlimited detail. Thus one little boy begged to have the engine explained, and strenuously insisted on putting one in. His wish could not be fulfilled, for the reasons given above. All the children executed cabins and inner arrangements, even furniture, most carefully, though they covered them up with the decks afterwards. It was pathetic to see how they still found another last touch, another improvement, after the bell had sounded. They worked so absorbedly that they grudged even the short break for tea, and had to be forced to go and drink it.

This delight in the work partly explains the good results. Two

other important points that instantly leap to the observer's eye are the infinitely closer concentration and far better training of the hand that these children already possess, as compared to normals. It is easy to understand about the concentration when we remember that most of the irritating diversions we have to suffer have their source in sight. Thus normal children at work or at play have their attention diverted quite independently of their volition by gestures or grimaces the others make, by the waving of a branch or the passing of a bird outside the window. One great difference between the sense of sight and that of touch is that the latter is limited to a small space circumscribed by the person's reach, and in a different sense by his will: the child need only feel and grope when he wants to, and except in the rare event of something bumping against him he is never disturbed by outside impressions of this kind. The diverting influences of sound are also greater with the normals, strange as this may seem. For though the blind are very sensitive of hearing, they never turn towards the source of the sound, as normals do—there is no object for them in turning. Thus they go on with the work in hand even while listening intently. They never stop modelling, for instance, when the teacher speaks to them. The better training of the sense of touch needs no comment. So far Professor Loewenfeld and I were at one as regards the explanations for the almost miraculous results achieved. I suggested another, however, to which he would not agree, and yet I venture to offer it here for what it is worth, since there is no control test to be found in psychological literature which has not yet dealt with this novel method. I imagine that the direct relation of perception and reproduction has some part in this success. In other words: the seeing child perceives the object through one set of nerves (the sense of sight) and reproduces it by another, the sense of touch, only controlled by the sense of sight, while the blind child uses one and the same set of nerves in perceiving and reproducing.

Another point of interest is the saddening fact that on the whole the æsthetic pleasure which the children receive is very slight. It seems that Helen Keller's delight in feeling a beautiful face, and other instances pointing to an æsthetic value in the sense of touch, are exceptions. It is only gifted individuals among the blind who can feel pure æsthetic pleasure (if there is such a thing) by the sense of touch. With most of these children the joy of creating, and of following their instincts of activity, are the primary and almost sole components of the delight they take in the modelling class.

The older boys and girls form the human face and figure, and if what I said above as to the way the blind work and the pre-

dominance of emotional elements is taken into account, one can understand the powerful impression made on the spectator by these statuettes and heads and masks. They are all formed with the longing to pour out the creator's soul; they strike one in the same way as modern expressionist work. As the modern sculptor of certain schools arbitrarily and of deliberate purpose treats the proportions of the body with sovereign contempt, concentrating all his energy and ability on reproducing the emotions he is charged with, so the blind young people of Loewenfeld's class naïvely, and *because* of their defect, work in the same way. Still, if the proportions are sometimes faulty, on the whole the details are nothing short of miraculous. There is the nude figure of a tired girl, every line of the slack body expressing exhaustion, the muscles of the back executed with amazing realism and delicacy; or a workman's hand, lifesize, that might well inspire a poet, an old man telling stories to a child, where the poignantly eager, thirsty expression of the listener is painfully characteristic of the blind. Watching them at work one notices that the faces they model almost always show a certain resemblance to their own, which is not to be wondered at, as, of course, their own face and form is all they can come to know really intimately. They work very quickly, perhaps also because the control of the eye, the comparison between model and creation, does not take place. Three of the gifted pupils, a girl and two lads of eighteen, formed a very creditable face mask each in the course of less than an hour. One represented a smiling, contented child, another a perplexed thinker, the third a boy angrily sticking out his tongue, quite a diabolical bit of malice. I talked to the artists privately, and in different words they all corroborated what Loewenfeld had told me—that they work with such passionate delight chiefly because this activity offers the means of self-expression.

PAULA ARNOLD.

IDEALISM IN CLASSICAL LITERATURE.

A PART from certain metaphysical meanings which do not immediately concern us here, idealism as a quality of human beings seems to mean an optimistic state of mind in which men are prepared to sacrifice themselves for some good aim or purpose which they have before them, and on this definition, I imagine, almost any brand of idealist would agree. But as the practical application of the definition would probably reveal differences of opinion, I will anticipate a later conclusion by dividing idealists into two groups and attempting to illustrate what they are. These two groups are the classical idealists and the romantic idealists and correspond accordingly, as their titles indicate, to two very well-known and important human outlooks, the impression of which, whether in politics or in literature, is stamped very clearly on the pages of history. As I intend to use these words in a very exact and perhaps narrow sense I will first endeavour to explain within what limits I mean them to be used.

By classical I wish to indicate a conception of human life (or attitude towards it) which has behind it a tradition of several thousand years and which is mirrored pre-eminently, although by no means exclusively, in the tragic drama of Greece and Western Europe. This conception, moreover, contains something in it central to human experience and does not vary with the ages. It represents man not in a state of peace, but of conflict, and as struggling in this conflict against opposing forces, whether these be the forces of nature, or a hostile environment, or a man's own divided will, or the will of other men. It portrays man as a creature of will partly conditioned and partly free, but emphasises to such an extent his freedom, that his nobility seems to rest upon this freedom itself. It shows him, lastly, in a state of collapse or fall, tragic ruin as the phrase goes, and thereby suffering a catastrophe which, however strong his will, nothing he can do can avert. Above all—and this point is of the utmost importance—the ruin of the tragic hero is not brought about merely by some error or sin on the part of the hero, by weakness of will or by the *hubris* or overweeningness of the Greeks, or even by the overwhelming strength of the adverse powers, but also by something else which lies deeper than these and which is nothing less than the tragic structure of the universe itself.

The truth of this may be seen by a brief examination of any tragic drama worthy of the name which the world has ever produced. It is because of this underlying structure that we find it so difficult, when analysing with care the action of a tragedy,

to apportion the "blame" or "guilt" of the catastrophe between the various personages and forces who seem to bring it about. We may consider, for example, the *Antigone* of Sophocles, a play in which at first sight the catastrophe is attributable to the conflict between Antigone and the King, Antigone because she insists upon burying her brother and the King because he insists that she shall not do so. This conflict of will leads to the death of Antigone and of the King's son Hemon, and to the bitter remorse of the King himself, a feature which usually leads to his assumption of the major portion of the blame for the entire catastrophe. Yet if we examine further we shall see that the catastrophe is far from being attributable only to the action of the King, and that the series of events does not really justify the laying of the blame at his door. The truth is rather that each person in the play according to his convictions acted as he ought to act, and that for some reason which does not lie solely in the totality of action, the outcome of it all was the catastrophe we have seen. We cannot help feeling, indeed, that we ourselves might easily find ourselves in a similar dilemma, thus realising that since the days of Sophocles the world has not changed very much.

The obvious example, and the one which is intimately related to that of Antigone, is the case of the conscientious objector in conflict with the law of the state which would make him do things against his principles. To this conflict, as many people would admit, there is really no solution this side of eternity, and because there is no solution there is a mystery in tragedy which is of strange fascination. It is, of course, often argued rather loosely that the root of tragic ruin, like that of most human catastrophes, lies in overweeningness on the part of the hero, lack of restraint in some direction, failure to attain the happy mean of human endeavour. This is partly true, but there is also something beyond and above it. Just before the final ruin, there is what is called the point of highest tension, when opposing forces are very nearly balanced and it is hard to tell who wins and who loses, a point which is itself on the highest level a most intense form of *mean*. But there is equilibrium for a moment only. Under the strain something gives way on one side or the other, collapse of the hero ensues, and there arises the curious feeling of inevitability often felt in tragedy, the feeling that this was by no means to be avoided and that it has a meaning and a high meaning of its own. In a similar manner it would not be difficult to quote from the *Julius Cæsar* of Shakespeare and its somewhat complicated plot, in which the representatives of two opposing political parties, both to a greater or less extent convinced of the justice of their cause, come to blows and by fair means or

foul do each other to death, while the world stands holding its breath. If we wish to take a drama on a more private and individual plane the *Hamlet* of the same author will furnish us with ample material. In this play the blame is largely but not entirely with the King. It is also due to the peculiar character of *Hamlet*, to the incidents of chance, to the unforeseen ways of the elements, and the outcome of all these causes is that at the end not only the arch-culprit the King is dead, but also a number of men who have little to do with the course of the action, so fragile is the connection between the tragic event and the guilt of individual men. Whence it follows that if the famous dictum of Schiller "*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*" [world history is world judgment] has any kernel of truth in it, it must be sought in another quarter than the guilt or *humariya* (error) of the victims of tragic events.

As a crowning example of the sort of thing I mean, I should like to bring forward, with some hesitancy, the death of Christ, the event which exemplifies most deeply in the minds of many people the tragic structure of the world. For in this event not one single individual, not Caiaphas, not Pilate, not even Judas himself can be rightly deemed evil in his actions, and the element which I have tried to isolate in tragedy is rendered most clear by the very nature and course of the action. For the death of Christ was predestined since the beginning of the world, yet the action of it and the men who bring it about give all the impression of freedom, seem to act as freely indeed as any human beings have ever acted. And Christ Himself, Who, we are told, knew that which was to happen, is human enough to quail for a moment before it and to ask that it should not be. If of course we really believed that the actions were predestined—and there is no doubt that we feel them to be—this movement on the part of the victim would have no meaning and would completely lose its tragic effect. The truth seems to be rather that we believe both in the predestination and in the freedom, and that the part of the tragic event which the actions of the victims do not explain is to be laid at the door of this predestination, something over, beyond and behind their freedom but by no means doing away with it. Now it is precisely in this synthesis of opposites—wherein the hero is felt to be doomed *a priori*, and yet is felt to remain free—that the marvellous effect and inner truth of great literature would seem to lie. Owing to its concentration of form and structure this is seen most clearly in tragedy but it can equally be seen in great epic poetry and in all the forms of high art. The heroes of the Trojan War all have prophecies of death ringing in their ears, and are even told on occasion the hour and

circumstance, as for example on the occasion when Hector prophesies to Achilles that he also will perish

ἤματι τῷ ὅτε κέν δε Πάρις καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
ἔσθλδν' ἔόντ' ὀλέσωσιν ἐνὶ Σκαιῇσι πύλῃσιν.

but are in no wise deterred from doing what their will urges them to do. The doom of the Nibelungs, in the German epic of the Middle Ages, is foretold to them before they cross the Danube, but the foreknowledge does not in the slightest degree prevent us from feeling that the slaughter in the house of Attila, the deaths of Hagen, Kriemhilda and Gunther, were brought on them by their own rage and by the folly of their actions.

The conclusion which I wish to draw for the benefit of my theme is that here precisely we find the classical idealism of which I have spoken, and briefly it is this. The classical idealist realises that the world presents to its human beings something which is terrible and even ghastly, but which at the same time is both noble and inspiring. The story of Christ is a terrible story, yet a magnificent and beautiful one, and its moral is, or rather its central truth is, that behind the supreme terror God is concealed, God Himself Who made all this, Who knows what it is like and Who because of this knowledge was not unwilling to subject Himself to the same necessity to which His creatures, by the very fact of their existence, were subjected. On a lower plane, but one which is lower only in degree, tragedy reveals the same truth, a truth which, like God, is constant and unchanging. The tragic view of life promises no better to-morrow and no happiness for man, if by happiness is meant a world in which there is no pity and fear. It has nothing to do with the recent belief in progress and indeed directly contradicts it. On the other hand it gives supreme value to the present and teaches, like Montaigne, that "*si vous avez vécu un jour vous avez tout vu. Il n'y a point d'autre lumière ni d'autre nuit.*" And as for that resurrection of Christ which is the promise of religion to man, that too is an element of tragedy. For in truth the tragic hero never dies. By the death of the hero man does not succumb, but lives on imperishably, with all the fullness of life. Life is great because of the death of Hamlet, because of the doom of Achilles, because of the fate of the Nibelungs, even as in supreme measure it is rendered noble by the death of Christ. For in these events something is given which pays the ransom of the world and without which the world would never be. This is the idealism of Christ, of Hamlet, of Job, of Antigone, the first fruits and the glory of mankind.

The other main type of idealism, that of the romantic kind,

has always existed and probably always will, but has come into particular prominence during the last two centuries owing to its connection with what is called the idea of progress. In essence romantic idealism seeks its ideal, not so much like the classical in the very midst of the general unpleasantness of the world, as in something "apart from" the world, "over against" it, too often attained by avoiding and glossing over the real, instead of facing it and triumphing over it. For this reason the romantic ideal lacks the centrality of the classical and has in particular no central human figure such as the tragic hero who does not change from age to age. On the contrary, in so far as the romantic attitude emphasises the emotions and passions of men and makes tragedy depend on passion alone, the romantic hero tends to become a projection of some particular human mentality, so that instead of the objective type of the past we have a number of subjective conceptions, the Byronic, the Faustian, the Musset type, and many others which defy classification and present, not so much what is central in man, as what is eccentric. The hero tends to be an expression of some dominating passion or desire, and as the principle of human will and human freedom is neglected, the hero becomes a puppet determined entirely by his own passion and desire. He ends in ruin no less than the tragic hero, but where the ruin of the tragic hero was set off and transfigured by the will which rose above it, the end of the romantic hero often presents a spectacle at best of histrionic or sensational pose, at worst of human degradation, neither of which is capable, except to a minor degree, of arousing the tragic feeling.

Furthermore it is characteristic of the romantic hero that he has as his aim or purpose something which is *a priori* unattainable, such as the desire of the early Faust to solve the mystery of the world, or of the Byronic hero to stand outside the universe as an outcast of a superior kind. It is because such an ideal is an ideal of temperament rather than of will that it fails to produce artistic effect, and frequently ends in utter disillusionment or cynicism on the part of the hero. This is true of Byron and it is true of Faust, as long as in Part I of the drama of that name he remains a temperamental hero. But in the second case we must allow for the genius of Goethe which changed Faust in the same play from a man of feeling into a man of will who, like a true tragic hero, acts by opposing his will to his emotions. In the Gretchen tragedy at the end of Part I, Faust rises to a level with the greatest tragic heroes and in his famous remark "*der Menschheit ganzer Jammer faszt mich an*" expresses, no less than they, the view we have presented in these pages. To this may be added

the remark of Mephistopheles in the same final scene: "Wilt thou grasp the thunder?—We have come to the point where human wit breaks down," indicating in inspired words precisely the point of tragic intensity which is the half transcendental and quasi-religious source of the tragic dilemma.

Now in the case of the romantic hero the inevitability which should be present in the catastrophe is replaced by a kind of factitious destiny or fate produced by his own uncontrolled passion, a typical example of which may be seen in the *Hernani* of Victor Hugo, when the verse tells us

*"Je suis une force qui va
Agent aveugle et sourd des puissances funèbres."*

Now it is typical of temperaments which are given free rein that they are usually idealistic when they begin to expand but bitter and severe when expansion ceases to give them pleasure, and their last cry is a cry of despair. This is perhaps why the early Romantics of 1770 descant like Rousseau on the beauty of the universe, while their successors of 1820 were apt like Leopardi to regard the world as "muck," or to lament like De Musset, that

*"Le seul bien qui me reste au monde
Est d'avoir quelque fois pleuré."*

But it is the faculty of seeing "glory" in the "muck" which is the unique value of real tragedy, a dualism which reflects the dualism of the world. There has always been "muck" (even the Greeks knew there was) and there always will be, but the world remains magnificent all the same.

It is also not surprising that the romantic movement began about 1800 and thus occupies a position on the crest of the first wave of a belief in progress to which allusion has already been made. The roots of this belief lie in the general movement of philosophy since the Renaissance, particularly in the Cartesian philosophy of rationalism and the materialistic sensualism which began with Francis Bacon and was carried on by Locke and Hume. The two main principles of Descartes, the belief in the power of the human reason to solve all problems and the belief in constancy of the laws of nature were linked up later with the Baconian principle of harnessing nature to the service of mankind, with the result of producing a human mentality almost unique in the history of human thought. Together these two streams of thought—and to them others might of course be added—produced a general belief that the world could be made into a better place for men and that, in short, to-morrow might be better than to-day. This belief is itself opposed to what we call the classical view of life, and although it is true in certain

ways it is not true in the deepest sense. We may add that the movement has culminated in two enormous catastrophes, one being the Napoleonic War and the other the Great War; and each in turn has borne the aspect of romantic enthusiasm followed by the deep wave of pessimism. This connection between romanticism and the belief in progress is fairly obvious, but there is another one which for our argument is even more important. It is that the same belief in material and intellectual progress has led to a belief that art might likewise be improved, and this belief shines out most clearly in the romantic determination to go one better than the tradition which had preceded it for two thousand years. One better than the pseudo-classical tradition of the eighteenth century romanticism certainly did go, but it failed and seemingly must fail to reach the height which real classicism has achieved in the past, the classicism of Sophocles, of Dante, of Goethe. In its turn it has been superseded, or perhaps rather remoulded into various "isms," realism, naturalism, expressionism, each of which lays stress, not on the classical central human figure, but on some eccentric element in human nature, and nature which is not always human. The last phase seems almost to have been reached in the art of the Bolsheviks among whom the mass-man, collectively considered, is held to represent what is finest in humanity. They are also the most fervent believers in the doctrine of a better to-morrow which, with the unreal idealism of the romantics, they are setting forth to create.

True idealism would seem to be that which faces the central facts of life and which places its hope not in to-morrow and in a better future yet to come, but in to-day and in whatever to-day the world may provide. Quite apart from all schools and all definite traditions, there has been a series of writers who represent this point of view and who therefore may be called classical idealists in the sense we have given to the word. Such, for example, is Montaigne, who in spite of his scepticism did at least believe in this one thing and wrote a book about it which survives to this day. In the heat of the French wars of religion he refused to be bigoted or to quarrel with his Protestant neighbours and calmly pointed out, very sensibly, that death comes to all men and that it is the quality, not the length, of life that matters. Re-echoing the Stoics he tells us in beautiful words "*Sortez de ce monde comme vous y êtes entré. Le même passage, que vous fîtes de la mort à la vie, sans passion et sans frayeur, refaites-le de la vie à la mort. . . . Allez-vous-en satisfait.*" And the reason why he convinces, even to-day, is that the life he discusses, like that of the tragic hero, has the elements of universal life in it. Like the hero again he promises no better to-morrow,

nor a happy to-day, but holds that life is worth living even so.

Not unlike Montaigne in this respect, but with a much stronger religious strain is our own Sir Thomas Browne, whose marvellous cadences reflect no less than those of Montaigne "that diuturnity is a dream and a folly of expectation." But like the Greeks also he has that tone of genuine regret that he must "take leave of the sun in his canicular days," a regret which is a real regret and in no wise hostile to the true *joie de vivre*. He too regards man as a small thing in the universe, but remembers also that "there is surely a piece of divinity in us, something which is older than the elements and owes no homage unto the sun." Lastly we will quote from Goethe, the most modern of poets and greatest of latter-day humanists. He began by portraying a Faust whose aim was to embrace infinity and ended by giving us another whose protest was "*was braucht er in die Ewigkeit zu schweifen?*" [why must he wander in infinity?]. And the famous *salto mortale* into the transcendental, in the mystical chorus at the end of Faust: "*Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis*" [all things transitory are but a symbol] with its denial of material progress, no less than the words *Alles Drängen, alles Ringen, ist ewig Ruh in Gott dem Herrn* [all striving, all conflict is eternal peace in God the Lord], do but re-echo the ancient idealism in its relation to the modern gospel of action. But the relation of man's deed to the eternal, from Job to Faust, remains ever the same.

The key to the whole situation would seem to lie in the time-worn theory of human dualism expressed by Sir Thomas Browne in the lines quoted above. There is a fatality in man and yet a freedom also, corresponding to the dualism we noted as being present in the tragic dilemma. There is a centre which is fixed as well as a circumference of fluctuation, and it is the centre around which the mass revolves which is the important factor. It is to the credit of ancient and mediæval thinkers that they placed all emphasis on the centre and their idealism in a belief in it, rather than on a temporal shift in the flux, in a to-morrow which in very truth never comes. The flux is by no means to be despised, and the great idealists do not despise it, but even as Plato told us years ago, it is not this which is the real, and no lasting bliss can be drawn from it. True happiness is not found by despising yesterday, nor by hoping in to-morrow, but by facing to-day. *Il n'y a point d'autre lumière ni d'autre nuit. . . .*

Perhaps the truth is that the ancient philosophers realised that the world will never be a comfortable place to live in and that idealism must face this fact. There is no reason to suppose, if a study of the writings of the period is anything to go by, that the ancient Hebrews were either less happy or more happy than

ourselves. Indeed if any contrast were possible it would seem that they were more happy because they believed in something, and it is the people who believe in something who are finally happy. The quality of happiness then depends on the quality of the belief, low if it is the immediate reality about us, high if it is the greater reality beyond. But above all it is not a belief in to-morrow but in to-day, a belief that to-day also has its transcendental side, however terrible to-day must be. Last of all that terror is the gate to the eternal and the road to the eternal lies through it. This King Lear found, Œdipus, and Faust himself.

F. McEACHRAN.

CONTINENTAL PROTESTANTISM IN THE WORLD CRISIS.

WHAT is European Protestantism? Is it a mere geographical notion? Is it an abstract idea? Is it a concrete reality? At any rate we cannot speak of Continental Protestantism as of an organised body or of a federation of Churches. It is in the first place a growing religious consciousness, a new feeling of mutual responsibility, a vision of a common need and destiny, the certitude that we shall live or perish together. These are spiritual values. They have been given to us in a time of common distress. In a time of need the Church as well as individual Christians had to learn again that God sits in darkness, that suffering is a price which we have to pay for spiritual life, that those who follow the Master have to follow Him to Golgotha. This applies especially to the Continental Churches because European Protestantism is in great danger and is bleeding from many wounds. Few Continental Churches are able to escape these experiences. Even the Churches in neutral lands such as Switzerland, Holland, Scandinavia have their share in the common suffering and although we are still now divided by racial and confessional barriers, our conditions form a bond between us all. A common spiritual heritage, a common tragic destiny and the common will to face it in the spirit of our Master are of the essence of Continental Protestantism, which includes nearly 100 larger or smaller Protestant Churches in twenty-three countries with seventy millions of members, belonging mostly to the two great types of Continental reformation: the Lutheran and the Reformed communions.

Continental Protestantism as a whole can be considered as a desperately struggling army, a great Protestant block in central and northern Europe, with a number of pioneer churches in the East, and also a few nearly abandoned or forgotten small scattered parish churches in isolated regions in Yugoslavia, Poland, Spain and Italy. Continental Protestantism is, therefore, in the first instance, in an attitude of defence. Our Churches would like to apply their whole strength to constructive work, but they have to defend their life and existence not only against an avalanche of hostile circumstances, but against a wilfully planned attack from the enemies of Christianity. Having recently returned from a journey through all the Balkan countries and visited within the last two years the larger part of our Churches, it has been possible for me to get first-hand and inside knowledge. The first problem in fifteen troubled countries is how at a time of universal poverty of States and peoples the Churches are to raise and maintain their regular budget. With

the world crisis this has become a fresh difficulty which some of the Churches had overcome during the later years. The general economic depression is again weighing so heavily upon them that some of them are near bankruptcy and ruin.

The problem of unemployment has its repercussion not only on public life, but also on religious conditions. The army of unemployed, about five millions in Germany alone, are more and more subjected to the anti-religious influence of communism and bolshevism. The psychology of despair opens the way to atheism and all aggressive anti-religious propaganda. It may be merely boastful talk heard in these circles that the time will come when the Wartburg and the Cathedral of Cologne will be centres of anti-Christian propaganda. Yet such a saying is characteristic of the kind of danger to which the Churches in their spiritual life as well as in their social and economic structure are exposed. I heard a few months ago in Sofia a most powerful propaganda speech from the radio station of Moscow. The Continent lies under a heavy fire of bolshevist ideas, provocative programmes, revolutionary and anti-religious pronouncements, while a radio station from central Europe, which I heard at the same time, spoke in an uncomprehending, harmless way of the discovery of a theft, the changing weather and local elections. The world evidently has not yet realised what a fire is already burning in the roof of the house in which we are living. The unemployment problem is particularly dangerous where congregations consist mostly of working-class people; in large German cities and in certain Czechoslovakian parishes the percentage of workers may be as much as 95. In the parish of Steyr in Austria nearly the whole congregation became unemployed when the factory in that place was closed.

The economic situation of the middle class is one of the most burning problems for the Churches. They were the real support of church activity. This middle class, especially in Germany, is at the present moment hanging like a glacier over an abyss. And constantly members of this class are slipping into the proletariat or are committing suicide, especially in Germany and Austria. This is not only a sociological process of great importance, an alteration of the social structure of the people, but also a danger to the inner spiritual life of this whole class in which religious feeling seemed hitherto to have its deepest roots. The Churches feel the repercussion of this structural alteration in increased refusals to pay the church taxes. It is not always a growing religious indifference which is responsible for it, but the impossibility of meeting any other expenses besides those which are strictly necessary for the maintenance of life. It is obvious that not only have the official church taxes been diminished, but also free efforts under such a

strain are weakening. The loss of economic equilibrium is all the more evident in the Churches as many of them had lost all capital during and after the world war. Some were compelled to invest at least a part of their capital in war loans. That capital is lost. Another part was lost at the time of the inflation and the other part, in Roumania for example, Jugoslavia and the Baltic countries, with the agrarian reform to which we shall come back later. In Germany this loss of church capital amounts to nearly 90 per cent. of the former capital. In Latvia, Lithuania and Poland not only has the whole capital been lost, but churches have been destroyed; in Poland alone more than 100 chapels and other buildings. In countries where the churches possessed land, the agrarian reform left them only a small part of their former property; in Latvia, for instance, only one-sixth of their former possessions. The inflation and the depreciation of the currency meant a further loss of funds which were either entirely destroyed or reduced to half or a tenth of their former value.

The actual economic depression is therefore catastrophic for some of these churches, so that their position is again very similar to that in the terrible years of 1920 to 1923. This is not only the case in industrial, but also in agrarian countries. It is so serious, for instance, in the Transylvanian churches that they are confronted with complete ruin. A few months ago I talked with the leaders of these churches at special meetings arranged in Bucarest, Hermannstadt, and Cluj. The situation is particularly serious for the pastors who receive a large part of their salaries not in cash, but in kind, in natural products such as wine and wood and wheat. There are many parish cellars in Transylvania filled with wine representing a large part of the income of the parish. The wine is excellent and would be sold in western countries for three or four shillings a litre, but it can be sold there for eight or nine pence. Nor can wheat or wood be sold, because Russian dumping is felt in all these countries. The people have enough to live on, but to have to buy a pair of shoes for a pastor's family is a misfortune and the education of children, especially when they have to be sent to a town, means ruin and disaster. A congregation in Roumania, Jugoslavia or Hungary may be able to preserve from starvation the pastor, but if the roof of the church has to be repaired it means despair and would involve impossible debts. The Consistory of the Evangelical Church in Transylvania wrote in a circular letter dated November 27th, 1930, as follows: The treasury of our Church is nearly empty. We can accomplish our financial obligations only in part or with great difficulty. We have to face a turning point in our destiny. A Church with a quarter of a million souls, with 271 primary schools, 9 higher schools and 3 seminaries, with 250 parishes, is actually faced with

bankruptcy and ruin, unless world Protestantism pays attention to the situation. For 700 years this ancient people has lived there. They maintained their language, and since the Reformation they had to defend their Church against the attacks of the Turks and Tartars. A deep discouragement is now penetrating all classes because they can no longer hold out. The position is very similar in the Hungarian Reformed Church of Transylvania. The present budget has reckoned for the giving up of forty parishes.

The agrarian reform which was meant to be of great social advantage has proved to be an openly admitted failure. Even members of the Roumanian Government admit that production has decreased in quantity and in quality since agrarian reform was introduced. This situation has proved frightful not only for the pastors and their families, but most of all for the old pastors and their widows. Travelling in these countries from France to Poland and Russia one is really ashamed to have a sufficient income when one sees what hundreds and thousands of pastors and their families, old pastors and their widows have to live on. Innumerable pastors in various countries have to live with their families on an average monthly income of £4 to £5 and less, which is entirely insufficient even in countries with a lower exchange.

As certain expenses are, for many churches, unavoidable, such as the most urgent repairs, they are heavily in debt. The Missionary Church of Belgium suffers under a deficit of nearly half a million Belgian francs. The Evangelical Church in Czechoslovakia has eight million crowns of debt. Innumerable parishes and institutions in Hungary and Italy do not know how to get rid of debt. These debts are all the more serious because of the high interest which has to be paid. Generally speaking, 7 to 8 per cent. interest is considered very low. In the answers to the questionnaire I sent round before preparing this article, the interest paid varied between 10 and 15 per cent. Germany, Austria, Latvia and Lithuania speak of 8 to 10 per cent. The Churches in Yugoslavia speak of 11 to 18 per cent. A pastor who introduced deaconess work into a certain part of Poland a few years ago had to pay even 26 per cent. which, of course, is ruinous. The conditions for students are deplorable in several of the countries. I know many who have to live on £2 to £4 a month and have to find work or suffer hunger if they wish to complete their studies. Others leave them uncompleted.

Apart from this struggle for existence we must, however, consider the constructive efforts the Churches are making to develop their activity. They are faced with the following tasks :

(1) The recruitment of the future leaders of the Churches. The Churches especially in the East of Europe are making great efforts to give a better education to their future clergy, both by improving

and increasing the staffs of teachers in their faculties, and by sending qualified students to other countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, France, Holland, Scotland, where they learn not only to know the church life of other countries, but are also initiated into all kinds of church activities.

(2) Another constructive effort of a great number of Churches is, for the first time in their history, to introduce all kinds of social and welfare work into their church activity. Quite a number of Eastern Churches are building up what may be called the social philanthropic work of the Church, especially deaconess work, youth work, charitable institutions for old and sick people, educational institutions. The introduction of deaconess work into one of these Eastern parishes means much more than a nurse for the sick. It is an extremely valuable help in evangelisation and in the raising of the moral standard of a congregation. It is a matter of the greatest joy to see how the Christian women of the East are discovering new tasks in this respect. A single woman in Transylvania, Miss Mary Pilder, Cluj, built up last year an evangelical women's society with more than 25,000 members which has already been of great blessing to the religious and moral life of their Church.

For these Churches in the East of Europe the maintenance of an evangelical school is indispensable, if parents do not wish to subject their children either to an entirely irreligious education or to the influence of non-evangelical education and propaganda. The new school reforms and agrarian reforms in the Eastern countries are a very severe menace to the evangelical school. There are congregations which prefer to bleed white so to speak before giving up their school. The growing influence of irreligious and anti-religious propaganda makes it necessary for the evangelical Church to watch very closely the education of the children and the maintenance of religious institutions, hospitals and all kinds of homes. Other Churches, like that of the Bohemian Brethren, are confronted with the huge task of building chapels for the growing new parishes and of preparing their leaders. The Church of the Czechoslovak Brethren built nearly fifty new chapels and churches last year by an effort which means the greatest sacrifice for people belonging mostly to the working class. It is a task far beyond their strength.

The evangelisation of France and Belgium is a similar problem. France counts among its forty millions, according to Roman Catholic sources, not more than about eleven millions who are practising Roman Catholics. There are one million of French Protestants. What about the remaining twenty-eight millions of French people attached neither to the Roman Catholic nor to the Protestant religion?

We must here consider what methods the Churches are using

to raise their budgets. Certain Churches are getting larger or smaller contributions from the State. While some States are acknowledging in this way former obligations, and especially duties following from the secularising of church property in earlier centuries, others are certainly not acknowledging these obligations to a satisfactory extent. The State's contribution, especially in Eastern States, is not only ridiculously small, but it is not paid regularly. Other States like Austria pay a share to the Church which, for instance, amounted to nearly half a million of Swiss francs in 1930. Latvia received about 120,000 Swiss francs for the reconstruction of destroyed churches and for central administration. Lithuania receives a contribution from the State for the central administration of the Consistory only. In certain places the payment of a grant depends very much on the political party which happens to be in power. In Czechoslovakia the Church receives one franc per member towards the pastors' salaries and pensions. In Poland the State pays 150 francs for each pastor because he exercises also civil functions. In Jugoslavia the German Evangelical Church received last year a total subvention of 72,000 francs for administration, scholarships, salaries and pensions. The Reformed Church received at the same time about 34,000 francs. This shows that in some cases the grant or contribution of the State is so small that in fact the Churches have to raise the largest part of their expenses by their own efforts. In the Evangelical Churches of the East of Europe the parishes have land property which has been greatly reduced by the agrarian reform. In Latvia, for instance, the Church lost five-sixths of her property and is not allowed to have more than 50 hectares per parish. So that the Churches have to raise the largest part of their budget by taxation and free collections.

In most of the Churches we find a great need for loans. During the war and after, it was not possible to make the necessary repairs. Since then a number of institutions of all kinds have had to be built, such as homes, schools, manses, etc. The need for capital is so great everywhere that the banks take interest at a percentage which is much too high for sound administration. We have seen above that interest rates varying from 10 to 18 per cent. are the rule in the Eastern part of Europe. Of course no bank would consider a church or a manse sufficient security for such loans. On the other hand, many Churches in Eastern Europe have land property which could be offered as security. There are also institutions such as schools, whose income offers considerable security for loans. A case in point would be the Evangelical School at Zagreb. And it might happen that in certain States like Esthonia, Hungary and Roumania, national banks would offer a guarantee with

certain provisions, of course, if foreign capital were invested in the country. This urgent need has compelled the European Central Bureau to study the question of loans. We first thought of American capital. American banks have for instance granted a loan of two and a half million dollars to the Central Organisation of the German Inner Mission. In order to have the advice of experts we founded a Bankers' Committee in Switzerland composed of five of our most distinguished Protestant bankers. They advised us not to take loans from America, but to build up a Credit Association based on shares. This plan has been worked out by our bankers and has been approved by the Swiss authorities. It has also been recommended by several large assemblies, such as the Assembly of the Swiss Church Federation, the Protestant Conference at Basle, the Presbyterian Assembly of England. It is understood that this association is to be built up on a business basis although its ultimate purpose is Christian Stewardship. Quotas have been underwritten by Switzerland, Germany, France, the Evangelical Church of Poland, the Reformed Church of Hungary and a group of Italian Protestants. A Dutch and a Scotch Committee are also trying to raise their quota. A capital of 600,000 Swiss francs, nearly £25,000, has been raised so far.

This is evidently a new method of aiding Protestant Churches with a constructive programme, but a new situation needs new financial methods. The Roman Catholic Church has not been afraid to start a tremendous constructive programme by loans to the amount of more than four million pounds. A long list of Roman Catholic parishes in many parts of the Continent shows that loans of between twenty and a million florins were granted to others.

In considering the kind of financial aid Continental Protestantism needs at the present moment, it is clear that :

(1) A certain number of Continental Churches and Protestant Institutions will require, for a long time to come, gifts from abroad because they are too weak to fulfil their task with their own means.

(2) Better organisation of the efforts which the various Churches make themselves in view of improving the economic structure of the whole Church is necessary. The Freewill Offering System and other modern financial methods may here come in as a welcome contribution of such experience as has been useful and effective in many countries.

(3) But the third kind of aid needed by Continental Protestantism, especially for its larger constructive programme, is to be able to borrow at reasonable interest. Given the financial uncertainty of the present world situation, it would be unwise to start

an enterprise on the basis of bonds, but it seems surely possible to have a modern aid society on the basis of free subscriptions or shares, a system which would combine business interest with a philanthropic point of view, for a common Protestant effort of solidarity. Continental Protestantism needs a kind of international Christian Red Cross, prepared for sound and business-like help wherever it is needed; a sort of financial lifeboat ready to start whenever danger is discovered.

President Hoover suggested to the American people that by helping Europe they would be wise creditors in their own interest and good neighbours. Can the appeal to be good neighbours mean more than the appeal to be brothers in the spirit of Christ? Will international solidarity on a secular basis become effective whilst Christian solidarity remains mere words or handshaking at international conferences? Our aid system has been dominated up to the present day by the idea of alms, which was the financial method of the mediæval Church. The present situation compels us to apply more modern ways; it means new financial methods and fundamental social reform. We are confronted to-day with quite other dangers than that of reducing our religious and social work or even with the bankruptcy of the Churches. We are approaching more and more the final battle between the spirit of this world and the spirit of Christ. Modern paganism, communism, materialism and atheism are our most cruel and irreconcilable enemies. We can surely not fight them with money and capital investments, but only with the spirit and the faith and hope which Christ has visibly stirred up again in a time of need, not only in those who are carrying the cross on their own shoulders, but in the minds of the larger assemblies whose watchwords are stewardship and solidarity. The Protestant Churches have learned in recent years the wisdom of doing together what no Church could do alone, a wisdom which is quite familiar to the Roman Catholic Church. This becomes effective when we consider ourselves not as masters of our own destiny, of our own fortune and capital, but as servants of a greater Master and as trustees for the spiritual and secular gifts with which the Lord of the earth has entrusted us. I do not believe that the wisdom of financial methods and of our own moral and religious efforts will save the world. But I do believe that the spirit of mutual responsibility, of service and solidarity is awakening in Christian hearts that mysterious saving and constructive power which the Lord may give us for saving what is worthy to be saved, and for building up what may be a realisation of God's will on this earth.

ADOLF KELLER.

RUSSIA 1931.

S LIGHTLY over four hundred years ago Sir Thomas More wrote a book about an imaginary island off the north coast of South America where an ideal community lived. To-day the name of that island has become a byword for an impossible state of perfection in society and the term "Utopian" has come to be synonymous with an "idle visionary" or a "fanciful dreamer." It is a strange coincidence that the one country in the world to-day that may be compared with Utopia should be the one that during the last decade we have come to consider as the home of mis-government, where the people are driven against their will by a horde of uneducated revolutionaries. Those who have read "Utopia" will remember the resemblances. The positions of the towns in Utopia, for example, like those of the new towns in the Soviet Union, were planned to bear a definite relation one to another. Hours of work, too, were shorter in Utopia than in other countries, because everyone, including the women and the aristocracy, did their share of the work, and the usual superstratum of idle rich was missing. In Russia, likewise, they worked a seven-hour day until it was found that the tsarist régime had left them so far behind the industrialised countries that it was imperative that they should work longer hours in order to make up the leeway, and it is certain that when the machines are once moving, and doing man's work for him, the outcome will be shorter hours, and not that other dreadful alternative that we have accepted—armies of unemployed workers who have been ousted from their jobs by the machines. Both in Utopia and in Russia the workers, when they are "free from the labour of their own occupations," are encouraged "to bestow the time well and thriftily upon some other science, as shall please them"; the children are cared for and educated by specially trained and competent nurses, and the people eat their meals communally, and escape the waste and drudgery of individual cooking.

Although I find this comparison amusing and interesting and above all a most effective antidote to the biased conception that so many people, fed with misrepresentations as they are by the Riga correspondents of the Conservative Yellow Press, bring to all things Russian, I should be the last to claim that life in Russia to-day is at all an Utopian one. The standard of living of everyone is much lower than the standards of corresponding classes of society in England. Housing conditions, transport facilities, clothes, and above all the food, are much poorer than those enjoyed in England. But the people are accustomed to living hard, and if living to-day is not much happier than it was under the Tsars, the present situa-

tion is not without its compensations. To people who can, and who trouble to think, the theory of Communism and the actual working of the Five-Year Plan provide adequate justification for present hardships. They feel that they are working to establish an ideal Socialist state, and that they themselves and their children will reap the benefit of their labour and present privation. And especially they feel that they are their own masters and are no longer exploited by a Capitalist.

They take their difficulties stoically and pass them off with a good deal of humour. There is the typical and well-known story, which I heard in several topical versions in different parts of Russia, of the man who boarded a Moscow tramcar wearing only a belt. "Here," said the outraged conductor, "you can't get on my car like that." "But," said the man, "I come from Minsk." "What's Minsk got to do with it?" asked the conductor. "Well," answered the man, "you see in Minsk we've completed the Five-Year Plan in two and a half years." Another similar story, which I quote because it further illustrates the mood in which many Russians look upon their difficulties to-day, is about a man who met a friend of his hurrying towards the Moscow river. "Where are you off to?" he asked, "I'm going to drown myself" answered the friend, "the Five-Year Plan is too terrible; there is no more food, no more clothes, no more vodka." "But," said the first, "you may as well stick it out till the Plan is finished, and do your bit. Things are so bad now that they can't go worse." "Oh, can't they," replied his friend, moving off, "there will be no more water in the river by then."

Propaganda is largely responsible for the hold the government has upon the people; propaganda is everywhere in Russia, and much of it is very persuasive. One evening in the Park of Culture and Rest in Moscow we came upon a large group of people learning community singing. They were led and instructed by a young girl, and her verve and enthusiasm affected us as it did the Russians. The results were excellent, and soon the whole crowd, numbering three or four hundred, were singing lustily. The tune was an old one, but the words were new, and they were very different from the ones we have come to expect in England; it was nothing about "the blue-eyed babies from Alabama," that the Russians sang, but of "the wars that are past and the battles that are ended, and of the prosperity and peace of Socialist construction that lie ahead." Now in cold blood it seems an incongruous community song, but there was nothing incongruous about it that night in the Moscow park. The people were singing really seriously and hopefully, and, little though we understood what they were singing, we were moved by their sincerity. In the Shooting Galleries in the Park one aims

at the symbol of the Pound Sterling or of the Dollar on the stomachs of delightfully fantastic financiers, and, if one hits them, a Soviet Worker springs up in triumph in the financier's place; in the same way Austen Chamberlain is replaced by Stalin, and Briand by Litvinoff. One Sunday morning as we were sailing down the Volga an agitation shock brigade came on board. It was composed of six young men who were voluntarily spending their holidays travelling up and down the Volga; they were giving dramatic performances on the boats and in the villages in order to preach the news of the victories of the Five-Year Plan, and of the failures and difficulties of the Capitalist world. They were also propagating the Third Decisive Year Loan, which is being raised to provide capital for new industrial enterprises. These six young men were fine types: clean shaven, with high cheek bones, and healthy, they have an infectious enthusiasm for the Plan. They are the type upon which the success of Communism depends, and they are worthy of it. Of this particular half-dozen, one was a university student and another a professor from Moscow, a third was a doctor, and with him a chemist. The two remaining were artisans. They gave their entertainment in the saloon of the ship, which was packed with passengers and crew. Before it began the leader was careful to explain that they were all amateurs, and that therefore any technical failings on their part must be forgiven. The programme consisted of twelve items, including many songs, and it was given with the same gusto and sincere energy that we had already met in the Park of Culture and Rest in Moscow. I will just indicate what one or two of the items were like. One of the shock brigaders, for example, made a speech which was a reproduction of a famous one by Lenin entitled, "From Horse to Tractor." Then they brought a large map of the Soviet Union and pointed out the places where large industrial enterprises are growing, and spoke of the successes and failures of the Five-Year Plan. Following this there was a dialogue on Anarchy versus Order. One of the actors narrated the story of capitalist failure, of strikes, unemployed, banking failures and so on. The other answered him with an account of the achievements of Socialist construction speaking of the success of economic planning, etc. One other item propagated airships. The Soviet Union needed airships, said one marionette; two others dressed, one as a priest, the other as a kulak, opposed him. Again, we were impressed by the sincerity and enthusiasm of the Communists.

One evening whilst we were in Moscow we went to a theatre in the Park of Culture and Rest. It was packed with people, and the piece was called "The West is Nerve-racking." It deals with a Russian engineer who has a nervous breakdown and has to go

to a sanatorium in Germany for treatment. In the first act we see him in a railway train, en route for Berlin. When they get to Poland two passengers get into the compartment, an officer and a priest, and the audience was continually laughing at their absurdities. I could not, of course, understand what they said, but it was obvious that it was propaganda against Poland, militarism and priesthood. In the second act the hero was in a night club in Berlin. He is nearly thrown out because he is not in evening dress and only orders a cup of coffee. The *habitués* were fantastic, although not entirely unknown types of idle rich. The funniest thing of the evening was one of the turns in the cabaret in which six Russians entered the night club to perform a Cossack dance. They represented a common Western European notion of what a Russian looks like, they had long beards, Russian boots, and coats down to the ankles. The audience, which probably did not contain a single beard, saw the joke and rocked away. The comrade next to me was beside himself, he jabbed me vigorously in the ribs and gabbled excitedly and unfortunately completely unintelligibly. During the cabaret there was a symbolic braying of a wolf and two half-starved unemployed broke in and made a demonstration: they were turned out and roughly handled by four policemen at the orders of the proprietor. In the end the Russian engineer was so worked up that he could stay in Germany no longer and took a train right back to Moscow. In the cinema, too, the Russian Government has found a powerful educative medium, in the same way that our Broadcasting Corporation is an educative medium, and it is making excellent use of it.

I cannot speak with the same enthusiasm of the Russian Press. No matter how necessary it is for the successful establishment of a Socialist state that the people should only hear one side of the question, I believe that ultimately the repression of freedom of thought and expression will be harmful. Russian newspapers are full of criticism of the detailed working of the Five-Year Plan, but they never print any outside news that is advantageous to the Capitalist nations, or any criticism of what is known as the "general line" of the Communist Party. No Russian with whom I spoke, provided that he had not travelled outside Russia, would believe for a moment that it is possible for the workers outside the Soviet Union to be as well-off as those inside. I mean well-off in terms of welfare, not of wealth. When I tried to tell anyone about the Bournville welfare work, for example, I was met by blank incredulity. On the other hand the papers are excellently informed concerning the "failures" of the Capitalist system. Every Russian brings the exact unemployment figures of the rest of the world into any argument about the relative merits of the two systems

and triumphantly concludes that there is not a single able-bodied unemployed man in the whole of the Soviet Union. The *Daily Worker* is the only English newspaper obtainable publicly in Moscow, and although the heads of the Government themselves read the *Observer* and *The Times*, they do not permit anyone else to do so. When we entered Russia the only things that were confiscated at the Customs were copies of the *Daily Express* and the *Evening Standard*.

The most unique, and certainly the most laughable, propaganda I saw was near Leningrad. We were driving out to see one of the Tsar's country palaces, and on the way passed a large detachment of the Red Army, marching solemnly along carrying spades and forks instead of rifles. They were headed by a brass band and by men carrying banners bearing the words: "We are a Shock-Brigade going to dig up potatoes in order to speed up the Five-Year Plan. Complete the Five-Year Plan in Four Years!"

The Russian is being awakened out of his traditional complacency by the working of Communism, and especially by the tempo of the Five-Year Plan. Work in Russia occupies somewhat the same position as that enjoyed by sport in England. The newspapers are full of statistics of the work completed under the Plan and the various factories in different categories are in competition to see which of them can achieve the greatest percentage of their allotted plan. Thus if Stalingrad manages to turn out a hundred tractors a day, instead of the eighty according to schedule, whilst Kharkov only produces sixty out of the planned eighty, the whole of Russia knows about it and acclaims Stalingrad with the same enthusiasm that in England the people lavish upon the winners of the Association Football Cup. Kharkov, on the other hand, suffers the same disgrace as a club which is relegated from the first to the second division. This aspect of work in Russia, if we could be sure that it will last, is an effective answer to those who say that we cannot get the best out of a man without a money incentive. It must be said that this system results in increases of quantity, and decreases in quality. Whilst I was in Russia I heard of another stimulant that is used in one group of factories. There each week the factory with the lowest monthly average of work in comparison with the plan is presented with a large wooden camel made out of three-ply wood. This "Order of the Camel" has to remain in the factory until some other is lower still in the averages. Workers in Russia can win two orders, which act as further stimulants, and which command as great respect there as the V.C. or the D.S.O. in England. They are the "Order of Lenin" and the "Order of the Red Banner," and they are given to

workers or organisers who have distinguished themselves in the furtherance of the Five-Year Plan.

Strange and often rather ridiculous though these means and methods seem to us, the Five-Year Plan is nevertheless anything but a stunt. The actual figures of the Plan have been well known for some time now, and, although sometimes exaggerated, they yet give a fair impression of the upheaval that is taking place. Over all Russia there are evidences of this huge national effort. New buildings are being erected everywhere, at present they are mostly just completed, with the whitewash and dirt still on the window-panes, and the drains still being laid. Streets are being re-paved, especially in Moscow, where it is intended that by the end of the Plan every street will have been re-laid. One evening in Moscow we were returning to our hotel about midnight when we came across a large crowd of people watching a gang of men removing the old tram track. The men were hauling energetically, as if they were in the final of a tug of war, and the crowd yelled their encouragement. When the track at last came away a great cheer went up. Here again a comparison between sport in England and work in Russia was inevitable.

It is hard to describe the appearance of the people convincingly. For one thing there is nothing startling about them, and the predominating colour is a drab grey. The men wear coarse serge suits, or, often, a white cotton smock drawn in at the waist by a belt. The women usually wear cotton dresses, and have cotton shawls over their heads. The people are practically all dressed in the same quality of clothing, but many of them are obviously of a higher type of intelligence than others. Their faces are usually tanned and clean shaven; they rarely smile, but this, I think, is as much due to the natural build of their faces as to the long years of poverty they have been through. The women brighten themselves with cosmetics, often applied with more energy than discretion. They glide quietly and quickly through the streets, and seem to be always on the move. The streets are always crowded, and the tramcars, although the service might seem adequate, are everlastingly filled to overflowing, and I was never, during the many times I travelled on them, able to get a seat. It is typical of two things Russian, their love of a long word, and their energy and cocksureness, that they should publish a statement saying that by the end of the Plan they "intend to liquidate strap-hanging." The railway stations and trains are equally full.

One of the pleasantest sensations I experienced whilst in Russia was the feeling that I was a member of a classless society. It was really delightful to get away for once from the bent-kneed, open-palmed servility of English and Continental hotels. Perhaps one

was not waited upon with quite the same attention, but the service as a whole was adequate. In the hotels when the porter had carried the bags to one's room, he liked to shake hands, and was not above accepting a cigarette, although he would not touch any money. It was enjoyable after the furtive tip and dissatisfied frown of which I have had so much experience. Equality did not end there, for when we were setting off from Moscow for Nijni-Novgorod, to give an illustration, I was standing on the platform slightly hot and bothered, unsure which was my compartment, and how I should get my bags there. An officer of the Red Army, corresponding, perhaps, to an English major, seeing my confusion came up to me, took the bags, boarded the train, found the compartment, arranged the things on the rack and, after shaking hands with me, said simply, "Good-bye, comrade," and disappeared. Imagine an English major in similar circumstances.

The most delightful evening of the tour was one we spent in the Park of Culture and Rest at Moscow. I have already mentioned the community singing that we heard there, and the theatre where we saw "The West is Nerve-racking" was also in this park. When we first entered we were inclined to be sceptical, and to call it the glorified Russian version of a pleasure beach. We soon found that we were mistaken. There were swings and roundabouts and a big pleasure wheel there, but there were also places which gave what might reasonably be called cultural entertainment. The nearest approach I know was the British Empire Exhibition. There was a large display of products out of every corner of the Soviet Union, which numbers of people were examining attentively, there were reading rooms, bookshops, propaganda posters, a zoo, sports of all kinds—climbing greasy poles, balancing tests, skittles, bowls, jumping, handball, football and so on. Finally, at the end of the Park, we came to a huge performance of country dancing. Imagine an area about the size of a football ground, surrounded by two rows of dancers, perhaps eight or nine hundred people in all, and then beyond about two thousand spectators. On a raised stand at one side is a large orchestra, and there also is a leader who directs the dancing by means of loud speakers. Inside the ring Young Pioneers—the Russian scouts and guides—show how the dances should be done with a gusto and delight that is infectious. The band plays Schubert's "Marche Militaire," the dance is a simple, enjoyable one, and everyone enters into the spirit of the thing. No one tries to make a fool of himself, and there is absolutely no vulgarity of any sort. Of course we joined in, and for half an hour I could have watched, if I had not been so occupied with enjoying myself, the unique spectacle of twenty-nine British scientists, many of them staid

Harley Street specialists, and convinced Conservatives, dancing delightedly arm in arm with members of the world's first proletarian dictatorship.

The scientists and doctors who were with the party were impressed, with certain exceptions, with the scientific work and with the hospitals they saw. For my part I was impressed with the enthusiasm of the Communists. There are less than two million of them in Russia and their ideals may be mistaken, but the energy and sincerity they put into the effort to translate their aspirations into facts is most inspiring, and augurs well for the future of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

E. K. WRIGHT.

A NEGLECTED PASTIME.

IT is curious that the coming of the aeroplane should have undermined the popularity of the balloon. There seems to be no good reason for this. The invention of steam power might just as well have ruined the vogue of the sailing yacht, yet it has not done so. There is an analogy between ballooning and sailing, for ballooning, like sailing, has the good qualities of its defects. In an age of speed and frantic hustle there is a charm in not knowing exactly where you are going or what time you will get there; and this is always the case in ballooning. The hour and place of arrival can only be guessed at; a balloon is no vehicle for a business man in a hurry. To the leisurely traveller, however, who takes pleasure in contemplation it affords many agreeable contrasts with the ordinary means of locomotion. Instead of the thrill of speed he experiences the ecstasy of immobility, for the rôles of the traveller and the scenery are transposed; to the traveller in a balloon the sensation of immobility is absolute, while the landscape floats noiselessly past.

There is indeed no sensation comparable with ballooning, unless it be running before the wind in a sailing vessel; yet how prosaic is this bustling motion compared with the soundless progress of a balloon. Judged by ballooning standards the aeroplane, battling laboriously against the pull of gravitation, is a wretchedly noisy nerve-racking piece of machinery. In a balloon, even at hurricane speed, no breath of wind is felt. At the most, if the wind changes suddenly a faint breeze may be noticed for a moment. If an aeronaut were so insanely reckless as to risk a gas explosion by lighting a match, the flame would burn without a flicker in the windless air, for the balloon is always moving with the exact speed of the wind, which is consequently never perceptible. The rise and fall are, as a rule, as little to be noticed by the passenger as the speed and direction of the journey. A fall of ominous rapidity will be signalled only by a light breeze coming up from below. This possibility of misjudging speed and direction may have significance during a journey, and did in fact produce a sensational situation during the journey which is now described. Yet there is no reason why ballooning should be more dangerous than sailing, and there is certainly much less for the beginner to learn. My own adventures were almost entirely due to inexperience; an expert would certainly have made a much less erratic descent.

This balloon voyage started at Easter from Paris at the hour of sunset. There were two of us in the car, and we carried as much ballast as we thought our gas-bag could lift. Ballast is to the balloonist like money to the traveller, the more he has the further

he can go. Hoping to stay up all night and determined to go as far as possible, we carried as much sand as we could. As we climbed in the men who were to start us gathered round, lifting off the weights attached to the outside of the basket and testing our buoyancy by half letting go. Then, as they completely relaxed their grip of the basket, we gently left the ground, hardly realising it, so quietly did we drift into the air, while our helpers became midgets far below and the great living map of Paris began to expand under our feet. The basket rocked when we shifted our positions, but otherwise hung sedately in space like a bubble floating in a calm tide. Only careful observation of the landscape assured us that we were moving and that our direction was towards the east. The expanse of Paris and of the open country beyond was increasing rapidly, an indication that we were rising fast. In this tranquil manner had we abandoned the earth.

The stillness of the air enveloping us and the vastness of the panorama opening beneath us produced in combination a strange impression. They reminded me of a show in London in my childhood: the panorama of the Battle of Waterloo. The spectator at this show came up through the floor of a circular platform and found himself in the centre of a panoramic painting of the field of Waterloo; a realistically painted dome of sky was above, and the whole produced a curious effect of spaciousness and airlessness combined with theatrical unreality. The panorama from the balloon now gave me the same peculiar impression. It did not last, however, for the reality of the world below soon reasserted itself, as the continuous mingled sound of children shouting and dogs barking mounted to us through the still air. At half-past six we observed we were crossing the Seine in a south-easterly direction. From now onwards the journey divided itself into three phases: firstly impenetrable darkness lasting until midnight, secondly a period of moonlight, and thirdly, beginning at dawn, came the final stage, the voyage at great heights above the clouds.

During the first hours of darkness the chief source of our anxiety was the continually alternating expansion and contraction of the gas. This was due to the instability of the temperature before night had finally asserted itself, and caused a constant up and down movement of the balloon, our altitude varying between several hundreds and several thousands of feet. In our efforts to combat this rise and fall we found by sunset that we had already spent six of our precious sacks of sand. The temperature was round about 36 degrees Fahrenheit, but secure from any sensation of wind we did not feel cold. Before ten o'clock two more sacks had to be sacrificed, and this caused us some disquiet, for we knew that we should need ballast with the coming of daylight, which was

expected to carry us up to an immense height owing to the sun's power of expanding the gas. For this reason a big reserve of sand was desirable, for when the gas shrank again we should need it for saving us from too swift a fall. Circumstances were to show that our anxiety was justified.

Although we had started with a clear sky, the weather was now cloudy and night came on with profound darkness. There was no prospect of a moon before midnight and I bitterly regretted that I had omitted to provide myself with a more efficient electric torch, our one feeble instrument having collapsed about ten o'clock. Before it had quite flickered out a reading of the barometer showed that we had risen at one time to 10,000 feet, although now we were almost level with the tree-tops. Such an altitude in thick darkness was dangerously low, and again more sand had to be thrown out. At once we rose and were drifting blindly on through the inky void when a sinister vision appeared, throwing us into consternation and upsetting every guess we had been making at what was our position on the map. Dim in the darkness but surely unmistakable there appeared below and ahead of us an immense sheet of water stretching away till it was lost in the night. We strained our eyes peering into the empty blackness, and as we did so there came up a sighing sound from the dark gulf at our feet. Surely that sound could be only one thing: the murmur of the sea on the beach? We tried furiously to think out the situation and to imagine what could have happened. Since the failure of our torch we had been unable to take any bearings. Was it conceivable that we were over the sea? Such uncertainty may seem ridiculous, but it must be remembered that when travelling in a balloon several thousand feet above the earth one cannot tell whether one is becalmed or travelling at the speed of an express train, except by very carefully watching the ground. For a hideous minute or two it seemed credible that we had got into an air current that had hurried us to the coast with the speed of a whirlwind in a direction contrary to that of our departure and that we were now actually at sea. In any case there was nothing to be done. If we were indeed over the sea we must keep on travelling over it until daylight. The utter darkness added to our sense of helplessness. I had never before felt myself immersed in such a blind void. Even a blizzard on an Alpine snowfield allows one the comfort of contact with the ground. Here we were completely cut off from all connection with the solid world. Fortunately our consternation was soon over; it became clear to us after a few minutes that the water-like expanse was only a lake of mist, and the murmur of waves merely the sound of the wind in a great forest of fir trees over which we happened to be passing. We were still travelling after all

on the same course as when we started, and great was our relief.

For some time after this we moved on over dim mysterious country, that might in the darkness have been either sea or land. At one moment, when the darkness seemed a little less profound, we pulled the valve and came down nearer to the ground, hoping to see something and to let our guide-rope trail. The guide-rope is a most useful form of self-regulating ballast; when coming down too fast the speed of the descent is automatically checked by the guide-rope as it trails on the ground. A reverse action prevents too sudden a rise. On this occasion, however, the guide-rope failed in its purpose, becoming entangled in the tree-tops. We accordingly threw out some ballast and as we rose the wind tore us free; with a crashing of broken branches we returned to safer levels above. At last, half an hour after midnight, the moon rose and we found that we were slowly crossing a country of moors and forests. There was no longer any temptation to sleep. During the hours of darkness anxiety had kept us alert; from now on the great spectacle of moon-lit heaven and earth kept us breathless with the splendours that it unrolled.

With the more equable temperature of night our height remained the same, a few hundred feet above the tree-tops, with our guide-rope just hanging clear of them. Unceasingly as we sailed across the moon-lit forest the nightingales accompanied us with their song. Before very long the cuckoos were awake as well. Once we crossed an electrically lit mill beside a roaring river. Otherwise nothing but the songs of nightingales and cuckoos broke the stillness until, as we passed over a sleeping village, we heard the church clock strike two. And so the night wore on. An hour before dawn we surmised that we were passing over vineyards. A few handfuls of sand thrown out increased our elevation; we sailed over more forest to some high uninhabited moors.

The first signs of dawn appeared soon after three, as we came over a high road with a drowsy peasant plodding along it. My companion leaned out over the edge of the basket and without raising his voice asked the man where we were. He gazed up speechless for a moment as our gigantic shadow stole softly across the moon, then his answer came "Bar-sur-Aube." We were still in highland country and apparently making for a gap or pass south of a steep-wooded summit in a bare range of hills. Some sand, parsimoniously sprinkled, just enabled us to skim the tree-tops as we floated out through the pass into the broad valley of the Aube. Far below, at the foot of the range which we had just crossed, lay the town of Bar-sur-Aube with its clocks striking four. It was quite light now and we were about a thousand feet above the river. The sound of weirs, cocks crowing and blackbirds sing-

ing reached us. Some miles up the river lay a lake of morning mist as like a sheet of water as any African mirage. My thermometer showed 38 degrees Fahrenheit as we sailed out into the sunrise at the same majestic, hasteless speed; roads bordered with poplars appeared, then more highlands. We crossed an old farmhouse with a courtyard; its silence showed that the occupants were still asleep. Beyond was a wood full of song-birds, jays and woodpeckers. We were intent on the gradually widening view when suddenly our guide-rope crashed into the tree-tops, bringing the balloon up short with a series of violent jerks. For a moment it seemed not improbable that we should stick in a tree; and we devoutly hoped that the rigging of our aged craft would withstand these strains and wrenches. To our good fortune the rope forced itself free, and thus we drifted serenely on until at 4.50 the rim of the rising sun made its first appearance, lighting up the countless white may-trees in the woods underneath us.

The third and most critical phase of the journey was now approaching. We knew that when the lifting-power of the sun's rays exerted its influence upon the gas, our rise would be prodigious. The process was already beginning, and we rose steadily, but at a gradually increasing rate, until soon we were breaking through a thin layer of clouds. Beyond these we came into another world, the billowy surface of the clouds beneath us shutting out the earth and throwing up a scorching glare like the heat reflected from fresh snow. White cumulus peaks of fantastic shapes shone out in radiant glory above darker cloud masses which the sun had not yet reached. A few moments more and we were so high that the noise of a passing train and faint chimes from a village church were the only sounds that could still be heard. A curious sight now to be seen was the rose-tinted shadow of our balloon encircled by a halo which appeared on the cloud-floor under us and followed in our wake. It is a phenomenon sometimes known as the spectre of the Brocken. Through ever-rarer gaps in the clouds we caught glimpses of the earthly landscape looking singularly lovely in the glowing colours of the dawn.

But it was time that we gave thought to our direction, for since we had left Bar-sur-Aube the earth had been hidden under a sea of cloud; consequently we had only the vaguest idea of our course. Through an opportune temporary break we now detected snow lying among pine forests, and from all sides there rose the faint humming roar of mountain streams. It seemed probable that we were crossing the Vosges and that the Alps lay ahead of us. The barometer told us we were rising fast, and soon after six I observed that we had reached an altitude of 10,000 feet. On the sea of cloud the dull red spectre of the balloon was still swimming per-

sistently after us ; we were travelling slowly as before, moving, it seemed, at the same rate and in the same direction as the cloud floor. This made it a difficult matter to calculate pace or position. By half-past six our height was 11,000 feet and it was cold in spite of the scorching sun ; some soup in a bottle was frozen. The earth was by this time completely invisible. Nevertheless a change in the cloud formation was taking place ; gradually we approached a big break in the main mass which now began to disintegrate like a polar ice-field, and for a few minutes we sailed over a wide blue gulf in the depths of which tiny towns gleamed. Here and there were pastures of brilliant emerald, with trees the size of pins' heads and a spider's web of roads stretching far and wide. On the other side of the gulf began another great continent of massive white cumulus with a long coast-like edge resembling realistically the cliffs of an iceberg.

At about eight o'clock when the glass indicated 13,000 feet and while we were rising slowly over the new cloud-continent, we noticed for the first time that the height was making us breathless. None the less we were hungry and devoured our provisions ravenously. Since dawn the rising and falling of the balloon had continued according to the variations of temperature caused by the clouds. Some of the falls were difficult to check, and we had been spending more ballast than we liked. Through a temporary thinning in the layer of cloud we were able to make out that the hills underneath seemed to be increasing in size and becoming more continuous, but this was all that we could learn of the world that we were cut off from ; it was once more completely hidden from view. For hundreds of miles nothing was to be seen but clouds, huge castles and mountains of them, dazzling our eyes and scorching our faces with the intense glory of their reflected sunlight. Meanwhile we rose to 16,000 feet and both of us suffered from violent palpitations and breathlessness. The discomfort was more acute than when climbing at much greater altitudes in the Himalaya ; we panted as if we had been running a race.

The question now before us was : had we enough ballast to justify us in attempting to cross the full extent of the Alps ? My companion, who was as ignorant of ballooning as I was, chose this moment to inform me that he had been cautioned about pulling the gas valve at any great height, since our balloon was so old and presumably unsound, that it might become difficult to stop the impetus of too prolonged a fall. We also had to consider that in coming down from a great height a big reserve of ballast is in any case necessary in order to control the descent. Although we were aware of this fact, we did not appreciate it sufficiently, as events were to prove. However, while we were arguing the point, the

balloon was continuing to rise and the vast masses of towering cumulus were becoming more and more magnificent. We seemed to be no longer playing any part in the world, but to be traversing the deserts of space in some strange orbit decreed by a capricious and inscrutable fate. We were still discussing what to do when a startling revelation took place; just as we reached a height of 18,000 feet a division appeared in the far horizon of the clouds, and through the opening we beheld the dazzling chain of Mont Blanc. The great summit itself was wrapped in a characteristic "*tourmente*," the snow-flurry known and dreaded locally as a sure sign of bad weather.

A decision was now urgent, for the idea of drifting over the Alps in bad weather in an old balloon with insufficient ballast was disturbing, to say the least of it. Unless we descended without delay we should find ourselves hanging over a boundless chaos of peaks with little chance of choosing a safe landing-place. I was in favour of attempting to hit off a solitary gap in the cloud-floor, through which at this moment one could discern open country suitable for a landing. My companion, however, still questioned the prudence of pulling the gas-valve, and in the meantime our upward movement was continuing. My arguments at last prevailed, and a tentative pull or two at the valve-rope started us headlong down with rapidly increasing speed. Hurriedly we threw out ballast, and unfortunately more than was necessary, for, to our dismay, the balloon began rising once more. Further to add to our anxiety the gap in the clouds had closed up; below us was an unbroken veil through which we should have to plunge without any knowledge of the ground beneath, but in the lamentable certainty that the ensuing condensation of the gas would greatly accelerate the speed of our fall. While we were facing this situation we distinctly heard the dull roar that rises from a big city as the sound came up to us through the clouds. If our choice lay between landing in a large town or coming down in the Alps in bad weather, the first alternative seemed preferable. So the valve was again pulled and this time the fall began in earnest. As the momentum increased a breeze blew up in our faces, a danger signal indicating too fast a fall.

Almost immediately we plunged into the sea of cloud; a few snow-flakes flew past us, but we could see nothing else in the dense fog that surrounded us. The extravagant speed of our fall was now so obvious that there was no need to gauge it by the usual method of dropping paper out of the car and observing its relative movement; we were hard at work emptying bags of sand over the side; and while helping in this I was also hastily preparing a basket of bottles and provisions to throw overboard as soon as the sand had been

used up. Telescopes and cameras we would not sacrifice, but crammed them into a wicker locker for safety when the moment of the crash should arrive. Meanwhile the sand flew up in our faces, for we were overtaking the ballast which we had thrown out.

Our fall through the clouds cannot have lasted more than a few seconds and now we were again in sight of earth. The big city that we had dreaded falling into was nowhere to be seen; we had providentially avoided it. But there was little time to realise the situation; we were falling at a very great pace towards some fields ringed round with wooded hills. For an instant I was able to observe one of many fields looking like a square in a tiny chess-board; the next moment it had increased to a prodigious size, and was rushing up to meet us with bewildering speed. The last of our sand-bags was flung out bodily, unemptied, and almost at the same instant we struck the ground with a crash. As we clung to the rigging in a shower of sand the balloon rolled over on its side and began to drag across the field, but a strong pull at the rip-valve brought the basket immediately to rest. Several men ran up, and after trying French on them in vain we discovered that we were in Switzerland near Bettingen, about six miles from Bâle. We had fallen in a field admirably adapted to balloonists, at a perfectly safe distance from the city. If our barometers and cameras were broken we ourselves were unhurt. The hour was ten o'clock in the morning and a clouded grey sky gave no hint of all the glories above it. So ended our balloon voyage; it had been a continuously enthralling adventure lasting sixteen hours.

As we puffed homeward in the noisy, dirty, jolting train, my thoughts went back to our outward-bound journey through the sky, a journey in which we seemed to have been wafted to our unforeseen destination by enchantment rather than by the caprices of the winds. Throughout the voyage we had experienced the sensation of profound immersion and absorption in the beauty of earth and sky, as if the traveller and the world travelled in were together part of a single harmonious whole. It is this strange and rare experience which above all others gives an incomparable glamour to ballooning.

C. F. MEADE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

REPARATION, DEBTS AND THE CRISIS.

(I) THE PREVALENT DESPAIR.

TWO odd aspects of the concern manifested in the first half of January about the prospects of the Lausanne reparation conference caused some little merriment of spirit among those who still retained the faculty of seeing obvious things. The first oddity was that the payment of reparation and international political debt, which *ex hypothesi* was the source of the mischief, had totally ceased, yet few people seemed to appreciate the inevitable consequences of that fact. The second was that the politicians, in their combined effect internationally, were behaving, as they always have and no doubt always will, in such a manner that if salvation depended upon them, there could be no hope of salvation whatever, yet it was obvious that salvation did not depend upon them, nor could be prevented by them.

This matter of the world crisis alarms those people, and they are legion, whose memory is not vivid nor detailed enough to remind them of what they themselves felt in the last crisis they experienced. How many people can recall, with even slight realism, what they themselves were thinking in 1920 about the crisis then upon them? Even 1928 is almost forgotten by distinguished economists who are now writing at top speed about a crisis which derived from 1928, and whose very continuity with 1928 has not yet been broken. On nearly every side the present crisis (which the French deliciously call a "crise de confiance") is regarded as something unusual, abnormal, unprecedented, hopeless. In 1928 on nearly every side the boom then raging was regarded as an impregnable, never-ending blessing of our time. They who had no fear in 1928 have no hope in 1932. They have the faculty of being wrong every time : but they are a necessary part of the human machinery of ups and downs, booms and slumps, without which the gay spirit of adventure in the level-headed remainder would die from the lack of opportunity.

In January 1932 the spectacle presented to one who looked upon the world as a whole was that of an apparently inextricable mess. The "Wiggin" report of August last and the Basle report of December had as much effect upon diplomatic action as the bleating of a lamb might have upon a volcano. The Hoover moratorium of July 1931 was baulked of its full purpose by the French politicians, who did not understand that purpose. The projected Lausanne conference of January 1932 was crippled in advance by the United States politicians, who cold-shouldered it, therein dis-

playing the remarkable impartiality of men who at one moment become the pioneers of a good cause and immediately turn to wrecking it when they see a chance of its being fulfilled. Trade was stagnant, markets idle. The two victors of the Great War, France and the United States, insisted upon a future resumption of tribute from the two vanquished Powers, Germany and Great Britain, who could not pay, were not paying and obviously would not pay again. Japan was in occupation of Manchuria, not knowing what to do next. China, the titular sovereign of Manchuria, was, and had been for twenty years, without any sovereign government convincing enough to substantiate any titular claim whatsoever. No single budget in the world (except perhaps the Czechoslovak and the British) had the faintest chance of balancing in the immediate future. Every major currency in the world had abandoned gold as its yardstick except the German (where the yardstick was fictitious) on the one hand, and the American and the French on the other (where the amassed gold, the cause of the abandonment above referred to, was thereby rendered valueless except in the event of war). The incidental paradox was such that whereas Germany was in the position of a bankrupt debtor to Great Britain, the mark had to be bought at a heavy premium by the pound. A disarmament conference was due to meet on February 2nd at Geneva, at which no fewer than sixty-four nations, including all the great Powers, were to be represented, but at which nobody in his heart expected that much business would be done.

A gloomy as well as a mad world: but the world is normally mad, if only cyclically gloomy. The Great War lasted for four and a half years. Ten million men were killed, many times more were maimed. After it the nations (except Germany, who was not allowed to) armed to a greater extent than ever before, and are now spending between them the rollicking sum of £1,000 *a minute* on armaments, and at a time when none of them can balance their budgets.

What then was the basis on which, in January 1932, the optimists based their optimism? Not the mystic, spiritual optimists who believe in the divinity that shapes our ends no matter what wars and politics we pursue (albeit such mystics are eminently practical in this matter); but the business men and the financiers? An examination of their faith bears upon the work of the Lausanne and Geneva conferences.

(2) THE BASIS OF HOPE.

It is a case in which the "general practitioner" (as it were) is a better guide than the specialist. During the past three years

the experts, mainly economic and monetary, have produced an enormous dossier of work, largely tending to lecture the politicians and the diplomatists on their past shortcomings and on their future duty. The diplomatist often has no understanding of economics. The economist has often no understanding of pure finance. One can read through the five volumes issued periodically since September 1930 by the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations and not read a single authority enshrined therein who seems to have any suspicion of the part played by pure finance in the origin of the present crisis. Sir Henry Strakosch, for example, has contributed to it valuable essays on the gold standard and on the economic consequences of changes in the value of gold. His work for Geneva, it must be conceded, was based mostly upon an experience falling before 1928; but as if to show that it would not have made much difference if he had written in the light of his further experience, he more recently wrote a Memorandum entitled "The Crisis," published as a supplement to the *Economist* on January 9th, 1932, in which his great gifts of exposition in the economic and monetary field were again displayed, but in which he ignored the part played by pure finance in the matters of which he wrote. We have, in short, heard a vast amount, both from the detached economists and from the official economists investigating the crisis at Basle and elsewhere, about gold, price levels, commodities, debts, reparation, trade stagnation. The 1922-8 course of economic progress, based largely upon the prescriptions of the League of Nations, upon the League's material help to such lame pupils as Austria and Hungary, and upon the general adoption of the gold standard, is a familiar story.

Then began the new story, suddenly, in 1929. In the Memorandum above referred to Sir Henry Strakosch merely prefaces a masterly survey of the subsequent deflationary process by stating colourlessly that at the beginning of 1929 an "abnormal" movement set in, not attempting to explain why. What was the cause, and was it abnormal? Is it not the case that the stock market inflation of 1928, especially in New York, was quite normally followed by a process of deflation? One could quote the speeches of distinguished financiers, delivered before the end of 1928, in which such deflation was predicted. The raising of the British bank rate on February 7th, 1929, was clearly the beginning of the process. Once started, it led to economic difficulty on normal lines (for financial reactions normally precede economic reactions); but in this case, as Sir Henry shows with his admirable sureness of touch, the desperate factor was the effect upon the debtor countries. That obviously is the unprecedented factor in

the present crisis. Every crisis is unlike every former crisis in its particular manifestation, but, so far, every crisis has been alike in the general truth that collapse has brought its own remedy. In the present case the particular difficulty is the unpractical burden of international political debt, the absurdity of which is a matter of common recognition, and the full enormity of which the two Basle reports have established. What then is the solution produced (as normally) by itself? Surely it is the fact that at this moment no payment whatever is being made on account of those debts. Few realistic people imagine that such payment will ever be resumed.

The fact that the payment has stopped is bound to have its effects in loosening the deadlock. It probably matters as little in the present case as it mattered in former cases, what the politicians may do or not do. The politicians, by reason partly of their responsibility to ignorant, vulgar passions in their respective countries, seldom do constructive work: but many people, on the evidence of past experience, believe that the normal courses of financial and economic inflation and deflation fulfil themselves independently of political influences. What they therefore feel is that just as the raising of the British bank rate in February 1929 was the beginning of the deflation (although it took nearly a year to show itself), so the Hoover moratorium will be proved to have been the beginning of the inevitable opposite movement, though in its turn the effect did not at once show itself.

(3) GOLD AND THE DEBTS.

The enormity of the debt burden was illumined when the deflation began in 1929. Up till then the four chief countries playing the game of international political debt payments—the United States, France, Germany and Great Britain—had in some measure become entangled, and the course of the game was confused. The United States (one of the receiver Powers) had lent money to Germany (one of the tribute-paying Powers) to enable her to pay. On the eve of the present crisis she stopped lending money to Germany for that or for any other purpose. Thereupon Great Britain (who had also regularly lent money to Germany so that Germany could pay tribute to France) became the sole lender to Germany to provide for the continuance of those payments. It is one of the abiding qualities of the British character that defeat is unknown, because never recognised. In the present instance the essential situation was that the defeated Germany paid tribute to France and the defeated Great Britain paid tribute to the United States. So far was Great Britain from recognising the general

contour of things that in 1929, in addition to paying her own tribute to the United States, she started providing the sole means whereby Germany paid her tribute to France. In the new situation thus created a one-way stream of money passed from Great Britain to the United States, involving the sale of sterling and the buying of dollars. Hence the new gold flow to New York. In Europe sterling was being changed in large quantities into marks in the process of British lending to Germany, and marks were being changed into francs in the course of the resultant German payment to France. That involved a constant selling of sterling, a self-neutralising buying and selling of marks, and a constant buying of francs. Hence the gold flow to Paris. It was not in the least "abnormal." It was the normal, inevitable, predictable effect of a clear concatenation of forces, revolving round the central function of general dupe performed by Great Britain.

(4) THE EPITAPH OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DEBT PAYMENT.

Inasmuch as all payment of international political war debt ceased in July 1931 and is not likely to be resumed, except in a radically modified form, some historical interest attaches to the completed record of the actual cash payments transferred up to the time of the Hoover moratorium. For the purpose of comparison the figures given below are all reduced to sterling. For simplicity they are confined to the case of the four chief Powers which have participated as payers or as receivers in those transactions.

(a) *Germany*. Although the capital figures of the reparation liability imposed upon Germany by the successive treaty instruments since 1919 have little more than academic interest—the practical figures being those of the annuity payments actually made—yet they have considerable interest as showing the process of deflation through which the unpractical Allied politicians of 1919 have been driven by the hard facts. The capital liability contemplated by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 was the monstrous sum of £11,379,000,000. (The sum was not fixed, but is calculable from the 1921 figure. See below.) The imagination recoils before such a figure. If one calculates the number of minutes that have elapsed since the birth of Christ and multiplies that number by twelve, one gets roughly the number of pounds sterling that the Allied politicians of 1919 really thought they could make Germany pay. The still, small voices of the few sensible people then extant immediately pointed to the absurdity of any such expectation, with the result that within two years a drop of nearly 50 per cent. had taken place in Allied political

expectations. It had been left for the Reparation Commission to fix the definitive sum. On May 5th, 1921, that sum was fixed at £6,600,000,000, representing a 58 per cent. "remission" of the 1919 "claim." It was not surprising even in 1921 that the reduced sum immediately proved itself to be unpractical. The German Government duly paid the first instalment, on September 1st, 1921, whereafter the whole matter of subsequent payments became the subject of never-ending reparation conferences, culminating in the "Dawes" conference of 1924. The capital figure of German reparation having been proved an unprofitable exercise of arithmetic on the part of the Allied financial experts, no attempt was made in the Dawes Plan to fix a new capital sum. Instead, Germany was requested simply to pay a series of prescribed annuities. By comparing the size of the Dawes annuities with those of the annuities resulting from the 1921 "settlement" one arrives at the estimate that the Dawes Plan virtually reduced the German capital liability by two-thirds, that is, to some £2,200,000,000. The Dawes Plan was duly succeeded in its turn by the "New Plan" (the popularly called "Young Plan" of 1929, brought into operation in 1930). Again the capital sum of reparation liability was left undefined, but, assessed on the theoretic capital value of the new annuities, it came to a little less than the Dawes figure, say to £2,000,000,000. The four capital landmarks in the process of reparation deflation therefore were: 1919, £11,379,000,000; 1921, £6,600,000,000; 1924, £2,200,000,000; 1929; £2,000,000,000.

As for the more practical figures of the annuities prescribed, we find a corresponding deflation. In 1921 Germany was asked to pay £100,000,000 a year, and in addition an amount equal to 26 per cent. of the value of German exports. On the basis of German exports of 1921 the full annuity demanded was something between £150,000,000 and £162,500,000. By the Dawes Plan, it being by then recognised that such annuities could not be paid, it was laid down that Germany should pay a first series of four transitional annuities leading up to a payment of the full "standard" annuity in the fifth year. The figures were: 1924-5, £50,000,000; 1925-6, £61,000,000; 1926-7, £60,000,000; 1927-8, £87,000,000; 1928-9 (standard year), £125,000,000. Next the Young Plan substituted a long series of annuities ranging from 1929 to 1988, beginning with £82,000,000 in 1930-1 (I give the first full annuity period, the actual first period being a half-year from September 1929 to March 1930), rising in 1966 to £117,000,000, and ending in 1988 with £45,000,000. It was a projected sixty years' dream, destined to be broken after the first full year.

Still more illuminating, however, was the evolution of the method prescribed for German payment. It was the illusion

of 1919 that Germany could pay £11,379,000,000 out of her own money. That illusion was still operative on the smaller scale in 1921, when the annuities then fixed were demanded wholly out of German resources. By the time of the Dawes Plan the disillusion had gone nearly full circle, for it was therein decreed that most of the new annuities should be paid out of the proceeds of loans raised by the German Government abroad, the rest out of German internal resources, namely out of the profits of the German railways. The Young Plan revealed the fact that by 1929 the disillusion had gone more than full circle, for it was therein provided that the annuities should be paid wholly out of the proceeds of foreign loans, and in addition it was arranged that Germany should be given a further loan for her own internal use.

The sum of the matter is that up to the time of the Hoover moratorium Germany had paid an aggregate total of £646,100,000 in reparation. That is the figure of the Reparation Commission. The German Government claims to have paid £2,800,000,000, but there has been wide controversy about the arithmetic. That government accepts for such purposes as may be served thereby the figure arrived at by the American Institute of Economics, which is £1,900,000,000, but which in its turn is rejected by British official opinion and is three times larger than the figure of the Reparation Commission.

(b) *Great Britain.* The position of Great Britain has been that of both creditor and debtor in the post-war debt transactions. Exact full figures are hard to establish for one's own satisfaction, harder to prove. The following cardinal figures, however, may be taken as reliable. The United States loans to the United Kingdom, funded as at December 15th, 1922 (including interest to that date), amounted to £958,330,000 (\$4,600,000,000, the exchange being taken at \$4.8 to the £). That was the debt incurred by Great Britain after the entry of the United States into the war. In the same period, that is from March 31st, 1917, the United Kingdom lent to her European allies, including accrued and unpaid interest to December 31st, 1922, the sum of £936,255,000. The capital position, therefore, in inter-Allied post-1917 debts, is that Britain borrowed nearly £1,000,000,000 from the United States, and lent nearly £1,000,000,000 to Europe. The total repayment made by Great Britain to the United States on account of the capital debt, up to the time of the Hoover moratorium, amounted to £326,200,000. The total repayment received by Great Britain for her European debtors (on account of all the European debts to her) up to the time of the Hoover moratorium amounted to £71,300,000. (The two last figures were

given by Mr. Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons on November 19th, 1931, but he gave the second figure wrongly as £71,275,000.) They reveal a net loss to Great Britain on inter-Allied post-1917 transactions of £254,900,000. In the matter of reparation Great Britain received from Germany up to the time of the Hoover moratorium a total sum of £121,000,000, and an additional £200,000 from non-German reparation. The net loss to Great Britain is £133,700,000. Moreover, the above figures refer only to the actual transfer of cash on account of funded debts. They leave out of account the vast amount of unfunded debt, many times greater than the funded debt, which remains as a dead loss for ever, and which will have to be paid for eternally by British taxpayers.

(c) *France.* The total sum received by France from German reparation up to the time of the Hoover moratorium was £273,600,000 and from non-German reparation £700,000. The total payment she made to the United States and Great Britain together on account of inter-Allied debt up to the same time was £111,000,000. The balance in her favour therefore is £163,300,000.

(d) *The United States.* The United States has received up to the time of the Hoover moratorium a total amount of £451,100,000 from Great Britain, France, Germany, etc., on account of her war credits. Of that total £326,200,000 has been paid by Great Britain, and £40,833,000 by France, £16,700,000 by Germany and £67,367,000 by other European debtors.

(e) *The salient figures.* It therefore emerges that, so far as actual transfers of cash have taken place since the war on account of reparation and debts, the United States on balance has received £451,100,000, and France £163,300,000. Great Britain on balance has paid £133,700,000, and Germany £646,000,000. It must be remembered, however, that although those figures fairly represent the real position as it has affected the United States, France and Germany, the position of Great Britain is not fairly represented thereby because in her case there remains the large amount of unfunded debt. An impressive statement was made on that subject by Sir Walter Layton at a public dinner on January 13th. He said (*Times* report, January 14th): "If all the reparations and debts were wiped out there was some £1,600,000,000 of our national debt still remaining on this country in respect of money which was raised here and loaned to the Allies, and [on which] we had got to go on paying interest until one of these days the bonds were repaid out of the taxes of this country. The internal debt remained. Germany would be left with only £500,000,000 of internal debt. That was £8 a head. France would be left with approximately £2,300,000,000 of debt, which was £56 a head;

Great Britain would be left with £6,600,000,000 of internal debt, £150 a head; and the United States with an internal debt of £3,200,000,000 or £27 a head."

The Lausanne Conference has a chance of closing what Signor Mussolini described as "the tragic ledger of the war."

(5) THE UNITED STATES AND LAUSANNE.

Up to the middle of December 1931 little evidence came from the United States of what the official attitude would be to the impending reparation conference. Mr. Hoover was clearly involved in the sort of personal crisis that assailed Mr. MacDonald last August. He had made a bold throw last June, which had been defeated of its major purpose by the lack of a strong British Government and by the obstruction of France. He had since been subjected by M. Laval to a virtual imposition of silence and inaction, M. Laval's visit to Washington and the depressing official statement recording its result taking place (October 25th) just before the British election altered the British factor in international affairs (see *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, December 1931, pp. 780-2). No doubt the ignorance of what that election was to produce contributed to Mr. Hoover's passivity. True, he made admirable speeches, calculated to coach his countrymen into a proper frame of mind for far-sighted American action in the international field, and gave full play, in that context, to the domestic argument: 6,000,000 unemployed, stagnant business and a prospective budget deficit of at least \$2,000,000,000. So far, however, as action was concerned, the United States, with apparently deliberate intention, kept in the background. On November 18th, Mr. Stimson in a public statement said: ". . . we are not in any way participating in the European negotiations." Mr. Hoover himself adopted a somewhat negative tone in his messages to Congress some three weeks later. In his first (December 8th) he made this reference to foreign affairs: "In many countries political instability, excessive armaments, debts, Governmental expenditures, and taxes have resulted in revolutions, in unbalanced budgets and monetary collapse and financial panics; in the dumping of goods upon world markets and in diminished consumption of commodities. . . . As our difficulties in the past year have plainly originated in a large degree from these sources, any effort to bring about our own recuperation has dictated the necessity of co-operation by us with other nations in a reasonable effort to restore world confidence and economic stability."

He therein adopted a somewhat defensive tone in his reference

to the part played by the Government in the moratorium against political debts then operative, and the part played by the American banks in the also operative *Stillhalte* arrangement with Germany in the matter of private debts. It was obvious from those sentences that Mr. Hoover aspired to do something sensible, but did not feel strong enough to press his countrymen. His third message (December 10th) was specifically devoted to the foreign field. In it he reviewed the course of events since he proposed the moratorium in June, dwelt on the advisability of the moratorium being ratified before December 15th (when the next half-yearly payments would fall due) and gave a lead, somewhat half-hearted as before, but substantially sound, in these sentences. "As we approach the New Year it is clear that a number of Governments indebted to us will be unable to meet further payments to us in full, pending recovery in their economic life. It is useless to blind ourselves to an obvious fact. Therefore, it will be necessary in some cases to make still further temporary adjustments." He therefore recommended "the re-creation of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, with authority to examine such problems as may arise in connection with these debts during the present economic emergency, and to report to Congress its conclusions and recommendations." In urging the prompt ratification of the war debts moratorium he submitted this wholesome doctrine: "I am suggesting to the American people that they be wise creditors in their own interest and be good neighbours." But as if to show that he himself hardly faced the logic of his own doctrine he immediately incorporated in his Message this curious passage: "I do not approve, even in any remote sense, of the cancellation of debts to the United States. World confidence would not be enhanced by any such action. Reparations are a wholly European problem with which we have no relations. As the basis of the settlement of debts due to the United States was the capacity of the debtor to pay, we should be consistent with our own policies if we take into account the abnormal situation now existing in the world . . . while this action has no bearing on the land armaments conference in February, we trust that by this evidence of our desire to assist we shall have contributed to the goodwill which is so necessary for a solution of this major problem."

As if to emphasise the faulty connection between his own doctrine and his own policy, Mr. Hoover at the very time when he was delivering his Message to Congress received an official intimation from the French Government that in its view there could be no remission of German reparation debt without a corresponding remission of other war debts.

The three thousand miles of ocean that separate the United

States from Europe have a symbolic as well as a physical value. It explains why Mr. John Garner, of Texas, Democrat, who had been elected Speaker of the House of Representatives in the seventy-second session of Congress, which began on December 7th, could say what he did say from the Chair on December 10th. Referring to Mr. Hoover's plea for a ratification of the moratorium before December 15th he protested that ratification could not take place by that date because "we certainly will not pass on such an important piece of legislation before we have some information on it."

That event, the fact that on December 10th, 1931, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives could plead lack of information about a state of affairs throughout the world which had induced the President of his own country six months before to propose a general moratorium against debt payments, is the very type of political ineptitude that makes of politics from one end of the world to the other an abiding barrier to commerce and ordered progress. Moreover, it was the Hoover proposal that led to the London Seven-Power Conference of July; it was that conference that led to the appointment by the Bank for International Settlements of a committee of Central Bank representatives, chairmaned by Mr. Wiggin, a citizen of the United States. That committee issued its report as long ago as last August. Its report contained a grave warning to the governments of the world about the disastrous effect upon "peaceful economic progress" of the prevalent system of international political debts, which involved the transfer of large sums from debtor to creditor countries, while at the same time those creditor countries were putting obstacles in the way of the free movement of goods. The "Wiggin" Committee—for by that American name the committee was known—issued its report four months before Mr. Garner from the Chair of the House of Representatives protested his lack of information.

On December 11th the Congress opposition to Mr. Hoover's proposal for the re-creation of the War Debts Commission, with its implied purpose of further adjustment in war debt payments, was vigorously championed by Senator Borah. That opposition, however, on that same day (December 11th) led to a salutary declaration from Mr. Mellon, who showed himself to be well aware of the essential facts of the situation. "It is the duty," he said, "of those in authority to deal with realities, and there is no escaping the fact that some of our debtors cannot meet in full the payments due to us until there has been a substantial measure of economic recovery. . . . Take the case of Great Britain, our best customer, which even in the depression year

of 1930 took \$678 million worth of American agricultural and industrial products. The economic and financial changes of the past year have immensely increased the burden of her payments to us. . . . All debts to Great Britain from foreign governments, except reparation payments—which are not being collected at all this year and are not likely to be collected in full next year—are payable in sterling, but her debt to us is payable in gold dollars . . . with the pound at par the British Treasury needs £32,800,000 in order to pay us \$159,500,000. With sterling at the rate at which it was sold on December 10th it would take £48,100,000, or an increase of £15,300,000, or 47 per cent. In other words, the burden on the British tax-payers would be increased by almost half. When the British settlement was made, it was estimated at its present value at $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. interest, and was 80 per cent. of the total amount due prior to the funding. If the amount to be raised in pounds sterling to meet obligations to the United States in dollars is increased by 47 per cent. it becomes apparent that from the standpoint of the British tax-payer he is asked to meet, not the obligation as established by our Debt Commission, but an amount considerably in excess of such obligation.”

The Republicans launched a campaign in Congress in support of the President's proposal. It was, however, a foregone conclusion that the moratorium could not be ratified before December 15th, and it therefore became necessary for the United States Treasury (December 12th) to announce that the foreign governments concerned would be informed that their failure to pay the debt instalments due on December 15th would not be regarded as “irregular.”

The Bill to ratify the Hoover moratorium was duly passed by the House of Representatives on December 18th, the majority being 317 votes to 100. It was passed, however, with an amendment that had been adopted by the Ways and Means Committee of the House the day before. That amendment destroyed all chance of the Lausanne conference attempting any serious solution of the full debt problem, for it placed on record the refusal of the United States to entertain any proposal for the reduction of debts owed to herself. “It is hereby expressly declared” (so ran the reservation) “to be against the policy of Congress that any indebtedness by foreign countries to the United States should be in any manner cancelled or reduced, and nothing in this joint resolution for ratification of the Hoover moratorium shall be construed as indicating a contrary policy or an implication to give favourable consideration at any time to a change in the policy hereby declared.” On December 22nd the Senate in its turn ratified the moratorium by 69 votes to 12, modified as it was by

the reservation of the House. The moratorium was signed on December 23rd, and Congress adjourned till January 4th. When it reassembled a story circulated in the corridors of the Capitol that Mr. Hoover had recently said to a visitor: "The last ten days have been the blackest in my memory." The story may not be literally true, but it is truly descriptive of the actual case. Mr. Hoover has made two conspicuously good gestures in his term of office. The first was his invitation to Mr. MacDonald to visit him at his camp on the headwaters of the Rapidan, in Virginia (October 1929), to discuss naval disarmament. The second was his debts proposal of June 1931. Both gestures were well timed, and on any principle of fair reward for good work should have led to lasting good for his generation. But it appears that the eternal muddle of the political field is too great to allow any individual enterprise, no matter how skilfully or resolutely carried out, to achieve its purpose. Mr. Wilson's attempt to help in cleaning up the European chaos after the war was thwarted by the muddled reactions of his own Congress; and now that the European chaos is proved to be also America's chaos, Mr. Hoover is thwarted in his turn by that same Congress. It is little wonder that after December 23rd last his public statements had so pianissimo a ring that they are hardly worth quoting.

(6) THE BASLE REPORT.

The Young Plan Advisory Committee, appointed by the Bank for International Settlements in response to the German application (see *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, January 1932, pp. 112 *et seq.*), did its work with a dispatch which contrasted sharply with the dilatory practices of the various governments. Its members were experts, not politicians. They met for the first time on December 7th at Basle, held their first full session on December 8th, worked in continuous session till December 23rd, and published their report before Christmas.

Their report, it is true, was calculated merely to force an open door. Everybody knew by heart enough of the relevant facts about Germany and about the general situation in the world to stand in need of no further conviction or enlightenment, but the technique of the Young Plan had to be carried out. Moreover, the politicians of the world were again thereby reminded of a duty which they had been told was urgent by the Wiggin Committee of last August: a warning which they had duly proceeded to ignore, after their manner. The first sentence of the Basle report resumed a weary tale: "The circumstances in which we have been called together are so well known that no lengthy recapitulation of events

is necessary." The committee proceeded, however, to recapitulate those events in a terse, preliminary chapter in which every word burnt itself into the reader's mind with an overwhelming effect of urgency. It gave shortly the main facts, alarmingly grave, about Germany's foreign debt, her trade balance, balance of payments, the position of the Reichsbank, of production and employment, the budget, the German railways. Chapter two traced the development of the present crisis in the case of Germany, chapter three outlined the special measures taken by Germany to meet that crisis (the culminating emergency decree of December 8th, 1931, being described as a measure "without parallel in modern legislation"), and chapter four stated that committee's "conclusions." Five annexes supplied the detailed documentary evidence upon which the preceding chapters were based. Chapter four was compressed within the compass of a thousand words. It began by stating simply that Germany could not transfer the conditional part of the annuity in the year following the present moratorium. It drew "the attention of the governments to the unprecedented gravity of the crisis." (It might as profitably have drawn the attention of the said governments to the sun, the moon and the stars.) It referred to the "growing financial paralysis of the world." It allowed itself one short digression, thus: "The Committee appointed by the Bank for International Settlements, on the invitation of the London Conference, after describing this situation in its Report of August 18th, 1931, sounded a most emphatic note of warning, urging that if disasters were to be avoided before the period of postponement of credits recommended by that Conference expires on February 29th, 1932, immediate steps must be taken by the governments. But events did not wait. . . . Unemployment has increased; stock exchanges remain closed, economic activity continues with difficulty at a very low ebb in the face of restricted credit, rigid control of the exchanges and paralysing restrictions on international trade. Slowly the effects of shrinking economic activity are making themselves felt in one country after another."

The practical recommendation to action by the governments was contained in the five short "considerations" submitted at the end of the chapter: "The first is that transfers from one country to another on a scale so large as to upset the balance of payments can only accentuate the present chaos. It should also be borne in mind that the release of a debtor country from a burden of payments which it is unable to bear may merely have the effect of transferring that burden to a creditor country which, in its character as a debtor, it, in its turn, may be unable to bear. Again, the adjustment of all inter-governmental debts (reparations and other war debts) to the existing troubled situation of the

world—and this adjustment should take place without delay if new disasters are to be avoided—is the only lasting step capable of re-establishing confidence, which is the very condition of economic stability and real peace. Finally, although the German Government is energetically defending the stability of its currency, steps are necessary to secure that these measures shall have a permanent effect. The European Governments during recent years have made great efforts towards re-establishing the stability of currencies after the disasters of the war and post-war inflation. The destruction of this work would mean an extremely disquieting setback, which would be heavy with consequences. The maintenance of the stability of the German currency, as of the currency of any debtor nation, may be placed in the greatest peril if the confidence of investors is lost.”

The remarkable part of those considerations was the linking of reparation with other war debts, and the fact that although the terms of the committee's reference precluded the giving of any advice about the unconditional annuities of the Young Plan, the committee did contrive by ingenious drafting to convey that neither the unconditional nor the conditional annuities could be paid after next July. The final sentence of the chapter could have been accurately anticipated in advance by any private schoolboy: “We appeal (it ran) to the governments on whom the responsibility for action rests to permit of no delay in coming to decisions which will bring an amelioration of this grave crisis which weighs so heavily on all alike.”

(7) ITS EFFECT UPON THE GOVERNMENTS.

Now what was the effect of that appeal upon the governments of the chief Powers concerned? The report was issued before Christmas. By the time these lines were written (January 15th), that is, after a lapse of more than three weeks, the British, French, German, Italian, Czechoslovak, Belgian, Polish, Greek, Portuguese, Roumanian and Yugoslav Governments had done three things: (1) they had agreed that Lausanne should be the place of the conference (agreement reached January 2nd); (2) they had agreed that the conference should meet on January 25th (agreement reached January 12th); (3) they had been forced to the conclusion that in view of the French Ministerial crisis which developed in the evening of January 12th, it was doubtful if, after all, the conference could meet on January 25th.

Let it be conceded that the above-recorded achievement was not the fault of the British Government. On Christmas Eve Mr. MacDonald stated that the conference ought to meet “without a day's unnecessary delay,” that the British Government was ready

to meet "at once," and he was reported to have driven home his point by the exclamation: "For God's sake let us meet at once." It was the British Government that took the initiative (December 30th) in circularising the other ten governments with a proposal that Lausanne and January 18th should be the place and the date of the conference. Nine of those governments within twenty-four hours accepted the proposal, but the tenth government (the French) accepted it "provisionally" (the qualification being grounded upon the possibility that the exigencies of parliamentary convenience in Paris might make it impossible for a French delegation to go to Lausanne by January 18th). A ministerial crisis began to develop in Paris of such a dimension that on January 9th the British Government proposed that the date of the conference be postponed till the 25th. The proposal was unanimously accepted. In the evening of January 12th, however, M. Laval and his Cabinet resigned, one of the incidental consequences thereof being that, as this paper was written, it could not be forecast with confidence when exactly the conference would meet.

In spite, however, of the apparent inaction of the governments, political forces were at work below the surface. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, of the British Treasury, paid a further visit to Paris to discuss with officials of the French Treasury the possibility of a convergence of French and British views upon the business in hand. It was felt in Whitehall that the resolution of the United States Congress above referred to made impossible the full, final and comprehensive settlement that Mr. MacDonald had publicly advocated on November 9th last. "No time," he had said, "has to be lost. A series of piecemeal and ephemeral compromises of a purely temporary nature will not meet the circumstances. A comprehensive and permanent settlement is now required." A modification of that policy being now imposed by the action of the United States, it was understood that the British Government was concentrating on the possibility of keeping open the avenue to a full settlement for exploration as soon as American opinion gave the opportunity. On January 9th some excitement was caused by a public statement made by Dr. Brüning to the effect that Germany could not pay reparation, and would demand at Lausanne a realistic, final settlement on that basis. The fact that excitement could be caused by the statement of a fact already known to everybody seems to suggest that depression does not make the world grow older.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

January 15th, 1932.

LITERARY DEPARTMENT.

LIST OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I. REVIEWS	
GLADSTONE AS FINANCIER AND ECONOMIST; THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY; LATE MEDIÆVAL LONDON ENGLISH; THE STORMSWEEP ROOF OF ASIA; RURAL BRITAIN BY NIGHT; DISARMAMENT; THE ENGLISH MARRIAGE SYSTEM.	253
2. SHORTER REVIEWS: " Bayle the Sceptic "; " The Man in the Making and Studies in Literature "; " World Peace and Armaments "	268
3. NOTICES OF BOOKS: " The Grey Squirrel "; " Theories of Population from Raleigh to Arthur Young "; " The Economic History of England (1760-1860) "; " A Survey of English Literature "; " How to See Well "; " Binding Crafts "; " The Exhibition of French Art "	270

GLADSTONE AS FINANCIER AND ECONOMIST.*

During the last year or two the fame of Gladstone has been rapidly recovering from the temporary obscurity caused by the cult of his dazzling rival. The official biography of Disraeli and the clever sketch by André Maurois brought him once again into vogue, and it became the fashion to dismiss Gladstone as *vieux jeu*. The tide has now turned, thanks to Lord Gladstone's *Thirty Years After*, Mrs. Drew's diaries, and the delightful recollections of Lord Rendel and Lord Kilbracken. Mr. Hirst's impressive monograph will carry the process of rehabilitation still further. Our problems to-day are naturally more complex and therefore more difficult than those of the Victorian age, but there is still much to be learned from our greatest master of finance. No one can speak with such authority on the subject as Mr. Hirst, who helped Lord Morley in the preparation of the famous biography, and who has given unremitting study for over thirty years to the subject on which he writes. His book is intended for the public as well as for the economist and the historian, and it may be truly described as a tract for the times.

The author has used the vast material now available in the

* *Gladstone as Financier and Economist*. By F. W. Hirst. Benn.

British Museum and a good deal of fresh evidence from private sources. The sketch of Sir John Gladstone in the first chapter is a valuable addition to our knowledge, and the Personal Recollections of his father by his only surviving son are full of interesting glimpses. The early chapters are dominated by the majestic figure of Peel, whom Mr. Hirst admires almost as much as his hero used to do. "If we take four names—Adam Smith, Cobden, Peel and Gladstone—we may say that they formed (with a host of valuable auxiliaries) a combination of originality, courage and character, more powerful in the sphere of public economy and finance than any great nation has ever possessed. It is to this unique combination that England mainly owed her emergence from misery, poverty, stagnation and discontent to social progress, rapid industrial expansion and widespread prosperity." The whole volume breathes the conviction that more can be done by good and bad finance to foster or to damage the national welfare than in any other way. After the great simplifications of the tariff in Peel's ministry we are introduced to the Railway Act of 1844 and Gladstone's colonial policy. Far from being hostile or indifferent to our mighty heritage, "Gladstone gloried in the greatness and prosperity of a free empire, or rather of a free Commonwealth of Nations."

The chapters on the budgets of the 'fifties and 'sixties reveal a unique combination of sound principles and hard work. Gladstone was not only the greatest Member of Parliament in our history but also the greatest worker among all our servants of the State, for he worked quicker than anyone of whom we have record. His supremacy among Chancellors of the Exchequer, declares Mr. Hirst, is as undisputed as that of Adam Smith among economists. While the world applauded the Budget speeches with their bold schemes and their compelling eloquence, only colleagues and subordinates were aware of his unsleeping vigilance as the guardian of the national purse. "His net swept over the whole field. Nothing was too trifling to escape criticism, nothing so great in the way of wasteful expenditure, whatever the influences behind it, to blunt his axe or to daunt his courage." Well may our author lament the absence of such driving force, such piercing vision, such lofty sense of responsibility in the latest tangled decades of our history. Mr. Hirst cares less than most people for what is called social reform, and sometimes appears to think rather of the price than of the value of the article. But such differences of opinion in no way diminish the cogency of his plea for economy at home and the maximum of liberty in our commercial intercourse with the nations of the world.

G. P. G.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY.*

Sociological and historical explanation has long been dominated by concepts and methods borrowed from biology. The notions of evolution, of the struggle for existence and natural selection, have frequently been applied to the relations between social groups, such as nations or races, on the assumption that the forces which account for the phenomena observable in the life of plants and animals will be found to operate also in human life and history. Thus the culture and institutions of peoples are interpreted as the expression of inborn, racial qualities, and the differences between them are ascribed to hereditary variations in their endowment or capacity. Again, since the inborn qualities of a stock are relatively permanent, any changes that occur in the history of a people are attributed to the sporadic occurrence of specially endowed individuals or geniuses, who are then regarded as "mutations" in the biological sense. Biological interpretations of progress are also involved in the whole movement of Eugenics, since, as commonly interpreted, it rests on the assumption that progress depends on the alteration or improvement of racial type rather than on the modification of institutions. Despite the importance which is thus widely assigned to biological factors, the assumptions underlying their use in sociology have rarely been subjected to systematic treatment or critical scrutiny. This is the task that Mr. Spiller has set himself, and in performing it, he has made an important contribution to social theory. While accepting and building upon the general theory of evolution, he seeks to show that the earlier evolutionists were too eager to bring out the similarities between man and his animal ancestors, and were thus led to overlook the equally important divergences between them. There is one fundamental difference between them which is of such far-reaching importance as to justify us in regarding man as constituting a separate kingdom in the world of life. This, Mr. Spiller urges, is to be found in man's capacity to learn freely from others. So far, students of comparative psychology remain doubtful whether even the animals nearest to man in intelligence—the higher apes—are capable of learning "by imitation." It is clear that even if they should be proved to possess this faculty at all, they can only do so to a very limited degree. Man, on the other hand, is capable of extending his own powers indefinitely by utilising the experience of others. Animals, as Mr. Spiller puts it, are individuo-psychic while man is specio-psychic, his achievement being the result of cumulative and collective effort throughout the ages. While animals, moreover, cannot hand over to their

* *The Origin and Nature of Man.* By G. Spiller. Williams & Norgate.

descendants any of the results of their own experience, and can only transmit their own qualities through the mechanism of biological inheritance, man can affect future generations by what may be called the social heritage, the body of tools, instruments, institutions, art and science, which constitutes human culture. The gap between man and the rest of the animal world is thus very great. Yet this does not involve any real breach of continuity in evolution. For the intelligence of the higher apes is so highly advanced, as recent psychology has shown, that only a moderate mental advance beyond them, sufficient namely to enable the individual to learn freely from the experience of others, needs to be assumed, in order to render intelligible the evolution of human intelligence.

Social theory must start, Mr. Spiller urges, from this fundamental difference between man and other animals. The explanation of human culture must be sought in those elements of human nature which are specific of, or peculiar to, man, and not in those which he possesses in common with the rest of the animal world. Any appeal to sub-human instincts, after the fashion of much recent social psychology, must of necessity fail. Culture must be explained in terms of culture. Above all, we cannot account for the variations in cultural level or for the general trends of social evolution in terms of inborn biological differences or variations. Cultural change is orderly and cumulative, while mutations are sporadic and haphazard. The rate of changes in civilisation, sometimes very rapid and sometimes very slow, is not in harmony with what is known of the rate of biological change. The gigantic transformations that can be effected in the social life and organisation of peoples, in a comparatively short period, and the rate at which peoples of very different levels of culture can be made to approximate to a common standard, suggest very strongly that the factors determining social change are independent of the factors determining racial change or alteration in germinal structure. Mr. Spiller goes so far as to say that all mental differences are primarily explicable on a non-biological basis by reference to cultural causes. He does not, of course, deny all originality to individuals, since it is clear that the advantage of learning freely from others would be nil if no individual were ever capable of contributing anything fresh. His point is rather that what the individual—even the genius—contributes is comparatively slight in comparison with the prodigious rôle played by cumulative and co-operative effort. Possibly Mr. Spiller goes too far in minimising inborn differences. But in the main, his argument does not really depend upon a denial of hereditary variations but rather upon their complete failure to account for cultural variations. Cultural development is

thus different in character from organic development and marks a new and critical departure in the evolution of animate nature.

On the basis of his general theory Mr. Spiller formulates in the second part of his work, what he conceives to be the principal laws of human development, and he shows their compatibility with the requirements of a humanitarian ethics. He is a great believer in the possibility of progress by the increasing substitution of rational for arbitrary methods of social control and guidance. Many will doubt whether sociology is yet in the position to lay down strictly scientific "laws" of social evolution and may be inclined to regard Mr. Spiller's conclusions as too optimistic. But all must be impressed by the ability and learning with which he has worked out his main thesis and will recognise its value as a contribution to modern sociology.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

* * *

LATE MEDIEVAL LONDON ENGLISH.*

Professor R. W. Chambers and Miss Marjorie Daunt have edited in the most thorough and exhaustive way, with explanatory footnotes, seventy-five documents of "London" English written between the years 1384 and 1425. Miss Daunt gives in addition elaborate "Notes" on the texts and an invaluable glossary, while Miss M. M. Weale supplies a very useful descriptive list of English manuscripts in the Public Record Office of London representing the bulk of the documents in that repository written in English up to the end of the year 1425. It is not proposed substantially here to try and extend the list of specimens of "London" English between these dates, but it may be that the Coroners' Rolls may add to the information as to the plain talk of London people a century after Chaucer's death, while it is tempting to suggest that the English writings of Walter Hilton as transcribed at Sheen in the period might yield some other valuable examples.

Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt have undertaken a necessary task, a fresh step in the direction of what was recognised as standard English in the later Middle Ages. They say indeed that "what is wanted is a collection of all the official documents in the English tongue, from the time of the Conqueror to that of Henry VI. Such a *corpus* would not be excessively bulky; the present editors have been making some collections towards it." It is indeed remarkable, as these learned editors say, that "for the period immediately after Chaucer, no attempt has yet been

* *A Book of London English, 1384-1425.* Edited by R. W. Chambers and Marjorie Daunt, with an Appendix on English Documents in the Record Office by M. M. Weale. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press.

made to collect and publish the documents upon which all grammatical theorising must be based. Not only have the documents not been collected: many have never been printed at all." They are indeed curiously scanty when it is realised that in the time of Chaucer and Langland "we find plentiful documents written in English by Londoners." As a consequence the editors rejoice in printing for the first time "the appeal of Thomas Usk against John of Northampton"—an interesting footnote to history as indeed is most of the material used in this book—which was undoubtedly written by an inner Londoner in the year 1384. The sparsity of material is shown by the work of Lorenz Morsbach, who has endeavoured to construct a grammar of London English during this period from fourteen documents only. The present editors give sixty-one documents not used by him. Full tribute is, however, paid, and it is due, for Morsbach's pioneer work at the Record Office. Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt have gone also to other sources and especially the Guildhall, the Books of the Brewers and Grocers, and Somerset House.

The problem before the editors and indeed before all workers on London English is to find out what was genuine London speech. Some cynical critics may even say that there was no specifically London speech, but Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt have no doubt at all on that matter. They admit that what they call provincialisms may and do in fact in various cases creep in, but that London speech in fact existed as a separate dialect (if it is not too dangerous to use that term) in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century. Yet one of the difficulties that strike the non-specialist mind must be, what is the meaning of the term "London." London itself in the late fourteenth century was a very restricted area. It must not be confused with Kent across the river, though there was a time, as Ptolemy makes clear, when London belonged to Kent. Yet the Kentish dialects—for there were several—were not only clearly distinct from the speech spoken in London but in some cases, as near to London as Tonbridge, a dialect was spoken—and indeed is spoken now—that was and is difficult to understand. The settlement of the Court at Greenwich and Eltham no doubt extended the London dialect a few miles south of the river, but it was Court speech and not the speech of the common people.

Again Essex must be ruled out. The hissing "s" of Essex was not part of the London dialect. Is Middlesex included in "London"? How far up the River Thames was the dialect spoken? Some way, no doubt, since the Londoners using the upper river were far more numerous than those who habitually used the lower river. These indeed included seamen from all

the English and many continental ports who may be ruled out as contributing to the London speech though they doubtless added many words to that dialect. The upper river is another matter and it may well be that "London" included the upper reaches as far as Richmond and Sheen or even Oxford. That is the importance of the English versions of Walter Hilton's contemporary work.

We seem thrown back, for one important aspect of London speech in the period of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, to one or possibly two sources which these editors have not touched and possibly nobody can touch—the speech of the schoolboy and the law student. The *Epistolæ Academicæ Oxon.* contain some English letters and they may relate to London, but they begin with the year 1421 and go on to 1509. Wiclif's *Wicket* is contemporaneous, but it is not likely that it reproduces the London dialect though that famous tract against transubstantiation made very popular reading. But the name of Wiclif raises the question of school-children. The point is this. Up to the Black Death of 1349 all teaching in the grammar schools was in Anglo-Norman. John de Trevisa, Wiclif and Richard Pencriche were at Oxford together about 1367, Pencriche being a Merton man, and John Cornwall was a teacher of grammar at Oxford in connection with Merton College in 1347. Trevisa was destined to translate and edit Higden's *Polychronicon* between 1385 and 1387, and in that work he says that after the First Death in 1349 children who had been formerly taught in Anglo-Norman were thenceforward taught in English. Trevisa says:

This manere was moche i-used to for firste deth [*or to fore the firste moreyn*], and is siththe sumdel i-chaunged: for John [Sir Johan] Cornwaile, a maister of grammer, chaunged the lore in gramer scole and construccioun of Frensche in to Englische; and Richard Penecriche lerned the manere techynge of hym and of othere men of Pencrich; so that now, the yere of oure Lorde, a thowsand three hundred and fourscore and fyve, and of the Secounde Richard after the Conquest nyne, in alle the gramere scoles of Engelond, children leuth Frensche and construeth and lerneth an Englische, and haueth therby auantage on oon side and disauantage in another side; their auantage is, that they lerneth her gramer in lasse tyme than children were i-woned to doo; disauantage is that now children of gramer scole conneth na more Frensche than can her lift heele, and that is harme for them and they schulle passe the see and trauaille in straunge landes and in many other places. Also gentil men haueth now moche i-left for to teche here children Frensche.

These passages from Trevisa are exactly within the period of time (1384-1425) chosen by Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt and the tongue is the Oxford tongue which, on the argument of river

access, may well have been, at any rate, closely allied to the London tongue. But the point is the value of the evidence of the schools themselves. The Staffordshire Penkridge school seems to have been the first grammar school to start teaching in English. It was even then a considerable and very ancient school. Moreover, after the Black Death, as Mr. A. F. Leach points out, at least twenty-five grammar schools were founded between 1363 and 1400. In 1393 the only London schools officially recognised were St. Paul's School, the School of the Arches and St. Martin's School, but we must take also into account Westminster School and the School of St. Saviour's, Southwark. Now the petition to the Crown of 1393 signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of London, the Dean of the Free Chapel of St. Martin the Grand and the Chancellor of the Church of St. Paul's, London, on the subject of these schools comes midway within the period chosen by Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt. It is reported in 3 *Rot. Parl.*, p. 324, and throws some light upon London English as well as the educational system of London. The Parliamentary records apparently have not been drawn upon by either Lorenz Morsbach or the present editors. The records of the schools mentioned ought to throw further light upon London English, since by the year 1385 Anglo-Norman had been abolished in the schools. The Inns of Court presumably will not help, since Anglo-Norman was the tongue spoken there for at least two centuries after 1425. The petition addressed to Henry VI in 1447 by the Rectors of All Hallows, St. Andrew's, Holborn, St. Peter's, Cornhill, and Colchirche on the subject of grammar schools is twenty-two years beyond 1425, but it, in fact, is an excellent example of London English of the period (5 *Rot. Parl.* 137). The text is printed on pp. 48-9 of *State Intervention in English Education*, an early effort by the present writer published in 1902 by the Cambridge University Press. The petition seems to have the exact prose phrasing of the London period 1384-1425. Further information might be obtained from certain Latin-English vocabularies of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These comments are in no way a criticism of the able book edited by Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt, but are an attempt to throw new light, in a humble way, on a very difficult problem. J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

THE STORMSWEPT ROOF OF ASIA.*

There is a great charm in this book of travel and adventure written by Dr. Emil Trinkler and translated from the German by

* *The Stormswept Roof of Asia*. By Emil Trinkler. Seeley, Service & Co.

B. K. Featherstone, a record of travel "By Yak, Camel, and Sheep Caravan in Tibet, Chinese Turkestan, and over the Kara-Koram." An unknown land sparsely inhabited has a fascination for the searcher after some new thing: a world unspoiled by civilisation, almost raw, one might say, except for the accretion of ages, and here and there clothed with the vegetation which the kindly winds had blown from other quarters.

The author started from Antwerp in April 1927 and for a year and a half he and his friend Signor de Terra journeyed in these little-known lands. Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, was the starting-point of the expedition; there they met their travelling companion Herr Bosshard who had gone ahead of them into Kashmir, making preliminary arrangements since February. Here they engaged their chief servants. Everything had to be thought of, provisions, clothes, and equipment of all kinds, scientific and photographic, and lastly the packing, no mean consideration of time and trouble. They hired pack-ponies and porters whose pay was fortunately fixed by the Indian Government. The cook, Habiba, and the boy, Abdul, proved most efficient throughout the journey. The little dog Kurrum must not be forgotten. The travellers left Srinagar on May 22nd taking with them another boy, a young Ladakhi who spoke fluent English. Each pony could be loaded up to 140 lbs. weight; thirty ponies were enlisted and thus the journey began. The country through which the travellers passed was magnificent, along the banks of the Sind river, and the aromatic air of the pines, reminiscent of Alpine scenes, rejoiced their hearts to the full, since they knew that after crossing the Zoji La trees and woods would be left behind for many a day.

Arriving at Baltal on May 27th they found deep snow on the first high pass, and the crossing was accomplished with difficulty, as the sides were almost perpendicular, sloping down to a deep ravine opening into the main valley. From Srinagar to Leh the Government has inaugurated a regular postal service which is maintained by runners. On arrival at Mechoi late at night, and finding the caravans with all baggage were still behind, they passed the night as best they could in a primitive hut with the snow falling heavily outside. The morning light revealed the great Himalayan peaks standing out against the vivid blue sky. As the snow melted the mountain-side was carpeted in parts with the blue gentian and many coloured primulas.

Dr. Trinkler gives a wonderful description of the Himalaya mountains, so vividly told that one seems easily to make acquaintance with that region and with the famous monasteries built on most precipitous heights. All through the journey scientific investigations were being carried on, and notes taken of the rocks

and strata, all of which helped to tell the tale of the dream-land through which they were travelling. The Rest-houses from Srinagar to Leh number fifteen, and for a trifling sum shelter and sometimes food can be obtained. The author throughout this book, as he travels from place to place, country to country, intersperses his narrative with accounts of the customs and the religious ceremonies of the peoples with whom he came in contact, dancing, and devil dancing since the eviction of evil spirits is generally part of the ritual, and, in fact, all ritual is symbolic. The religious use of colour is significant. An instance is painting horses *red* which indicates sinbearing, and sending them forth loose. This is, in essence, similar to the scapegoat of the Hebrews. The comparative study of primitive religions is advanced by such facts.

The earlier expedition of Sir Aurel Stein often helped the travellers. Dr. Trinkler continually came across some landmark of his forerunner, and never fails to note the fact or to use his maps. To follow our author and the various members of his expedition through Chinese Turkestan, over the Kara-Koram, and back to civilisation through India must be left to the fascinated reader. The mountains climbed, the passes crossed, the deserts traversed, the thirst suffered, the heat and cold endured, and all the adventures and "most disastrous chances" conquered and made light of, are written for all to read in this book of wonder travel.

S. DE M.

* * *

RURAL BRITAIN BY NIGHT.*

Mr. A. R. Thompson is to be congratulated on his book, *Nature by Night*, in which he deals with the wild nocturnal creatures of the British Isles. Our woods and hedges, the banks and streams, all teem with life; with creatures desperately busy carrying out their part in nature's scheme of work. Some of them work by day, some by night, and others at any time during the twenty-four hours. There are many day naturalists, and Mr. Thompson considers that there might be more night workers. "It is at least as interesting, and when a man spends his day in earning his living, a tendency to specialise in the wild life of the hours of darkness enables him to preserve continuity in his observations." Mr. Thompson himself is an entomologist, but he is always ready to observe other forms of life if he has the good luck to discover them, and, in fact, he illustrates this charming work by over one hundred photographs from his own camera.

To obtain intimate knowledge of wild creatures from watching

them in their haunts is intensely interesting work, apart from its obvious value to naturalists. It is work involving endless patience for limbs as well as mind, but the sight, perhaps, of a badger and her cubs at play will more than repay the hours of tiring waiting. Nature is full of odd ways; there are so many happenings which seem the contrary of common sense and logic. Why do rabbits live in the same earth as badgers, though perhaps not using the same chambers? A rabbit fleeing from a stoat is in a state of hopeless terror; but "a female rabbit, with young to defend, will turn on a stoat and leap over it, giving it in passing, a thwack with its powerful hind-legs"; and the stoat generally leaves at once. A buck rabbit with a kick from its hind-legs can really hurt a tom cat; "but that same buck rabbit would probably succumb to the first stoat which got on to its trail."

Mr. Thompson's fascinating accounts and photographs of the lives and habits of the badgers, the fox, the otter, the stoat, the rodents, the hedgehog, and the night-birds, to mention only some of his subjects, make the reader anxious to go and look for them himself at once. We all know that life, busy as our own, is abundant everywhere, but we seldom really realise it until the naturalist has pointed it out. Country people particularly would be expected to be animal lovers, they certainly must have more general knowledge of wild creatures than townspeople; yet they can always persuade themselves that the hunted as well as the hunters enjoy the run.

It is interesting to find that

human beings were not the inventors of anæsthetics. Glow-worms had an anæsthetic perfected and in use ages before. The favourite food of the glow-worm is a certain species of small snail, and to obtain a meal, the glow-worm approaches a suitable snail and very gently taps it with its mandibles which are grooved and bent backwards into a minute hook. . . . The whole process is so insignificant that it is hard to believe it can have any effect upon the snail. Yet in a minute or two it renders the mollusc unconscious and entirely insensible to pain. . . . Death may be administered in the feeding process, but there is no doubt that the snail is only rendered unconscious in the first instance. Fabre shows that it is quite insensible to the prick of a needle, but that in a day or two, it can be revived into an active snail apparently none the worse for its adventure.

This is an instance of the amazing processes that we find in the detailed examination of nature even in our familiar woods. Mr. Thompson's book has many examples of strange or apparently strange behaviour of the creatures he examines. Why do insects

find "light so irresistible"? It has been suggested that they are afraid of shadows, as indeed Man himself is. Why does the corncrake, a notable night-bird, never fly on British land? It has to fly great distances to reach us. Perhaps it does not fly in the nesting season. The shrew, like the bat, has so shrill a note that some people cannot hear it. Differences of note are doubtless a form of protection. Bats are curious creatures which belong to an order of their own, the sole survivor of some prehistoric development which failed. They are useful, as are hedgehogs, moles and shrews, as insect destroyers. Much of what Mr. Thompson writes makes the reader aware of the perfect balance of nature, even from the point of view of Man, though the habits of foxes and the danger of rats seem to show that Man in his destructive habits is a necessary part of the natural scheme.

* * *

DISARMAMENT.*

As the World Disarmament Conference draws nearer, attention becomes more and more focussed upon the League of Nations. After years of work, the Preparatory Commission has issued a skeleton report on the ways and means of disarmament; and it will be for the full Conference to decide the extent of any limitations on the manufacture of arms. The measure of its success will be determined largely by the character of public support. It is, therefore, especially valuable that an anthology of representative opinions on the need for peace and disarmament should be published at the present time. *From World Understanding to World Peace* is the title of this collection secured by Madame Hélène Claparède-Spir. She has collected the opinions of public men and women in Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the United States. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that Japanese and Russian opinions have been omitted, as well as some of the smaller non-European States. In the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations the lesser Powers collectively maintain a majority of votes.

In the Preface to this volume, Professor Gilbert Murray remarks that "all Europe is speaking peace, and apparently longing for peace; yet it is full of armaments and economic strife, and, from time to time, outbursts of national passion." He declares that this "longing for peace" is perfectly sincere, but that there is a

* (1) *From World Understanding to World Peace*. Williams & Norgate.

(2) *The Geneva Experiment*. Oxford University Press.

terrible lack of connection between the desire of the world and the means of realising it.

The old creaking machinery of national Parliaments, national elections, national newspapers, still remains in force everywhere, and the widespread sentiment which enters the machine as a desire for peace and goodwill too often comes out at the other end as a demand for national security by means of armaments or for prosperity by wrecking a neighbour's trade.

It is the clash between nationalism and the international spirit. "The civilised world is really one society" and needs the direction of one government. This diagnosis is substantially followed by Professor W. E. Rappard in *The Geneva Experiment*. "National sovereignty inevitably leads to international war, and thereby to universal suicide." The danger of war is in proportion to the lack of sovereignty in the League of Nations. In a critical analysis Professor Rappard first considers the League from the viewpoint of its founders. They compromised between the ideal of the super-state and the recognition of national sovereignty. "Their main quest was for peace, but they consciously repudiated the logically necessary means for the achievement of that purpose, that is, the subordination of national independence to the collective will of the international community." Moreover (as Professor Rappard admits), the subsequent history of the League shows that the idea of internationalism has become more and more subordinated to the reality of the national state. Though national opinion has become more international in its outlook, it does not follow that the days of the national state are numbered. Sympathy and consideration do not necessarily involve the cession of sovereignty. The great mass of people still prefer the rule of national governments. Hence the League of Nations has not been accepted as an international sovereign. "When we look over this whole field of the League's activity we may . . . note the contrast between its success as a promoter of voluntary co-operation between the nations and its impotence in presence of defiant national sovereignties." The recent policy of Japan is exemplary of this position. Professor Rappard says, "The fundamental fact is that peace cannot be guaranteed to and against sovereign states by an unsovereign league. Only if the League were endowed with that kind of sovereignty to which all states, and particularly the great Powers, still pretend to-day could it enforce peace." This is no doubt true, but it does not follow that League sovereignty is the only guarantee of peace. Moreover, it is fortunate that this is so, because what Professor Gilbert Murray calls "the main remediable fault in the world at present" has certainly no remedy in practical politics at

the present time. National feeling is too strong and deep rooted to tolerate the direct forfeiture of any sovereign power.

Yet international sympathy and co-operation, promoted through the League, along with the growing recognition that nations are dependent upon each other for their own prosperity, will lead necessarily to renunciation of war as an instrument of policy. When the victor suffers in the same degree as the vanquished, the right to make war can hardly be considered a function of sovereignty. Conversely submission to the rules of international law hardly implies any resignation of sovereignty. It defines and segregates competing sovereign powers. An adverse judgment in a Court of Law does far less damage to a sovereign authority than the waging of a successful war. Expediency has become the stoutest economic argument against war.

This growing recognition of the interdependence of nations and hence the futility of war will gradually promote greater international confidence. Then will come the time when the longing for disarmament will become compatible with national defence. Then, perhaps, the League of Nations will emerge from a standing conference and become the centre of a World Federation. In the words of Professor Rappard, "as yet a useful but humble clearing house of international relations," the League will "become what the impatient reformer seeks for in vain in Geneva to-day : a temple of lasting peace built on the foundations of secure justice." On the other hand mutual appreciation and understanding between nations may obviate the need for any super-imposed authority. A world alliance of the nature of the British Commonwealth of Nations will be as great a security for peace as any other system of world federation.

* * *

THE ENGLISH MARRIAGE SYSTEM.*

This book on the formalities of marriage was first published in 1920 but much vital legislation has been passed since that date, and a reissue of a most valuable volume is the necessary result. The author, Mr. Arthur S. May, is the Surrogate of Ecclesiastical Courts in Doctors' Commons and has vast experience not only of the Law of Marriage, but of the ignorance of those who aspire to the state of Holy Matrimony. In 1920 he came to the sad and almost embittered conclusion "that many people know as little about getting married as Londoners do of the inside of Westminster Abbey, and that someone ought to make an attempt to give them the necessary information." So Mr. May undertook the dreary task.

* *Marriage in Church, Chapel and Register Office: A Practical Handbook.* Longmans.

The English law as regards age, mental and physical capacity, condition and relationship and the consent of the parties has first to be considered since "these constitute the essentials of a valid marriage," while the formalities of marriage, such as the consent of parent or guardian and the rules relating to residence, place, time and manner of the ceremony are important, since the marriage is sometimes invalidated by non-observance. All the details of the Common and Statute Law are given. At Common Law the age of consent was fourteen for the man and twelve for the woman. This rule has now been altered by the Age of Marriage Act, 1929, which enacts that *for the future* marriages between persons either of whom is under the age of sixteen shall be void. The judges of the High Court who go on circuit are not all satisfied with the change of the Law, and Mr. Justice McCardie at the Leeds Assizes last spring expressed the view that power should be given to magistrates to allow marriage in a proper case before the age of sixteen. The Old Common Law, in fact, met actual cases.

It is well to state other changes in the Law since 1920 as described by Mr. May. By Lord Hardwicke's Act of 1753 the father's consent to the marriage of a minor became necessary. This simple rule has been revolutionised by the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925. The infant who aspires to matrimony is now in a difficult position. If both parents are living together both parents must consent; if they are divorced or separated the parent having the custody must consent, and both parents if each has the custody of the infant for part of the year. If one parent has been deserted by the other the parent who has been deserted must consent. If both parents have been deprived of the custody then the person to whom the custody has been given by the Court must consent. If one parent is dead and there is no other guardian then the surviving parent must consent, but if a guardian has been appointed by the deceased parent then the consent is required of the surviving parent and the guardian if acting jointly, or the surviving parent or the guardian if the parent or the guardian is the sole guardian of the infant. When both parents are dead the guardian or guardians appointed by the deceased parents or by the Court must consent. These difficulties have not yet been appreciated by the writers of melodrama, and in the circumstances of the various possibilities it would be as well for minors not to marry at all. In the case of an illegitimate child the mother must consent if she is alive, unless she has been deprived of the custody of the child, when her place is taken by the person to whom the custody has been given by the Court. If the mother is dead then the guardian appointed by her must consent. In all necessary cases there is a latitude allowed to the superintendent registrar.

Recent legislation has created other changes. For instance, the Adoption of Children Act, 1926, vests the rights of the actual parents in the adopter or adopters while the Legitimacy Act of the same year involves change by the change of status of the infant. The statutory permission to marry a deceased wife's sister given in 1907 has been extended to a deceased husband's brother by an Act of 1921, and to the deceased wife's niece and aunt and the deceased husband's nephew and uncle by an Act of 1931. The Act of 1931 does not apply to Northern Ireland. Important questions under the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, in accordance with Orders in Council of 1913 and 1925 are also dealt with in the Appendix. The Marriage Measure, 1930, gives some facilities to members of the Church of England. Certain variations in the Church of England Marriage Service are now allowed. An important change in regard to marriage under a superintendent registrar's licence came into force by Regulations on December 31st, 1926. "It is no longer possible to qualify for marriage in a particular district by one of the parties going there for a day." The details of this change should be carefully examined. It is to be noted that banns cannot be lawfully published by diocesan lay readers. An opinion by Sir Alfred Kempe, given in 1918 and 1920, seems to be conclusive on this very much disputed point.

In his Appendix, Mr. May raises a question of the first importance :

If dossiers on continental lines were kept at Somerset House, and extracts from them were required upon every application for marriage, the crime of bigamy, which now bulks largely in our courts, would almost vanish. There were only eight convictions in France in 1921. Also, incidentally, the parental veto would become a real obstacle to hasty marriage.

The reform suggested is a perfectly simple one and would stop untold misery. It is astounding that it has not been adopted before, and it should be brought forward in Parliament without any more delay.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Of the need of a book on Pierre Bayle there can be no doubt : of the adequacy with which Professor Robinson has supplied this need* there can be just as little doubt. The appendices on the writings of this seminal thinker, the related works appearing in his lifetime, the pointed criticisms before 1789 and those after that well-chosen date—all these are given with a fullness of the *apparatus criticus* that leaves nothing to be desired. This is always the first part of a volume

* *Bayle the Sceptic*. By Howard Robinson. Columbia University Press.

to which we turn, as it serves at once to exhibit the fitness or the unfitness of the author for the task he has taken in hand. The author reveals not only the thinker but also the man, a character of high quality and singular attractiveness. For the sake of his views he underwent the bitter pains of exile, at the same time reflecting that "the comforts of a benefice or the dignity of a mitre" in Paris were not to be compared with the "private state of exile, indigence, and freedom" in Rotterdam. A highly suggestive chapter examines the attitude of Bayle towards the movement for toleration, and the share taken by Locke in this matter is related to that of the author Professor Robinson admires. Like so many advocates of toleration, Bayle himself became the victim of intolerance, and a pathetic chapter traces his sufferings, which of course were as much mental as physical. The *Historical and Critical Dictionary* receives careful attention, and the real nature of an epoch-making work is ably set forth. Yet it was the loss of his professorial post that rendered it possible. His treatment of the Bible in general and of the problem of the miraculous demands the careful survey that Professor Robinson accords. The Church to-day can see in him, as it also sees in Voltaire, men who really befriended her, for they assisted her in getting rid of the many impurities that disfigured her throughout the eighteenth century. The work that Joseph Butler and John Wesley accomplished in England they accomplished in France, though inevitably in a far rougher manner. We too can say, *Écrasez l'infâme*, and by *l'infâme* we mean much that Bayle was forced to denounce. This book concludes with an illuminating account of the influence of Bayle which takes full view of the activities of a many-sided man.

* * *

The interesting little book entitled *The Man in the Making and Studies in Literature** by Mr. F. G. Phillips, of the Sydney Grammar School (who is also president of the New South Wales Teachers' Guild), consists of articles and literary appreciations written for the *Australian Teacher*, the organ of the Guild. Mr. H. S. Dettman, headmaster of the Sydney Grammar School, writes in his Foreword that "this book is a pleasing proof that a man may teach boys for his daily bread over a period of thirty years and still retain his freshness, enthusiasms, his curiosity, his judgment and, in every sense of the word, his humanity." The studies in literature are full of interest. Mr. Phillips suggests that in Keat's famous poem *La Belle Dame Sans Merci* La Belle Dame represents consumption—tuberculosis—the malady that ended the great poet's brief life. This ingenious surmise is contrary to the poet's own statement. The essays on the poetry of Mary Webb, Francis Thompson and Mr. Masfield lend a modern note to the volume.

* * *

World Peace and Armaments† by Mr. A. J. Jacobs is an interesting exposition of the author's views on international peace and of his contention that a policy of mutual protection between the various nations can be the only basis of future stability. He considers the principles by which individuals secure order and safety among them-

* Sydney and Melbourne Publishing Company Ltd.

† Hutchinson.

selves. Members of a community cannot stand aside and allow individual disputes to be violently decided and crime to remain unchecked; "the inevitable result would be anarchy and the total disappearance of civilisation." The maintenance of peace and justice is only attained by the participation of the whole community in the condemnation of disorder. But "the practice of nations has been entirely at variance with the principle of mutual protection to which individuals owe the security of life and property which they enjoy." Mr. Jacobs logically condemns the doctrine of national neutrality. "Any nation has been allowed to attack another without hindrance from the general body. They have recognised no responsibility for each other's safety because, among other reasons, an outbreak of war has not seriously affected non-belligerent nations in the past." It is, indeed, true that the nations are to-day more inter-dependent than ever before. The present economic crisis is clearly evidence of this. But if a nation cannot remain neutral to-day, which way will it act? Co-operation with one country will mean enmity with another. In its desire to do what is right, a nation may well work for disruption. International co-operation demands impartial supervision. While Mr. Jacobs' proposition that mutual protection is the great modern need is sound, it must presuppose some guiding hand, just as in a community of individuals order receives the direction of a government. Necessity may force the nations closer together, but permanent peace demands the authority of some international tribunal.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

"The Grey Squirrel; the introduction and spread of the American Grey Squirrel in the British Isles, its habits, food, and relations with the native fauna of the country,"* by Mr. A. D. Middleton is intended to give an unprejudiced account of this squirrel to naturalists, foresters, agriculturists, and others. The grey squirrel was introduced into this country early in the last century and increased in numbers and range until the end of 1930, when an amazing decrease in numbers owing to various causes set in. This, however, was of short duration, for in August 1931 "ample evidence has been obtained to show that the grey squirrel population is rapidly recovering . . . and there now appears to be little doubt grey squirrels will continue to increase in numbers and extend their range into suitable localities throughout the British Isles." The sudden decrease is mysterious but not unexampled. Apparently cycles of increase and decrease are not unusual in the animal kingdom. The introduction of this squirrel has resulted in a menace to agriculture, to our forests and fruit-farms. Mr. Middleton has written a valuable and extremely interesting book on a subject upon which he is a leading authority and it should be very widely read.

* * *

Dr. James Bonar in his valuable volume entitled "Theories of Population from Raleigh to Arthur Young"† deals with Raleigh,

* Sidgwick and Jackson.

† George Allen & Unwin.

Harrington, Graunt and Petty, Halley, Güssmilch, Hume, Price and Arthur Young (who died in 1820), thus covering the various theories of population that occupied the minds of thinkers for more than two centuries. Sir Walter Raleigh was not surprised to find that neither Spain nor England was depopulated either by wars or colonies. Raleigh left most things to nature provided there was a strong government which gave nature the chance to recuperate. In that sense there were the germs of a sound political economy. Harrington lived in stirring times when strong men like Cromwell appeared and he held that there should be a balance of property in land, and leadership coupled with an electoral system of married people with children. So Dr. Bonar goes through the list of thinkers English and continental. Montesquieu and Güssmilch thought that "population needed direct encouragement." Price believed that the repeal of the Corn Laws would double the people. Young hated theory and stood against the theories of Richard Price.

* * *

Mr. Arthur Redford's book entitled "The Economic History of England (1760-1860)"* is a very useful treatise for beginners and indeed for all who wish to revise a very difficult subject. Mr. Redford writes in his preface: "In seventy thousand words I have tried to tell the plain truth about the most controversial century in the economic history of England; and in doing this I have tried to avoid controversy." The work is, in the main outlines, based on modern authoritative writings, but the author has also gone to original sources in compiling this able account of the Growth of Industrialism from 1760 to 1815 and the Age of Reforms 1815-60. He very properly repudiates the idea that in 1760 a vital change was first apparent. In fact it was a year when the process of change was apparent to all.

* * *

Mr. Ernest Pickering in his work entitled "A Brief Survey of English Literature from its Beginnings to the Present Day, with chapters on the Irish Literary Movement and American Literature"† gives the student a notable little book of real critical value which has the special merit of drawing the reader to the English classical texts of the great writers. He rightly asserts at the opening of his work that apart from the ancient literatures of Greece and Rome "English literature is the oldest, and probably the richest, literature in the Western world." Mr. Pickering has a singularly well-stored mind and his book is the fruit of a period when, being a Professor of English in Japan, his mind turned to English literature as England's "greatest contribution both to her own children and to the world." The work is not intended to compete with Professor Saintsbury's famous book but it is a worthy introduction to it with much original thought and it includes some account and estimate of twentieth-century authors.

* Longmans.

† George G. Harrap and Company Ltd.

Miss Alice Pearson in her interesting little book "How to See Well" * divides it into three parts. The first deals with bad habits of seeing and provides exercises showing how to help and preserve the eyesight. Part II is on mental strain and its various causes, and, by means of selections of poems, and meditations from Browning, Wilberforce and other writers, shows the reader how to regain the peace of mind so indispensable to bodily health. The third part urges the necessity of a reformed vegetarian diet, an ideal that few book-readers will adopt. They will plead that their teeth are intended for some use of non-vegetarian food.

* * *

An interesting example of the type of books that are being prepared for the new junior secondary schools is Mr. F. Davenport's volume entitled "Binding Crafts for the Senior School" † a continuation of his earlier work for junior schools. The exercises "form part of a graduated scheme which ends in the making and binding of books." They lead up to a famous and definite craft and the work may be done in the ordinary class-room. Handicraft, indeed, has a great place in education and stands beside the art of drawing. Mr. A. F. Collins, the Inspector of Handicraft and Science in the City of Birmingham, who writes a foreword to Mr. Davenport's book, says very rightly that there is no need to-day "to justify the inclusion in the curriculum of this type of work, for its value as an educational instrument is now admitted on all sides." There is indeed, as he says, still a wide field for experiment and further development and Mr. Davenport's volume is a step in advance.

* * *

Attention should be drawn to the publication of the catalogue entitled "Exhibition of French Art 1200-1900" ‡ to the famous Exhibition which is open at the Royal Academy till March 5th. The work is much more than a mere catalogue. It gives the history of each work of art, a description of the work and a list of the literary writings dealing with it. The catalogue contains also a list of the lectures which are being given on French Art at the British Academy, the Victoria and Albert Museum and University College, Gower Street. The last includes a lecture on February 8th by Dr. Tancred Borenius on "The Artistic Relations between France and England through the Ages." The catalogue includes also a delightful Introduction in French by M. Paul Léon and in English—on French Art and England—by Mr. W. G. Constable, the general editor of the catalogue. The preparation of this wonderful compilation has fallen mostly on the shoulders of Mr. Trenchard Cox.

* James Clarke and Co., 9, Essex Street, W.C.2.

† Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Ltd.

‡ Royal Academy of Arts, London.